June 15, 2013 - No. 23

The Need to Work for Peace
on the Korean Peninsula

Peace and reunification on the agenda at a recent national gathering of Korean Americans,
Los Angeles, May 14, 2013. (Nodutdol)

Korea Is One!

13th Anniversary of the Korean North-South
Joint Declaration

President Kim Dae Jung is welcomed to Pyongyang by leader of the DPRK Kim Jong Il, June 15, 2000,
for the historic summit produced the North-South Joint Declaration.

June 15, 2013 marks the 13th anniversary of the signing of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration between north and south Korea. This historic event was decisive in giving impetus and encouragement to the Korean people's movement for the reunification of their divided country.

It is the United States which has kept Korea divided through force of arms for more than 60 years to serve its imperialist interests. The U.S. imperialists hope to this day to overtake all of Korea and use it as a forward staging ground for U.S. wars of aggression against China and Russia, using the Korean people as cannon fodder. Following the Second World War, the U.S. ensconced itself in the south to lay claim to all the factories, mines, and other industries that the Japanese imperialists had developed in Korea for their war machine. It then divided Korea along the 38th parallel to make sure it imposed its own system which it could only achieve by coups d'etat and using brutal repression and military occupation. The U.S. instigated the Korean War in 1950 to expand its occupation to all of Korea but this plan was defeated by the Korean people united around the Korean People's Army which forced the U.S. to sign the Armistice Agreement in 1953. 

The U.S. maintains a hostile atmosphere over the Korean peninsula by sabotaging all efforts at normalization of relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including its refusal to sign a peace treaty, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement which ended the fighting in the Korean War. The signing of such a treaty would not only contribute to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, but would stabilize the region which would favour not only the Korean people but also the peoples of East Asia and the world. Such a peace treaty would also be an important step towards national reunification.

If the U.S. military occupation of south Korea is ended and the Korean people are left to solve their own problems without outside interference, the whole country would move toward re-unification because it has been on the Korean people's agenda for almost 70 years.

The U.S. is deathly afraid of a reunified Korea which would be an economic powerhouse and a champion for the independence and self-determination of all nations and peoples, and a nail in the coffin of Anglo-American imperialism. Thus, to block the work toward reunification and keep its military presence in the south, the U.S. beats the war drums and spreads all manner of disinformation against the DPRK.

Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification (or Reunification Arch), Pyongyang, DPRK. The twin women symbolize the union of the two Koreas. The three charters consist of "the three principles of national reunification (independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity), the proposal for founding the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo and the ten-point program of the great unity of the whole nation."

The Korean people made great strides towards unification from 2000 to 2007 in an all-sided manner because both sides were guided by the spirit of genuine openness and co-operation codified in the June 15 Joint Declaration. When the pro-U.S. Lee Myung Bak government took office in south Korea in 2007, the U.S. introduced a hostile spirit into north-south relations which set back the work for reunification. This hostile attitude has been carried forward by the government of President Park Geun Hye, which came to power in February 2013. President Park, the first woman President of south Korea -- is the daughter of the anti-communist pro-U.S. dictator Park Jung Hee who ruled south Korea with an iron-fist from 1961 to 1979 before he was assassinated by the head of his own security unit. President Park is herself hostile to the independent Korean re-unification movement and openly says that the future of south Korea lies in forging stronger economic and military bi-lateral relations with the U.S. In fact, her government announced on June 1 that it would extend U.S. wartime operational control of south Korea's military beyond December 2015. This is in violation of an earlier agreement signed between the U.S. and south Korea. Furthermore, the Park government has agreed to have south Korea assume more of the "non-military" costs of the U.S. military presence in south Korea, on the order of billions of dollars a year, to the chagrin of the Korean people. Driving out the U.S. military occupiers of Korea is the precondition for national reunification.

This pro-U.S. agenda is also evident in the Park government's continued criminalization of the Korean reunification movement and to target and imprison pro-reunification activists. The Park government has forbidden any south Korean patriotic organizations from travelling north to celebrate the 13th anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration. It has sabotaged any efforts for the Korean people to come together to sum up their re-unification movement and push it forward.

The onus is on the U.S. and south Korea to bring themselves to order and demonstrate through words and deeds a sincerity towards proposals for peace and a just reunification such as the DPRK has put forward since 1953, and which Koreans in the north, south and overseas have consistently demanded.

Despite the challenges facing them, the Korean people are relying on the justice of their cause and on their own political unity and peaceful efforts to hold high the banner of national reunification and carry it forward. They firmly believe that as sure as the sun rises in the East, the Korean reunification movement will be victorious. They have the support of all the peace- and justice-loving people of Canada and the world.

Hail the 13th Anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration!
U.S., Sign a Peace Treaty with the DPRK Now!
U.S. Troops Out of Korea!
Korea Is One!

Recent Developments in North-South Relations

- Interview, H.P. Chung, Spokesperson, Canadian 6.15 Committee -

TML: There was supposed to be a ministerial level meeting held on June 12 and 13 in Seoul between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Republic of Korea to discuss re-establishing north-south relations. This meeting was cancelled at the last minute. What is your opinion about what took place?

H.P. Chung: In my opinion, even if the south Korean government agreed to the meeting, it did not have any intention to discuss relations on a new basis. At a prior preliminary meeting, the south Korean government had given the name of a person who they insisted should lead the north's delegation to these talks. When the south Korean government realized that their proposed person was not on the list of delegates coming to Seoul, it accused the north of not being sincere. The DPRK proposed its delegation to fit the political level of the talks. In my view, since the two sides govern themselves, there is no basis for an objection on south Korea's part.

TML: What is the attitude of the new south Korean government of Park Geun Hye to the Korean reunification movement?

HPC: The new south Korean government's attitude is the same, and could even get worse than the previous government of Lee Myung Bak. President Park Geun Hye openly insists that there will be no inter-governmental meetings unless the DPRK agrees to discuss its so-called denuclearization. In my view, Park's understanding of the situation on the Korean peninsula is totally distorted if this is what she thinks is the source of tension.

TML: What are some of the developments in the Korean Reunification movement in the last year?

HPC: Under the Lee Myung Bak government, in power from 2008 to 2013, the Korean reunification movement was suppressed in the south. This has continued under the new Park government. This has certainly put pressure on the Korean Reunification movement. In June 2012, on the occasion of the 12th anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration, a joyous and historic moment for the Korean people, overseas Korean groups gathered for the Reunification Rally in Moscow to boost the movement's morale. DPRK delegates also participated. One Korean-Canadian delegate attended. No south Korean delegates were permitted to attend this event or any other gatherings.

TML: This year marks the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War. How will overseas patriotic Koreans mark the occasion?

HPC: There is going to be the grand celebration in Pyongyang on this important occasion. Many overseas patriotic Koreans will attend, including a delegation of the Korean patriotic community living in Canada. There are also big celebrations being planned in Japan and China.

TML: What is the significance of the recent proposed new outline for the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command structure that was announced by south Korea on June 1?

HPC: When Rho Moo Hyun was the President of south Korea, from 2003 to 2008, he insisted that the command of the south Korean military must be returned to Korea from the U.S. general stationed in south Korea. On October 22, 2009, south Korea and the U.S. confirmed that it would be returned on April 12, 2012. Then there were protests from the right-wing and retired anti-communist Korean generals in the south. When Lee Myung Bak became President, he postponed the date to December 2015. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, the June 1 proposal could be another delaying tactic to keep the U.S.-south Korean military command in U.S. hands. Also recently, there was an agreement that the south Korean government will pay more money to cover the cost of keeping the U.S. military in south Korea in the future. The Korean people want the U.S. military out of Korea, because it has been the major obstacle to Korean reunification. We do not want the U.S. military to extend their stay in south Korea.

TML: Is there anything else you want to say about the present situation on the Korean peninsula?

HPC: In my opinion, the south Korean government does not have the autonomy to make any policies or decisions about Korean reunification because it is under U.S. influence. The key to the issue is the relationship between the DPRK and the U.S. The way forward to find a solution is the normalization of relations between the DPRK and U.S., starting with the signing of a Peace Treaty as stipulated in the Korean Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953. I sincerely hope that the Canadian people will wholeheartedly support the call for a Peace Treaty.

Revocation of Plan for Military War Time Control from U.S. to South Korea Denounced

Anti-war activists in south Korea oppose the new U.S.-south Korea combined command structure revealed June 1 as mere show to cover up the government's agenda to maintain U.S. domination of south Korean affairs.

Solidarity for Peace And Reunification of Korea (SPARK) held a press conference in front of the Ministry of National Defense on June 3. Their banner read: "Denounce the scheme to annul plan to transfer wartime control: No to the creation of a new combined command structure! Completely dismantle the ROK-U.S. Combined Command! Transfer wartime control!"

Yu Yeong Jae, an organizer with SPARK pointed out, "The point of the transfer of operational control was for the South Korean army to gain its own separate command. Since that part has been left out of the working-level agreement, this is no better than if we had scrapped the transfer of operational control."

A statement released by SPARK at the press conference points out that the U.S. and south Korea are using the bogeyman of aggression by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to justify revoking the plan to transfer wartime control of the military back to south Korea. The statement adds that the aim is also for purposes of encircling China.

Activists with Save Jeju Now, an organization working to stop the construction of a U.S. naval base on Jeju Island, Korea, point out that south Korea is currently the only country in the world that does not have the right of wartime control of its own military. This has been the case for 60 years, since the Armistice Agreement ended the military operations of the Korean War. Save Jeju Now explains that operational control of the south Korean military became an issue in 1950 during the Korean War when President Rhee Syng Man transferred the right to U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN Forces at the time. The peacetime control of the south Korean military was transferred from the U.S. to south Korea on December 1, 1994, under the government of Kim Young Sam. The transfer of the right of wartime control back to south Korea was first raised in the 2005 south Korea-U.S. Security Policy Initiative. The government of Roh Moo Hyun expended great effort in 2006 to make progress on the issue.

A June 3 article from the south Korean English-language newspaper Hankyoreh explains:

"The new outline for the US-ROK combined command structure that was disclosed on June 1 is nearly identical in structure to the existing Combined Forces Command. The major change is that the highest figure in the combined command structure changes from the commander of US forces in Korea to the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. [...]

"In accordance with that, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US forces in Korea are combined into the joint theater command, and the ground forces, navy, air force, and special forces are placed under that as joint component commands. [...]

"However, a US commander would retain wartime control of the air force, the key force in contemporary warfare. This measure is seen as showing awareness of the overwhelming air supremacy and the long experience of the US 7th Air Force, which is located at Osan Air Force Base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province.

"This agreement is considerably different from the basic outline prepared by former president Roh Moo-hyun, who worked hard to regain wartime operational control. The key point of the handover of wartime control as espoused by the Roh administration was the principle of autonomous defense, the idea that South Korea should be defended by South Koreans.

"While the two countries agreed in Feb. 2007 to transfer wartime operational control to the South Korean military on Apr. 17, 2012, president Lee Myung-bak, who took power soon after, delayed this three years until Dec. 2015, after his term as president ended.

"'When I look at the latest proposal released by the Ministry of Defense, it is hard to see that they intend to have independent national defense, which was the heart of the original idea of transferring wartime operational control,' said Kim Jong-dae, editor of Defense 21+. 'It is uncertain whether the South Korean military, which has been so dependent on the US, will be able to give commands to the US military, and it is also unclear whether the US will accept this.' The national goals and interests of South Korea and the US are sure to be different if war breaks out. The Ministry of Defense is not abiding by the strategic position of South Korea determining its own destiny and is instead still settling for the tactical convenience of relying upon the US, Kim suggested."

UN Special Rapporteur Criticizes Limited Freedom of Expression in South Korea

- Choi Yu-bin, Hankyoreh, June 9, 2013 -

A UN human rights special rapporteur expressed a variety of concerns about the human rights situation in South Korea, suggesting that the criminalization of defamation limits the activities of human rights advocates.

Margaret Sekaggya, the UN special rapporteur for human rights defenders, spent two weeks in South Korea assessing the human rights situation in the country. On June 7, shortly before she left the country, she held a press conference at the Koreana Hotel near City Hall in central Seoul to present her initial research findings and to make some recommendations. At the press conference she identified the criminal status of defamation and the National Security Law as major obstacles to defending human rights.

Speaking in regard to Korea's criminalization of defamation, Sekaggya said that, since defamation is defined as a crime in Article 33 of the criminal code and can be punished with fines and imprisonment, it represents a limitation on the freedom of expression. "This has a chilling effect and leads to self-censorship by certain human rights defenders," she said.

Sekaggya suggested only allowing people to sue for damages due to defamation through the civil code, saying that this is the only way to give vulnerable members of society more options for fighting back against human rights violations. Defamation is not part of the civil code in many countries in Western Europe.

Sekaggya also addressed the National Security Law, saying that human rights advocates who criticize government policies are branded as anti- government organizations. She urged that the law only be applied strictly when there is a clear threat to the state.

Sekaggya also gave low marks to the National Human Rights Commission. "The Human Rights Commission has lost the trust of human rights advocates and a variety of other parties concerned and is failing to play an important role in protecting and promoting human rights," she said. "The Commission must become more independent and more professional."

Sekaggya also made a reference to the sit-in protest that is challenging the construction of the electric transmission towers in Miryang, South Gyeongsang Province. She criticized the current system of citizen gatherings needing to be reported to authorities in advance, saying that it is effectively a licensing system that is being used to prevent peaceful gatherings and demonstrations. In addition, she expressed concern about the situation of the media in Korea, mentioning the MBC and YTN reporters who had lost their jobs.

Sekaggya arrived in Korea on May 27 to carry out a fact-finding mission, visiting government agencies including the Police Department, the National Human Rights Commission, and the Korea Communications Standards Commission. She also stopped by the site of the sit-in at the Miryang transmission towers and the aerial sit-in on an electricity pylon at the Hyundai Motor factory in Ulsan.

Sekaggya is planning to compose her final report based on her preliminary findings and present this to the 25th meeting of the UN Human Rights Council, which will take place in Geneva, Switzerland in March 2014.

For Your Information

The Need to Work for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

- Marty Hart-Landsberg*, May 2, 2013

While the details of U.S.-North Korean relations are complex, the story is relatively simple. In brief, the U.S. government continues to reject possibilities for normalizing relations with North Korea and promoting peace on the Korean peninsula in favor of a dangerous policy of regime change. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the U.S. media supports this policy choice with a deliberately one-sided presentation of events designed to make North Korea appear to be an unwilling and untrustworthy negotiating partner.

As a corrective, in what follows I offer a more complete history of U.S -North Korean relations, focusing on the major events that frame current tensions over North Korea's nuclear program. This history makes clear that these tensions are largely the result of repeated and deliberate U.S. provocations and that our best hope for peace on the Korean Peninsula is an educated U.S. population ready and able to challenge and change U.S. foreign policy.

Historical Context

Perhaps the best starting point for understanding the logic of U.S.-North Korean relations is the end of Korean War fighting in 1953. At U.S. insistence, the fighting ended with an armistice rather than a peace treaty. A Geneva conference held the following year failed to secure the peace or the reunification of Korea, and U.S. demands were the main reason for the failure.

The United States rejected North Korean calls for Korea-wide elections, supervised by a commission of neutral nation representatives, to establish a new unified Korean government, a proposal that even many U.S. allies found reasonable. Instead, the U.S. insisted, along with South Korea, that elections for a new government be held only in the North and under the supervision of the U.S. dominated United Nations. Needless to say, the conference ended without any final declaration, Korea divided, and the United States and North Korea in a continuing state of war.

Up until the late 1980s and early 1990s, an interrelated, contentious but relatively stable set of relationships -- between the United States and the Soviet Union and between North Korea and South Korea -- kept North Korean-U.S. hostilities in check. The end of the Soviet Union and transformation of Russia and other Central European countries into capitalist countries changed everything.

The loss of its major economic partners threw North Korea's economy into chaos; conditions only worsened the following years as a result of alternating periods of flood and drought. The North Korean government, now in a relatively weak position, responded by seeking new trade and investment partners, which above all required normalization of relations with the United States. The U.S. government had a different response to the changed circumstances; seeking to take advantage of the North's economic problems and political isolation, it rejected negotiations and pursued regime change.

It is the interplay of U.S. and North Korean efforts to achieve their respective aims that is largely responsible for the following oft repeated pattern of interaction: the North tries to force the United States into direct talks by demonstrating its ability to boost its military capacities and threaten U.S. interests while simultaneously offering to negotiate away those capacities in exchange for normalized relations. The United States, in turn, seizes on such demonstrations to justify ever harsher economic sanctions, which then leads North Korea to up the ante.

There are occasional interruptions to the pattern. At times, the United States, concerned with North Korean military advances, will enter into negotiations. Agreements are even signed. But, the U.S. rarely follows through on its commitments. Then the pattern resumes. The critical point here is that it is the North that wants to conclude a peace treaty ending the Korean War and normalize relations with the United States. It is the U.S. that is the unwilling partner, preferring to risk war in the hopes of toppling the North Korean regime.

The Framework Agreement, 1994-2002

The U.S. government began to raise public concerns about a possible North Korean nuclear threat almost immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These concerns were driven by many factors, in particular the U.S. need for a new enemy to justify continued high levels of military spending. Colin Powell, then head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained in testimony to Congress that with the Soviet Union gone, the United States was running out of enemies. All that was left, he said, was Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung.

The North had shut down its one operating reactor in 1989 for repairs. In 1992, the CIA claimed that the North used the shutdown to reprocess plutonium and was now in possession of one or two nuclear weapons, a claim disputed at the time by the State Department. The North also denied the claim but offered to settle U.S. nuclear concerns if the United States would enter into normalization talks.

The Clinton Administration rejected the invitation and began planning for war. War was averted only because of Jimmy Carter's intervention. He traveled to North Korea and brokered an agreement with Kim Il Sung that Clinton reluctantly accepted. The resulting 1994 Framework Agreement required the North to freeze its graphite-moderated reactor and halt construction of two bigger reactors. It also required the North to store the spent fuel from its operating reactor under International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) supervision.

In exchange, the U.S agreed to coordinate the building of two new light water reactors (which are considered less militarily dangerous) that were to be finished by 2003. Once the reactors were completed, but before they were fully operational, the North would have to allow full IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. During the period of construction, the U.S. agreed to provide the North with shipments of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

Perhaps most importantly, the agreement also called for the United States to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations" with the North and "provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States."

Although rarely mentioned in the U.S. media, the U.S. government did little to meet its commitments. It was repeatedly late in delivering the promised oil and didn't begin lifting sanctions until June 2000. Even more telling, the concrete for the first light water reactor wasn't poured until August 2002. Years later, U.S. government documents revealed that the United States made no attempt to complete the reactors because officials were convinced that the North Korean regime would collapse.

The Bush administration had no use for the Framework Agreement and was more than happy to see it terminated, which it unilaterally did in late 2002, after charging the North with violating its terms by pursuing nuclear weapons through a secret uranium enrichment program. Prior to that, in January 2002, President Bush branded North Korea a member of the "axis of evil." In March, the terms of a new military doctrine were leaked, revealing that the United States reserved the right to take preemptive military strikes and covert actions against nations possessing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as use nuclear weapons as an option in any conflict; North Korea was listed as one of the targeted nations. In July, President Bush rejected a North Korean request for a meeting of foreign ministers, calling Kim Jong Il a "pygmy" and a "spoiled child at the dinner table."

It is certainly possible that North Korea did begin a uranium enrichment program in the late 1990s, although the Bush Administration never provided proof of the program's existence. However, what is clear is that the North did halt its plutonium program, allowing its facilities to deteriorate, with little to show for it. The failure of the United States to live up to its side of the agreement is highlighted by the fact that North Korea's current demands are no different from what it was promised in 1994.

The North Korean government responded to the Bush administration's unilateral termination of the Framework Agreement by ordering IAEA inspectors out of the country, restarting its plutonium program, and pledging to build a nuclear arsenal for its defense.

Six Party Talks, 2003-7

Fearful of a new war on the Korean peninsula, the Chinese government organized talks aimed at deescalating tensions between the United States and North Korea. The talks began in August 2003 and included six countries -- the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Two years of talks failed to produce any progress in resolving U.S.-North Korea differences. One reason: the U.S. representative was under orders not to speak directly to his North Korean counterpart except to demand that North Korea end its nuclear activities, scrap its missiles, reduce its conventional forces, and end human rights abuses. The North, for its part, refused to discuss its nuclear program separate from its broader relations with the United States.

Finally, in mid-2005, the Chinese made it known that they were prepared to declare the talks a failure and would blame the United States for the outcome. Not long after, the United States ended its opposition to an agreement. In September 2005, the six countries issued a Joint Statement, which was largely a repackaged Framework Agreement. While all the countries pledged to work towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, most of the concrete steps were to be taken by the United States and North Korea "in a phased manner in line with the principle of 'commitment for commitment, action for action'."

Unfortunately, the day after the Joint Statement was issued, the United States sabotaged it. The U.S. Treasury announced that it had "proof" that North Korea was counterfeiting $100 bills, so called super-notes, an action it said amounted to war. It singled out the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, which was one of North Korea's main financial connections to the West, for supporting the country's illegal activities, froze its dollar accounts, and warned other banks not to conduct business with it or service any North Korean dollar transactions. The aim was to isolate North Korea by denying it access to international credit markets. The charge of counterfeiting was rejected by the North, most Western currency experts, and even China and Russia who were given a presentation of evidence by the U.S. Treasury. However, fearful of possible U.S. retaliation, most banks complied with U.S. policy, greatly harming the North Korean economy.

The timing of the counterfeit charge was telling. The U.S. Treasury had been concerned with counterfeit super notes since 1989 and had originally blamed Iran. The sum total identified was only $50 million, and none of the notes had ever circulated in the United States. This was clearly yet another effort to stop normalization and intensify economic pressure on North Korea.

The North announced that its participation in Six Party talks was contingent on the withdrawal of the counterfeit charge and the return of its Banco Delta Asia dollar deposits. After months of inaction by the United States, the North took action. On July 4, 2006, it test-fired six missiles over the Sea of Japan, including an intercontinental missile. The U.S. and Japan condemned the missile firings and further tightened their sanctions against North Korea. In response, on October 8, 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Finally, the U.S. agreed to reconsider its financial embargo and the North agreed that if its money was returned and it received energy supplies and economic assistance it was willing to once again shutdown its nuclear facilities, readmit international inspectors, and discuss nuclear disarmament in line with steps toward normalization of relations with the United States.

The Six Party talks began again in December 2006 but the process of securing implementation of the Joint Statement was anything but smooth. The U.S. chief negotiator at the talks announced in February 2007 that all frozen North Korean deposits would be unfrozen and made available to the North within 30 days; the North was given 60 days to shut down its reactor. However, the Treasury refused to withdraw its charges, and no bank was willing to handle the money for fear of being targeted as complicit with terrorism. It took the State Department until June 25 to work out a back-door alternative arrangement, thereby finally allowing the Six Party agreement to go into effect.

The Six Party Agreement, 2007-9

As noted above, the Six Party agreement involved a phased process. Phase 1, although behind schedule because of the U.S. delay in releasing North Korean funds, was completed with no problems. In July 2007, North Korea shut down and sealed its Yongbyon nuclear complex which housed its reactor, reprocessing facility, and fuel rod fabrication plant. It also shut down and sealed its two partially constructed nuclear reactors. It also invited back IAEA inspectors who verified the North Korean actions. In return, the U.S. provided a shipment of fuel oil.

Phase 2, which began in October, required the North to disable all its nuclear facilities by December 31, 2007 and "provide a complete and correct declaration of all its existing nuclear programs." In a separate agreement it also agreed to disclose the status of its uranium enrichment activities. In exchange, the North was to receive, in stages, "economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance." Once it fulfilled all Phase 2 requirements it would also be removed from the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act and the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

North Korean complaints over the slow delivery of fuel oil delayed the completion of this second phase. However, in May 2008, North Korea completed the last stage of its required Phase 2 actions when it released extensive documentation of its plutonium program and in June a declaration of its nuclear inventory. In response, the U.S. removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

However, the U.S. government failed to release the remaining promised aid or end the remaining sanctions on North Korea. It now demanded that North Korea accept a highly intrusive verification protocol, one that would open up all North Korean military installations to U.S. inspection, and made satisfaction of Phase 2 commitments dependent on its acceptance. The U.S. was well aware that this demand was not part of the original agreement. As Secretary of State Rice stated, "What we've done, in a sense, is move up issues that were to be taken up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactors, into phase two."

North Korea offered a compromise -- a Six Party verification mechanism which would include visits to declared nuclear sites and interviews with technical personal. It also offered to negotiate a further verification protocol in the final dismantlement phase. The U.S. government rejected the compromise and ended all aid deliveries.

In February 2009, North Korea began preparation to launch a satellite. South Korea was preparing to launch a satellite of its own in July. The North had signed the appropriate international protocols governing satellites and was now providing, as required, notification of its launch plan. The Obama administration warned the North that doing so would violate sanctions placed on the country after its nuclear test. In response, the North declared that it had every right to develop its satellite technology and if the U.S. responded with new sanctions it would withdraw from the Six Party talks, eject IAEA monitors, restart its reactors, and strengthen its nuclear deterrent.

The North launched its satellite in April. In June, the U.S. won UN support for enhanced sanctions, and the North followed through on its threat. In May the North conducted a second nuclear test, producing yet another round of sanctions.

Recent Events

In April and December 2012 the North again launched earth observation satellites. Although before each of these launches the U.S. asserted that these were veiled attempts to test ballistic missiles designed to threaten the United States, after each launch almost all observers agreed that the characteristics of the launches -- their flight pattern and the second stage low-thrust, long burntime -- were what is required to put a satellite in space and not consistent with a missile test.

After the December launch, the only successful one, the U.S. again convinced the Security Council to apply a new round of sanctions. And in response, the North carried out its third nuclear test in February 2013. The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that there have been "more than 2,000 nuclear tests and 9,000 satellite launches" in the world, "but the UN Security Council has never passed a resolution prohibiting nuclear tests or satellite launches." The Security Council responded to the North's nuclear test by approving stricter sanctions.

In addition to sanctions, the U.S. has also intensified its military provocations against North Korea in hopes of destabilizing the new North Korean regime led by Kim Jung Un. For example, in 2012, U.S.-South Korean military analysts conducted the world's largest computerized war simulation exercise, practicing the deployment of more than 100,000 South Korean troops into North Korea to "stabilize the country in case of regime collapse." As part of their yearly war games, U.S. and South Korean forces also carried out their largest amphibious landing operations in 20 years; 13 naval vessels, 52 amphibious armored vehicles, 40 fighter jets and helicopters, and 9,000 U.S. troops were involved.

As part of its March 2013 war games, the U.S. flew nuclear-capable B-2 Stealth bombers over South Korea; these are also the only planes capable of dropping the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator bomb, which was developed to destroy North Korean underground facilities. Nuclear-capable B-52 bombers also flew over South Korea, dropping dummy munitions. The United States also sent the nuclear-powered submarine USS Cheyenne, equipped with Tomahawk missiles, into Korea waters.

The North Korean government responded to these threats in three ways. First, the content of their declarations changed. In particular, they began to focus their own threats on the U.S. as well as South Korea. For example, the government stated, "If the US imperialists brandish nuclear weapons, we -- in complete contrast to former times -- will by means of diversified, precision nuclear strike in our own style turn not just Seoul, but even Washington, into a sea of fire." It also asserted, for the first time, that its nuclear weapons were no longer negotiable. At least, not "as long as the United States' nuclear threats and hostile policy exist."

Second, the government put North Korean forces on full alert, including all artillery, rockets, and missiles. Kim Jong Un announced that the country would "answer the US imperialists' nuclear blackmail with a merciless nuclear attack." Finally, it announced, in April, that it would restart its uranium enrichment program and its Yongbyon reactor.

What Lies Ahead

The Obama administration has adopted what it has called the doctrine of "strategic patience" in dealing with North Korea. But as made clear from above, in reality the U.S. has continued to pursue an aggressive policy towards North Korea, motivated by the hope that the regime will collapse and Korean reunification will be achieved by the South's absorption of the North, much like the German experience.

The consequence of this policy is ever worsening economic conditions in the North; continuing military buildup in the United States, Japan, China, and both North and South Korea; a strengthening of right-wing forces in South Korea and Japan; and the growing threat of a new war on the Korean peninsula. There are powerful interests in Japan, South Korea, and the United States that are eager to further militarize their respective domestic and foreign policies, even at the risk of war. Tragically, their pursuit of this goal comes at great cost to the majority of the people concerned in these countries, even if war is averted.

North Korea has made clear its willingness to enter direct talks with the United States. It is only popular pressure in the United States that will cause the U.S. government to change its policy and accept the North Korean offer. It is time for the U.S. government to sign a peace treaty finally ending the Korean War and take sincere steps towards normalization of relations with North Korea.

* Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; and Adjunct Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South Korea. His areas of teaching and research include political economy, economic development, international economics, and the political economy of East Asia. He is also a member of the Workers' Rights Board (Portland, Oregon). This item was originally published by the Korea Policy Institute.

PREVIOUS ISSUES | HOME

Read The Marxist-Leninist Daily
Website:  www.cpcml.ca   Email:  editor@cpcml.ca