The first entry: "Zhenya died on December 28, 1941 at 12:30 am" Sister Zhenya worked at an arms plant, where she had to walk battling the harsh winter elements. She became the first victim of the family, due to high physical demands and a lack of nutrition. Less then a month later, a new entry appeared in the diary: "Grandma died on January 25, 1942 at 3 pm" Then, Tanya's grandma, Evdokia Arsenieva "Leka died on March 17, 1942, at 5 am" Next, Leonid Savichev (1917-1942) "Uncle Vasya died on April 13, 1942 at 2 am" Finally Tanya writes about the death of Uncle Lesha, and her mother Maria. Lesha died on May 10, and her mom 3 days later. In the entry Tanya skips the word "died": "Mama on May 13, 1942, at 7:30 am" Last entries: "Savichev family died" "Everyone died" "Only Tanya is left" Soon Tanya was evacuated with other kids. In August 1942, the train with kids arrived in village Shatki. The girl ended up in an orphanage, #48. But she was the only one among the new kids with tuberculosis. Tanya died on July 1, 1944 at 14 years. Commentary: Maria Zakharova, Director,
|
Victory Day, Moscow, May 9, 1945. |
Volume 4 deals with the liberation of the Soviet territory in 1944 and describes the Red Army operations to push back the Germans.
Volume 5 provides details of the "victorious finale" of the war including the decisive battles of the Red Army in Europe and the war against Japan in the Far East.
Volume 6 details the "secret war, intelligence and counter-espionage during the Great Patriotic War. The volume narrates a story about the efforts undertaken by foreign, military and counter intelligence to achieve victory."
Volume 7 examines the Soviet economy and armaments. "It provides the description of the economic base of the USSR at the time of the war and offers descriptions and characteristics of the weapons systems in the inventory of the Red Army."
Volume 8 deals with the foreign police of the Soviet Union and diplomacy during the war.
Volume 9 is devoted to the policies of the Allies in the Second World War including the United States and Great Britain and others and devotes attention to the operations of their armed forces.
Volume 10 examines "power, society, and war. It tells about the role of the government and society in the war effort."
Volume 11 discusses the "policy and strategy behind the victory and how the strategic command of the armed forces was exercised in extreme conditions."
Volume 12 sums up the war and "provides ideas on what
lessons Russia
and its military should learn from the Great Patriotic War."
Rubtsov writes: "The new edition offers hundreds of the
documents that
have been found during the recent twenty years in the archive of
President of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political
History
(RGASPI), the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence and
other
national and foreign archives. The material used is unique. It provides
a clue
to understanding the genuine reasons and the goals of the criminal war
unleashed by Germany against the Soviet Union. It dispels the myths
about the
"preventive war" Germany had to start. The documents prove that the
goals
pursued by the Soviet Union in the war against the fascist alliance met
vital
interests of its peoples, as well as the peoples of other countries. It
testifies to
the fact that the USSR pursued a just cause by fighting for
independence,
territorial integrity and its very right to exist."
The author emphasizes: "The statistics adduced in the treatise show that the Great Patriotic War was the main event of the Second World War. The Soviet Union bore the brunt of the effort to rout Nazi Germany and its European allies. The work offers an insight into the interaction with the anti-Hitler coalition allies, and the role of economic and military aid provided according to the Lend-Lease. It shows that it was the people's war. The treatise sheds light on the role of the [Communist] Party and government organs, public organizations and the church in mobilization efforts. It explores the subject of where the resources and willpower to fight the aggressor came from and how subversive activities were conducted in the enemy's rear. It provides a clue to understanding how high was the price of war, what immense human and material losses the country suffered."
Celebrating the liberation of Yugoslavia. |
According to Rubtsov, the authors of the 12-volume study "provide substantiated replies to controversial questions. Could the Second World War and the aggression of Germany against the Soviet Union have been avoided? What caused the defeats suffered by the Red Army in 1941 and why the war inflicted such great losses? Why did some Russians collaborate with the enemy? Is there a reason for painting as an aggressive force the army that liberated (fully or partly) 11 European and two Asian countries?" He points out that the answers to these questions are relevant to today.
The authors of this massive study of the Great Patriotic War "vividly react to the attempts of falsifiers to do away with the very notion of Great Patriotic War. They offer to use the definition "Soviet-German" or "Nazi-Soviet" instead and make the Soviet Union and the Third Reich equally responsible for unleashing the war. Some try to paint the soldier-liberator as an occupant and rapist. The authors of the treatise have reviewed all available information about the Second World War. Solid facts have been separated from inventions, the previous mistakes and oversights have been rectified."
Rubtsov concludes his article by pointing out that one
of the features that
stands out in this historic study is that it is linked to the future.
"The authors
directly and unambiguously try to learn lessons of practical use for
Russia and
the build-up of its armed forces in the 21st century. It's up to
readers to decide
how successful they are. Hopefully the new treatise on the history of
Russia's
1941-1945 Great Patriotic War published on the eve of the 70th
anniversary
of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union has come into the world to
start an
independent, long and fruitful life."
The West continues to disavow the USSR's momentous contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and her satellites. But there is documentary proof that can refute any speculation on this subject. Suffice it to point to the economic price of the victory won by the people of the Soviet Union.
The war caused an astronomical level of financial damages to the USSR. On Nov. 2, 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree establishing the Extraordinary State Commission for Identifying and Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders and Their Accomplices, and the Damage Inflicted by Them on the Citizens, Collective Farms, Social Organizations, State Enterprises, and Institutions of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.
Soldiers celebrate decisive victory in the Great Patriotic War at Stalingrad. |
After the war, that Commission published the following statistics: the German-Fascist invaders and their accomplices razed 1,710 towns and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets, depriving approximately 25 million people of shelter. They destroyed about 32,000 factories, 84,000 schools and other educational institutions, and demolished and looted 98,000 collective farms.[1] In addition, they destroyed 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 communications facilities, 6,000 hospitals, 33,000 outpatient clinics, treatment centers, and infirmaries, 82,000 primary and secondary schools, 1,520 specialized high schools, 334 institutions of higher education, 43,000 libraries, 427 museums, and 167 theaters. In the agricultural sector, 7 million horses, 17 million head of cattle, and tens of millions of pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry were appropriated or killed. The country's transportation infrastructure endured the wreckage of 65,000 kilometers of rail lines and 13,000 railway bridges, and in addition 15,800 steam- and gasoline-powered locomotives, 428,000 rail cars, and 1,400 ships were destroyed, severely damaged, or stolen.
German firms such as Friedrich Krupp AG, Reichswerke Hermann Göring, Siemens-Schuckert, and IG Farbenindustrie pillaged the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.
The material damages inflicted on the Soviet Union by the Nazi invaders were equal to approximately 30% of the country's national wealth, and that number rose to 67% in the areas under occupation. The Extraordinary State Commission's report was presented at the Nuremberg trials in 1946. A summary of the direct material losses is given in the following table.
Type of loss | Quantitative estimates of the losses caused by destruction, damage, and theft |
Core
manufacturing
assets |
|
Metal-cutting equipment (each) |
175,000 |
Sledgehammers and presses (each) |
34,000 |
Coal cutters (each) |
2,700 |
Jackhammers (each) |
15,000 |
Electrical plants (kW of power) |
5 million |
Blast furnaces (each) |
62 |
Open-hearth furnaces (each) |
213 |
Textile machines (each) |
45,000 |
Spindles for spinning (each) |
3 million |
Agricultural resources | |
Horses (per head) |
7 million |
Cattle (per head) |
17 million |
Pigs (per head) |
20 million |
Goats and sheep (per head) |
27 million |
Tractors (individual units) |
137,000 |
Combines (each) |
49,000 |
Tractor-mounted seed drills (each) |
46,000 |
Threshing machines (each) |
35,000 |
Livestock buildings (each) |
285,000 |
Planted croplands (in hectares) |
505,000 |
Vineyards (in hectares) |
153,000 |
Transportation and communications | |
Rail lines (in kilometers) |
65,000 |
Locomotives (each) |
15,800 |
Rail cars (each) |
428,000 |
Railway bridges (each) |
13,000 |
River vessels (each) |
8,300 |
Telegraph and telephone lines (in kilometers) |
2,078 |
Housing |
|
Urban housing (individual buildings) |
1,209 |
Rural housing (individual buildings) |
3.5 million |
These numbers do not reflect all the damages incurred. They show only the losses resulting from the direct destruction of property owned by Soviet citizens, collective farms, social organizations, and state enterprises and institutions. This total does not include losses such as the financial costs to the national government due to the partial or complete suspension of the work of state-owned companies, collective farms, and private citizens, nor the cost of the products and supplies confiscated by the German occupation forces, the military expenses incurred by the USSR, or the financial losses that ensued from the stagnation in the country's overall economic development as a result of enemy operations between 1941 and 1945. Data is provided below on these additional economic damages.
Type of product
|
Amount of loss*
|
1. Coal |
307 million tons |
2. Electricity |
72 billion kWh |
3. Steel |
38 million tons |
4. Aluminum |
136,000 tons |
5. Metal-cutting equipment |
90,000 units |
6. Sugar |
63 million centners |
7. Grain |
11 billion poods |
8. Potatoes |
1.922 million centners |
9. Meat |
68 million centners |
10. Milk |
567. million centners |
Even before the end of the Second World War, it was clear that the Soviet Union was bearing the brunt of its economic burden. After the war, various calculations and estimates were made, which only served as confirmation of that obvious fact. The West German economist Bernhard Endrucks conducted a comparative assessment of state spending for military purposes over the duration of the war by the primary belligerents. The French economist A. Claude produced comparative estimates of the direct economic losses (destruction and theft of property) suffered by the primary belligerents. We have summarized these estimates in the following table.
|
State military spending* |
Direct economic damages** |
Total economic loss**** |
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) = (1) + (2) |
USSR |
357 |
128 |
485 |
Germany |
272 |
48 |
320 |
Great Britain |
120*** |
6.8 |
126.8 |
France |
15 |
21.5 |
36.5 |
USA |
275 |
- |
275 |
Italy |
94 |
- |
94 |
Japan |
56 |
- |
56 |
Poland |
- |
20 |
20 |
Total |
1,189 |
224.3 |
1,413.3 |
Exactly 30% of all the state military spending by the seven primary belligerents during the Second World War can be attributed to the USSR. The combined state spending by the allies (USSR, USA, Great Britain, and France) on military objectives amounted to $767 billion. The USSR financed 46.5% of all the military expenses borne by the four allied powers.
Of the total direct economic damages suffered by the five belligerents, 56% can be attributed to the USSR. It should be noted that the direct economic damages inflicted on the Soviet Union were 2.7 times higher than similar damages endured by Germany. This should be no surprise -- the Third Reich imposed a scorched-earth policy in the East.
The USSR bore the burden of 53% of all the military expenditures and direct economic damages to the four victorious countries (USSR, USA, Great Britain, and France). Stalin was exactly right when he suggested at the Yalta Conference that half of all the German reparations should be paid to the Soviet Union.
The USSR suffered 50% higher aggregate economic losses than Germany. The Soviet Union paid the highest price of any of the belligerents during World War II.
1. The data cited in this article was taken from the book by Nikolai Voznesensky. Voennaya Ekonomika SSSR v Period Otechestvennoi Voiny. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1948). The author, Nikolai Alekseevich Voznesensky (1903-1950), served as the chairman of the Soviet Union's Gosplan Committee from 1938 to 1949.
(Strategic Culture Foundation, May 6, 2015. Slightly edited for grammar by TML.)
Of all the harm inflicted on all the Allied countries (the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France) during the Second World War, approximately half occurred in the USSR.
At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin suggested that Germany pay a total of $20 billion in reparations, anticipating that half of that sum ($10 billion) would go to the Soviet Union -- the country that had made the greatest contribution to the victory and endured more than any of the other nations in the anti-Hitler coalition. With some conditions, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed to Josef Stalin's suggestion. Ten billion dollars is approximately what the US spent on aid to the Soviet Union under the lend-lease program during the years of the Second World War. Ten billion US dollars, when they were backed by gold (one dollar at that time was technically worth 1/35 troy ounce of gold), were equal to 10,000 tons of gold, so the entirety of the reparations was worth 20,000 tons of gold. In fact, the German reparations that the USSR agreed to accept would barely provide compensation for a mere 8% of the direct damages inflicted upon the Soviets. And the costs of only 2.8% of the total damages were recouped. This appeared to be a generous gesture on Stalin's part.
Red October factory during the battle of Stalingrad shows the extent of Nazi destruction in the Soviet Union. |
These figures stand in stark contrast to the enormous bill for reparations that the Entente Powers (excluding Russia) submitted to Germany at the Paris Conference in 1919. The Treaty of Versailles set the amount of reparations at 269 billion gold marks -- the equivalent of approximately 100,000 (!) tons of gold. That nation, which had initially been battered and weakened by the economic crisis of the 1920s, and later by the Great Depression, was unable to pay the enormous sums demanded as reparations and was forced to borrow from other countries in order to meet the terms of the treaty. In 1921, the Reparations Commission reduced the amount to $132 billion, or by approximately 50%, but even that new sum was the equivalent of 50,000 tons of gold. When Hitler took power in 1933 he put an end to the reparations payments altogether. After the Second World War and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the foreign ministers of the US, UK, and France forced that new nation to resume payments on the debts owed under the Treaty of Versailles. In accordance with the 1953 London Debt Agreement, the German lands that had been lost after the war were permitted to forgo interest payments until after East and West Germany were reunified. The reunification of Germany on Oct. 3, 1990 reinstated her reparations obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. Germany was given a respite of 20 years to pay off her debts, for which the country had to take out a twenty-year loan of 239.4 million marks. Only late in 2010 did Germany make her final reparations payment to her closest allies. This was very different from the Soviet Union's policy -- only a few years after the end of WWII the USSR refused reparations from Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, which were by then fellow members of the socialist community! Even East Germany stopped making any reparations payments to the Soviet Union shortly after that nation was established.
Stalin did not want to see a replay of what had happened in Germany and Europe after the Treaty of Versailles was signed. It was precisely that treaty that forced Germany into a corner and set the stage for Europe's slide into the Second World War. Speaking about the peace treaty with Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, Andrei Vyshinsky, at that time the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, explained the idea behind the Soviet policy on reparations, "The Soviet government consistently follows this line in its reparations policy, which consists of starting with a realistic plan, so as not to suffocate Hungary or rip up the roots of her economic recovery, but rather to help in her economic revival, help her get back on her feet, and help her to join the common family of the United Nations and to play a role in Europe's economic revival."
The USSR also took this magnanimous approach to other countries that had fought alongside the Germans. This can be seen in the peace treaty with Italy that required the payment of $100 million in restitution to the Soviet Union, although this offset no more than 4-5% of the direct damage inflicted on the USSR.
The principle behind this magnanimous approach to determining the sum of the reparations settlements complemented another important principle of Soviet policy -- that of using a country's current industrial output as the principle means of discharging the reparations debts. This principle was phrased with due regard for the lessons of the First World War. It is important to remember that the demands for reparations imposed on Germany after World War I were exclusively monetary, and to be paid in foreign currency. As a result, Germany had to focus on manufacturing products that were never intended to supply her domestic market with basic necessities, but were instead destined for export, in order to obtain the needed foreign currency. In addition, Germany was compelled to obtain loans in order to pay off each new installment of her reparations bill, which forced her into debt bondage. The Soviet Union had no desire to see that repeated. Vyacheslav Molotov explained the Soviet position at a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on Dec. 12, 1947: "No deliveries of reparations are currently being made from the western zones, and industry in the combined Anglo-American zone is operating at only 35% of its 1938 level. Deliveries of reparations are currently being received from the Soviet zone in Germany, and industry there is operating at 52% of its 1938 level. Thus, the index of industrial production in the Soviet zone -- even though a more challenging environment exists here for industrial recovery -- is 50% higher than the index of industrial production in the Anglo-American zone."
At the Yalta Conference, the leaders of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain reached an agreement regarding the principle of the non-monetary nature of the reparations. The Anglo-American allies once again endorsed this at the Potsdam Conference. But in 1946 they began to work actively to scuttle this policy. In addition, they also undermined other agreements pertaining to reparations. Even at the Potsdam Conference, the allies of the USSR agreed that Germany could partially offset her reparations debts by supplying products and dismantling equipment in the western occupation zones. However, the allies devised obstacles to prevent the Soviets from obtaining goods and equipment from the western occupation zones (only a small percentage of the planned quantities were received).
One consequence of the Cold War launched against the USSR by the West in 1946 was that no single mechanism for the allies to collect and tally reparations was ever created. And once the Federal Republic of Germany was established in the western zones of occupation in 1949, any opportunity for the Soviet Union to obtain reparations compensation from western Germany vanished forever.
After the Yalta Conference, the precise total of the reparations imposed on Germany after the Second World War was never again cited. And that issue remains fairly opaque. The full sum of Germany's reparations debts was not documented. An effective mechanism was never created for the centralized collection and tallying of Germany's reparations payments. The victorious countries satisfied their reparations claims against Germany unilaterally.
Judging by statements from her officials, not even Germany herself knows exactly how much she has paid in reparations. The Soviet Union preferred not to receive reparations in cash, but in kind. According to Russian historian Mikhail Semiryaga, for one year beginning in March 1945, the highest bodies of power in the Soviet Union made almost a thousand decisions related to the dismantling of 4,389 companies from Germany, Austria, Hungary, and other European countries. In addition, approximately one thousand factories were moved to the USSR from Manchuria and even Korea. These are impressive figures. But that depends what you compare them to. The Nazi invaders razed 32,000 industrial plants in the USSR. That means that the number of manufacturing facilities dismantled by the Soviet Union in Germany, Austria, and Hungary represented merely 14% of what was destroyed in the USSR. According to Nikolai Voznesensky, who was at that time the chairman of the Soviet Union's Gosplan Committee, the value of the equipment taken as spoils from Germany compensated the Soviet Union for only 0.6% of the direct damage she suffered.
Some data can be found in German documents. Thus, according to information from the West German Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Intra-German Relations, all that was confiscated from the Soviet occupation zone and the German Democratic Republic prior to 1953 was worth 66.4 billion marks, or 15.8 billion dollars. German experts claim this is equivalent to $400 billion in today's dollars. Confiscations were made both in kind as well as in cash. The reparations that passed from Germany to the USSR primarily consisted of the following: goods currently being manufactured by German firms -- 34.70 billion marks and cash payments in various currencies (including occupation Reichsmarks) -- 15.0 billion marks.
Between 1945 and 1946 a common form of reparations consisted of dismantled equipment from German companies that was sent to the USSR. In March 1945 a Special Committee of the Soviet State Defense Committee was created in Moscow, which coordinated all the work to dismantle German military-industrial facilities in the Soviet zone of occupation. Between March 1945 and March 1946, decisions were made to dismantle more than 4,000 industrial plants: 2,885 from Germany, 1,137 from German companies in Poland, 206 from Austria, 11 from Hungary, and 54 from Czechoslovakia. The key equipment was dismantled at 3,474 sites, and 1,118 million pieces of equipment were confiscated: 339,000 metal-cutting tools, 44,000 presses and sledgehammers, and 202,000 electric motors. Sixty-seven factories that manufactured only military goods were dismantled in the Soviet zone, 170 were destroyed, and 8 were converted to civilian production.
However, once this equipment was dismantled, manufacturing came to a halt in eastern Germany and unemployment surged, so by early 1947 the Soviets began to limit reparations of this type. Instead, 31 joint-stock companies created with Soviet entities were established, based on 119 large firms in the eastern occupation zone. In 1950, these were responsible for 22% of the GDR's industrial output. In 1954, all joint-stock companies created with Soviet entities were freely transferred to the German Democratic Republic. This represented the final word in that chapter from the history of WWII reparations.
(Strategic Culture Foundation, May 7, 2015. Slightly edited for grammar by TML.)
The West believes that the anniversaries of the main events of World War Two have already been celebrated after organising a theatrical performance dedicated to the Normandy landings. The same World War Two event is in the American interpretation, the second element of which is the Holocaust. But as far as the Eastern Front is concerned, an American may ask: "What, did something happen there?" If memory serves, at the beginning of the 1980s there was a joint ten-part Soviet-US TV film dedicated to the Great Patriotic War that was released in America under the name The Unknown War.
The 'total' war and the total defeat have left too deep an impression in the minds of the German people. As the years go by, there are fewer and fewer living witnesses of the war's events, but many prefer to keep silent about the war, just as Nobel literature laureate Günter Grass kept silent, only admitting that he had been a soldier in the Waffen-SS in 2006. There is a term, 'communicative silence,' that describes the avoidance of stories about the past by Germans who had survived the war, even among their own families, which was typical in the first post-war decades. This trait created a peculiar atmosphere of solidarity in West German society that reinforced both the general resentment at the victors' behaviour and the desire to play down the guilt of the German nation. And the more successfully this ideologised memory of the war was implanted, the more it gradually forced out personal memory.
Today, German collective memory of the Second World War already has its own story. In divided Germany, collective memory in the West and the East took shape differently, but all the time with an eye on each other. The first German post-war film made in the GDR [East Germany] was rejected by the British occupation authorities, but after its première in East Berlin it appeared in West German cinemas. It was called The Murderers Are Among Us. At that point, a fundamental difference revealed itself between the East and the West: in the FRG [West Germany], 8 May was regarded as the day of capitulation and collapse, while in the GDR it was the day of liberation from Nazism and the birth of Germany.
Talking about liberation in West Germany was considered hypocritical. The first federal president, Theodor Heuss, recognised that Germany was both destroyed and liberated at the same time; this kind of duality was obviously a concession to the victorious powers. Then the Cold War quenched the Western powers' impulse to carry out denazification in Western Germany and in 1965, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard once again removed any mention of liberation from official speeches regarding the end of the war.
Social democrat Willy Brandt (chancellor from 1969-1974) referred to himself as the chancellor of a liberated Germany to the huge indignation of his conservative opponents. It is generally believed that just 40 years after the end of the war, Germany's entire political class had come to an understanding that the German people were liberated in 1945. This can be heard in a speech by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker. When he died on 31 January 2015, his 1985 speech was recalled as part of the memorial events, but without placing any emphasis on the idea of liberation. Now, however, this emphasis has been placed: liberation from Nazism came to the Germans from overseas. (We should stress: never, not even under Stalin, did the USSR claim to be the "liberator" of the Germans, although Moscow used to extend its congratulations to the leaders of the GDR on the anniversaries of the "liberation of the German people from the tyranny of Nazism." It should also be remembered that Stalin tried to prevent Germany's post-war division.)
During the 1980s, the war on the Eastern Front was still well remembered in the FRG and this was largely due to the fact that the date was celebrated in the GDR. The leaders of East Germany not only referred to their republic as the first state of workers and peasants on German soil, but also the first anti-fascist state. And in fact they themselves were anti-fascists. Walter Ulbricht was one of the founders of the German Communist Party, he worked underground after Hitler came to power and then emigrated to Moscow. Erich Honecker was arrested by the Gestapo in 1935 and imprisoned until the end of the war. German anti-fascists were honoured in the GDR, whereas the West tried to forget about them. By way of example, the burgomaster of Königsbronn said that erecting a monument to Georg Elser, who carried out an assassination attempt on Hitler in 1939, was the same as immortalising the memory of terrorists from the Red Army Faction (a far-left militant group that operated in West Germany at the beginning of the 1970s). A monument to Elser was only erected in his hometown of Königsbronn in 2010.
Meanwhile, the first chancellor of the FRG, Konrad Adenauer, believed that the Germans needed to suppress their memories of the recent past and concentrate on reconstruction. The scale of the post-war reconstruction was colossal, since in many of the cities less than 30 per cent of the buildings were still standing. An irony of fate is that in Munich, which Hitler regarded as the birthplace of fascism, the royal palace of the Wittelsbachs was reduced to rubble, while both buildings of the National Socialist Party survived. In Nuremberg, 90 per cent of the buildings were rebuilt after the war. The most well-known of the newly-reconstructed cities, Dresden, was almost totally destroyed by Anglo-American bombing in February 1945. The destruction of Dresden by Western allies, along with Würzburg and Rothenburg, are united by the fact that these cities were not of military significance. Why the order was given to destroy these cultural centres is not a question that has been debated in Germany. Relatively recently, German historians even revised the number of victims of the Dresden bombings, significantly reducing the number of deaths compared to what had been previously believed. In Germany, it is unacceptable to point out that a multitude of 'ancient' monuments are, in fact, post-war new builds. It is also considered improper to remind their NATO allies how American and British carpet bombing wiped German cities from the face of the earth.
Monument in Dresden to the Trümmerfrauen (rubble women) who cleared away the ruins of German cities after the war. |
Monuments to the women who worked on clearing the rubble are also looked upon modestly today, although in the first years of the FRG's existence these women were honoured as heroes. Rather than these female workers, it is the female victims of violence who are more often remembered these days. Sandra Maischberger's weekly talk show on the German television channel ARD was dedicated to this subject at the end of March. Eighty-four-year-old pensioner Elfriede Seltenheim told viewers that the arrival of the "Russian rapists" turned out to be more horrific than Nazi propaganda had depicted it.
In the run-up to the 70-year anniversary, some German newspapers introduced a special section devoted to history, publishing materials related to the Second World War. As a general rule, these publications serve to reinforce the old stereotypes in the German collective memory, sometimes giving them new shades.
Recognition of the German people's guilt for the Holocaust is still the centre of attention, but ideally with a happy ending. (Süddeutsche Zeitung recently published an article recounting how the bombing of Dresden "saved" a Jewish child.[1]) In Germany, the basis for the Germans' deep repentance to the Jews was laid by Chancellor Brandt: today, his name is associated with a visit to the Warsaw Ghetto (in 1970), during which the politician knelt before a monument to victims of the Holocaust. The Holocaust memorial in Berlin is currently regarded as a materialisation of the collective memory of Germans regarding their historical guilt for the outbreak of the Second World War. This deformation of collective memory has also been actively encouraged by the Americans, including through the showing of a U.S. mini-series entitled Holocaust in 1979 (directed by Marvin Chomsky).
The fact that the war in the East was radically different from the war waged by the Third Reich in the West has been completely forgotten. In the East, the Germans waged a war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg) against the USSR. Losses in the USSR among the civilian population alone exceeded seven million people. Few [Germans today] refer to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war in German concentration camps as cruel and inhumane. There were times when local Germans were brought in to see how "subhumans" die from hunger. Is this known to the inhabitants of today's united Germany? In 1936, Hitler said: "If the Urals with their incalculable raw materials, Siberia with its rich forests, and the Ukraine with its incalculable farmlands lay in Germany, it would under Nazi leadership swim in surplus." Evidently, someone in Ukraine thinks that this is the end of the quote, that the Führer promised this surplus to the Ukrainians. In reality, Hitler ends the quote like this: "...every single German would have more than enough to live." How fiercely this fantasy has been played out by the modern-day worshippers of National Socialism in Ukraine! One needs only remember the "Miss Ostland" competition that was organised last autumn on the social networking site VKontakte (journalists renamed it "Miss Hitler"). And even though the competition was organised from Kiev and those competing for the dubious title were predominantly Ukrainian girls, Bild, the biggest German newspaper, wrote that this is how Russian internet users amuse themselves.
Publications emerging in Germany today are diligently avoiding any mention of the battles on the Eastern Front, but are in no way shying away from writing about the advance of American troops in Europe: they recount the tank 'battle' in Cologne, for example, during which three Brits were killed by a single German tank; or they write that the final stage of the Second World War apparently began with the capture of Aachen. They readily report details of the American landing at Okinawa.
Some German politicians are openly condemning Russia for carrying out military parades in honour of the anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. A statement in exactly this vein was made by the chairman of the Bundestag's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Norbert Röttgen (Christian Democratic Union), who accused Russia of using history to justify its foreign policy. And here we could mention something else: about how Germany is exploiting the "military glory" of the soldiers of Hitler's Wehrmacht to increase the morale of the Bundeswehr! Some barracks are even being named in honour of these 'heroes.' A foundation affiliated with the German Bundeswehr bears the name of Theodor Molinari, a man whose name is included in the 'Brown Book' on war and Nazi criminals in the FRG and West Berlin (published in 1968). Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who was pardoned in 1953, appears on the same page. Manstein's memoirs are entitled Lost Victories (published in 1955), which is quite conceited for a man who was sentenced to 18 years in prison by a British military court in 1950. For decades, this kind of literature laid the groundwork for the myth regarding the unsullied honour of Wehrmacht, which fought valiantly. The myth was so deeply ingrained in the minds of Germans that the first attempt to discredit it was stopped. This was at the end of the 1990s, when an exhibition on the crimes committed by the Wehrmacht had to be cut short and closed after being shown in 33 German cities. In the run-up to the 70th anniversary of Germany's surrender, there is a completely different exhibition being shown that was opened at the Bundestag with some fanfare in the autumn of 2014 on the German soldiers and participants of the Bundeswehr's peacekeeping efforts around the world.
The 'communicative silence' and cultivation of the German people's collective consciousness continues.
Note
1. "Zerstörung von Dresden rettete Michals Bruder das Leben," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.02.2015
(Strategic Culture Foundation, April 16, 2015)
The Red Army and British-American forces had one enemy -- the German Wehrmacht -- but quite often they waged different wars. The liberation of the Polish city Poznan by the Red Army and the bombing of Dresden by [other Allied countries] -- one event following one week after the other -- 70 years ago in February 1945. These two examples provide a good illustration of this.
During the Vistula-Oder Offensive, the 1st Belarussian Front under the command of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the "Hero of the Soviet Union," managed to secure two bridgeheads west of the Vistula River between July 27 and August 4, 1944, opening the way to Berlin. The concentration of German forces were left blocked but not defeated at Schneidemüh and Poznan. With the main forces continuing to advance in a westerly direction, it took time and effort to rout the German grouping at Poznan.
General Vasily Chuikov, the commander of the 8th Army (who later became Marshall of the Soviet Union), was responsible for the operation planned to smash the enemy forces there. In his memoirs he said the German-built fortifications were classic Vauban-style fortresses... The design envisioned the construction of underground forts in the center and citadels at the junctures to accommodate a large garrison.
Greeting the Soviet liberators in Poland |
In Poznan the city and fortifications were strongly defended and integrated into a single defence plan to coordinate fire. The Fort Winiary citadel stood on a hill to the north of the city centre. Around the perimeter of the city were 18 massive forts spaced at intervals of about 2 kilometres in a ring with a radius of about 5 kilometres. General Chuikov described the forts as "...underground structures each with several storeys, the whole projecting above the surrounding terrain. Only a mound was visible above ground -- a layer of earth covering the rest. Each fort was ringed by a ditch ten metres wide and eight metres deep, with walls revetted with brickwork. Across the ditch was a bridge, leading to an upper storey. Among the forts, to the rear, were one-storey brick bunkers. These were clad in concrete almost a full metre thick, and were used as storehouses. The upper works of the forts were sufficiently strong to provide reliable protection against heavy artillery fire... the enemy would be able to direct fire of all kinds against us both on the approaches to the forts and within them, on the rampart. The embrasures were such that flanking fire from rifles and machine-guns could be directed from them." Together with Volkssturm (a German national militia of the last months of World War II), Poznan was defended by the 60,000-strong garrison.
The offensive started early in the morning on January 26. The first strike was delivered from the south. It was unexpected by the enemy. Two southern forts were seized on the Warta River's western bank. As a result, the troops and tanks penetrated the ring of forts to attack the enemy from behind. The attack from the north produced little result. The Soviet troops did not attack from the west. Chuikov remembers that a way out was left on purpose to allow the enemy to withdraw from the city-fortress. But Germans did not leave. A long hard battle lay ahead. On January 28, another attack was launched. Chuikov addressed the surrounded German troops in Poznan [and issued] an ultimatum. It read: "Officers and soldiers of the Poznan garrison. You are surrounded. There is no way you can leave the city. I, General Chuikov, offer you to immediately lay down your arms and surrender. I guarantee life and return home after the war is over. Otherwise you'll be wiped out. The death of civilians in Poznan will be your responsibility. Do not hesitate. Raise white flags and come to our side. General Chuikov."
But the garrison had no intention of surrendering. Soviet aviation and artillery strikes delivered on fortifications tried to avoid damage to the buildings inside the city and casualties among civilians. The Fort Winiary citadel was ruined. The soldiers hid underground.
By February 5 the assault teams had fully liberated the residential areas. After February 12 the Fort became the main target. As the Soviet troops approached, the resistance grew. The 5-8 metre high brick walls protected the enemy, preventing tanks from advancing. Heavy artillery pieces were moved closer to fire at the Fort from a distance of 300 metres. But even 203 mm projectiles did not inflict much damage to the thick walls.
At that time, the 1st Belarus Front forces moved to the west reaching the Oder. The general assault started on February 18 and lasted without stop for four days. Having built an assault bridge, Red Army tanks and assault guns of the 259th and 34th crossed into the main grounds of the citadel at 3 am on February 22 commencing the final struggle for the old fortress. The groups of 20-200 men started to surrender. Only 12,000 troops remained of the 60,000-strong garrison. The bloody fighting ended on February 23, 1945, the 17th anniversary of the Red Army. Two hundred and twenty-four artillery pieces fired 20 salvos to salute the victory.
Here is an example of the war waged by the allies. On February 13-15, they delivered air strikes against Dresden which inflicted damage comparable to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks.
Americans called the operation "Thunderstrike." Who was it targeted against?
The city had no significant defence industry facilities and was flooded with refugees.
A Royal Air Force (RAF) memo issued to airmen on the
night of the
attack said: "Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much
smaller than Manchester is also the largest unbombed builtup area the
enemy
has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westward and
troops to
be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers,
refugees,
and troops alike, but to house the administrative services displaced
from other
areas." Why raze to the ground a city that had no substantial
importance for
the war effort? The very same memo was rather cynical about it. It
read: "The
intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it
most, behind
an already partially collapsed front... and incidentally to show the
Russians
when they arrive what Bomber Command can do." That's what the Royal Air
Force really did by bombing from a safe altitude a city flooded with
demoralized people.
As the end of war was approaching British-American aviation started to deliver more frequently politically motivated strikes, destroying cities of no significance for the German war effort that were soon to be liberated by the Red Army, for instance Prague, Sofia etc. Dresden is the brightest example of how this vicious tactic was employed. The devastated area in Dresden exceeded by four times the devastated area of Nagasaki. Fifteen-hundred degree heat hit the larger part of the city. People running to reach the city's outskirts fell into melting asphalt. Smoke was 45 metres high. At least 25,000 died. Some experts say the death toll was as high as 135,000.
Günter Wilhelm Grass, a German writer and recipient of the 1999 Nobel Prize for Literature, called the bombing a war crime. This point of view is supported by many.
Dr. Gregory Stanton, president of Genocide Watch, expressed himself more bluntly saying the Allied firebombing of Dresden and the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were war crimes and also acts of genocide.
(Strategic Culture Foundation, February 26, 2015. Edited slightly for grammar by TML.)
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