2006
Federal Accountability
Act
Harper Government Fails to Restore Trust in Undemocratic Institutions
- MLPC Brief -
Submitted to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs, September 7, 2006. The
Honourable Senator Donald H. Oliver Chairperson Senate
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Mr.
Chairperson and Members of the Committee, Bill C-2,
the Federal Accountability Act, has been
presented with the stated aim of improving "the level of trust
that Canadians have in their government and in their elected
officials." The public trust, it is said, has been violated by
the scandals that culminated in the Gomery Commission, and Bill
C-2 is meant to prevent a repeat of such things. One
of the main concerns of the Federal Accountability
Act involves changes to the Canada Elections Act.
This
brief addresses some of these changes and argues why they will
not achieve the stated aim of the Act. ***
The background material published by the Harper government on
the Federal Accountability Act cites the reform of
the
financing of political parties as one of its key elements,
providing the following context: "The Canada Elections Act
governs campaign donations and the financing of political parties
and candidates in Canada. The law ensures transparency and
regulates the financial relations and operations of political
parties and candidates. However, more needs to be done to rebuild
public confidence in the integrity of the democratic process, and
to ensure that influence cannot be bought through political
donations. Donations from corporations, unions and organizations
are of particular concern, since they currently allow for a
contribution of funds from unknown original sources." The
background material explains that in regards to political
financing, the purpose of the Federal Accountability Act
is to "toughen the laws around the financing of political parties
and candidates to reduce the opportunity to exert influence
through large donations." The Harper government presents the
changes to the Canada Elections Act as a means "to
increase transparency, reduce opportunities to influence
politicians with contributions, and help Canadians feel more
confident about the integrity of the democratic process." In
addition, it is claimed that the changes "will level the playing
field among individual contributors, and encourage political
parties to engage the electorate more freely." Surely
then, our duty is to look at the proposed changes and
see whether they will achieve the stated aim and from that draw
warranted conclusions. Having studied the proposed
changes, it is our opinion that
they will not achieve the stated aim. One reason may be that
there has been no deliberation on what led to the Sponsorship
Scandal in the first place. Establishing that wrongdoing took
place and even describing some of it and establishing fault in
the cases examined is not sufficient. Blame and responsibility
are not one and the same. We have the case of the two American
pilots who were found to be at fault and blamed for killing four
Canadians soldiers in what is called a friendly fire incident but
where did the responsibility lie? Why do we have repeated cases
of Canadians killed in "friendly fire" incidents? In
the case of the investigation into the Sponsorship Program,
while touching upon how public money made its way into Liberal
Party coffers, the problem of why such a situation came into
being has not been tackled. There was no examination of the
desperate need of certain political parties for money in general
and no examination of what it was that drove a long-established
political party in Canada to steal funds from the public purse.
In other words, there was no examination of the crisis in which
the party-dominated system of representative democracy is mired
or of the electoral process designed to bring political parties
to power, why the people feel disempowered or how they are
reduced to the status of voting cattle. Instead, the matter has
been consigned to the existence of some unscrupulous individuals
in the Liberal Party and in the public service, some flaws in the
administrative processes, and a lack of adequate policing. The
practice, norm or code of conduct of Ministerial
responsibility which prevailed not so long ago as a mechanism to
ensure there was accountability was simply discarded. The
implications of this on the polity are not even being considered.
Individual Canadians, individual members of political parties,
political parties themselves, Members of Parliament, civil
servants -- all have been put into an untenable situation of not
knowing what to expect. New laws are enacted without deliberation
worthy of the name and they are railroaded through to further
partisan interests on the basis of sophistic, self-serving
argument such as the following example: The aim is
accountability, transparency, changing the way government works.
These changes will accomplish this aim. The changes are good
because the aim is good and Canadians want this aim. So anyone
who opposes these changes is opposing what Canadians want. In
our opinion, the measures contained in the Act and the
manner it is being dealt with show that the aim is not serious.
It merely has propaganda value. Who sets the aim and what the aim
may be is not discussed or approved but taken as righteous. The
solution to a serious problem is then presented in the
form of increased state regulation of political parties and
increased surveillance, policing and prosecution of public office
holders and public servants. The Context
The Gomery Inquiry brought out the fact that the Sponsorship
Program was conceived during a retreat of the Liberal Party
Cabinet on February 1-2, 1996. At that Cabinet retreat, the
principal subject of discussion was a report containing
recommendations on national unity that Minister of
Intergovernmental Affairs Marcel Massé had been assigned to
prepare. Among other things, the Report recommended "a
substantial strengthening of the organization of the Liberal
Party of Canada in Quebec. This means hiring organizers, finding
candidates, identifying ridings that are winnable in the next
federal election, and using the most modern political techniques
of reaching targeted voters." Other recommendations related to
"increasing the federal presence in Quebec," which has come to be
known as a euphemism for interference in the political affairs of
the people of Quebec, some of it illegal, as was the case during
the 1995 referendum "unity rally." The view of the
Liberal Cabinet that getting Liberals elected
in Quebec was the solution to Canada's constitutional crisis and
the decision to do this at all cost, combined with the refusal of
the Government of Canada to recognize the right of the people of
Quebec to self-determination, up to and including secession if
they so desire, led to what is now known as the Sponsorship
Scandal. The ensuing activities involved a kick-back scheme
through which funds were channelled into the coffers of the
Liberal Party and electoral campaigns that were illegally
funded. To this day, the facts related to this have
not been fully
investigated and nobody has been held to account for violations
of the Canada Elections Act. How can we expect
politicians
to be held accountable in the future in such a situation is a
legitimate question. The Liberal Party was absolved by purging
some of its members and paying back to the state treasury the
money it received through known government contract kick-backs.
The fact that it used public money to pay back the taxpayers,
money which was given to it according to votes received through
fraudulent election campaigns, was not even considered a matter
of concern. The Notion That the Absence of Law Is
the Problem
In terms of political financing, the overall approach
contained in the Federal Accountability Act
according to
which the problem is one of law and order, is to increase the
laws and restrictions on contributions and to extend the amount
of time under which prosecution can be initiated. The key,
according to the Prime Minister, is to "toughen the laws." In
terms of the functioning of the civil service, a similar approach
is taken. In the opinion of the Marxist-Leninist
Party of Canada (MLPC),
the notion that the problem is an absence of law is ridiculous.
For example, one of the sections of the explanatory notes to the
Federal Accountability Act has a headline reading:
"Ban
Secret Donations to Political Candidates." By definition a
"secret donation" is not known, so the notion that such
contributions can be banned is ludicrous to say the least. The
activities which led to the Sponsorship Scandal were not
committed as a result of the absence of law but involved breaking
the law and breaking it with impunity for years on end. The facts
show that through the Sponsorship Program, the existing laws were
violated by officials of the Liberal Party who attempted to fix
the results of several elections and by-elections in Quebec by
circumventing the electoral laws. One of the
proposed changes to the Canada Elections Act
is that cash contributions over $20 will be illegal and all
contributions regardless of the form will have to be receipted at
the $20.00 point. The picture that remains in everyone's mind in
terms of corruption and the Sponsorship Scandal is the bags of
money being handed over in restaurants. Members of Parliament and
Senators deliberating on this Act cannot be so blind as to
suggest that such a prohibition can prevent money from being
illicitly used to influence political affairs in the future. In
fact, a one-sided approach is being taken which further
discriminates against the involvement of ordinary citizens in
building political parties. So long as elections remain primarily
all about money, not citizen empowerment to exercise control over
their choices and elected representatives and governments, all
these changes actually facilitate the increasing concentration of
power in fewer hands which is in itself one of the factors that
facilitates corruption, patronage and cronyism. The
Effect of Bill C-2 on Political Formations: Violation
of
the Right to Freedom of Association
When Bill C-24, An Act to Amend the Canada Elections
Act
and the Income Tax Act (Political Financing), was introduced
by the Liberals, the MLPC argued that limits on contributions to
registered political parties constituted a violation of the right
to freedom of association. Freedom of association is generally
understood to mean that no one can be penalized for forming any
association they choose so long as the aims of the association
are not to break the law. The reality of Bill C-2 is that one of
the elements of freedom of association -- fund-raising to build
that association -- has itself become a criminal act. An
individual who contributes more than $1,000 to a registered
political party will be breaking the law. An individual who makes
a $21 cash contribution or accepts a $21 cash contribution will
be breaking the law. A monthly political dues system, a tradition
in workers' parties, at any level above $83.33 per month will be
illegal. The reform will bar individuals from
getting together and
raising money amongst themselves for a common political aim on
their own terms, if they participate in elections as a registered
party. For example, if a political party wants to carry out a
special project that requires large sums of money, such as
building an educational institute, it could not directly appeal
to the people to make large contributions to carry this out. At a
time when the role of political parties in Canada is in disrepute
and one of the reasons for this is that they are seen as crass
election machines, Bill C-2 will further entrench the conception
of a political party as an organization that functions only as a
machine to solicit and deliver the vote and then be paid for each
vote from the federal treasury. The media are currently carrying
complaints about the Conservative nomination process where
increasing evidence points to problems which emerge when forces
that control a party run roughshod over party members and their
expectations. Furthermore, Bill C-2's limits on
contributions, like those in
Bill C-24, make illegal the very means through which the
political parties in the House of Commons established themselves.
A new political party would not be able to raise large political
contributions such as those that the Conservative (Reform) Party
solicited from the oil industry in Alberta, or those that the New
Democratic Party solicited from the trade unions. In this regard,
it is of interest to note that in the period before the limits on
trade union and corporate contributions came into effect, while
the Liberals were waxing eloquent about large donations creating
at least the perception of undue influence, and about the need
for transparency, it accepted a donation of $2,974,341.20 from a
numbered corporation. At the same time the New Democratic Party
more than doubled the contributions from its top-ten union
contributors from the year before. This shows the self-serving
character of such electoral reforms which among other things will
serve to stifle the formation of political opposition to the
established parties in the House of Commons and lead to further
fighting within these parties and between these parties. The
parties in Parliament have secured for themselves, in the form of
dollars for votes, a multi-million dollar source of perpetual
state-financing, which in turn is routinely used as collateral
for bank loans. And for some strange reason this practice is not
considered a corrupt form of corporate funding. The
Difference Between Regulating Elections and
Regulating
Political Parties
In the course of the Senate Hearings on Bill C-2, a dispute
has emerged about the Conservatives not reporting, as
contributions to the party, registration fees to the March 2005
Conservative Party Policy Convention. This incident highlighted a
significant political development in Canada, one which is
manifest in Bill C-2 and in Bill C-24 before it. As more and more
regulations are introduced governing what a registered political
party can and cannot do, the distinction between the role of the
state in conducting elections and the role of the state in
controlling political parties is being obliterated. The former is
justifiable, necessary and in need of democratic renewal. The
latter is unacceptable, anti-democratic and making a mockery of
any conception of political freedom. It is a
dangerous road that is being paved because the
development of such broad state power over the internal affairs
of political parties constitutes a police-state in the making.
The dispute over convention registration fees certainly brought
to the fore the extent to which the internal affairs of political
parties have been brought under state regulation and how even the
most routine political affair can be turned into a suspected,
potential or real crime. Elections are a legitimate
target of legislation. The state
has the duty and responsibility to guarantee that all citizens,
regardless of their economic status, can exercise their right to
elect and to be elected. It has the duty to guarantee that
elections are conducted in conditions that enable citizens to
deliberate on the future of their society, to select and elect
candidates from amongst their peers, to set the agenda to be
discussed, and consequently elect their government. Such laws
should be enacted in Canada and the exclusive domain that
political parties have over elections and government should be
ended. The Distinction Between Funding Political
Parties and
Candidates and Funding Elections
Just as the distinction between regulating political parties
and regulating elections is being obliterated, so too the
distinction between funding the electoral process and funding
political parties is being obscured. In Canada, the
existing body of law is said to create "free
and fair" elections through a regime of election spending limits
and more recently political contribution limits. This regime is
out of control and anathema to political freedom because (1)
election campaigning has no beginning and no end; (2) the amount
of money required to compete in an election, even with "spending
limits," is out of reach for anybody who is not independently
wealthy or connected to the power brokers in one of the political
parties of the establishment; (3) the inherent competition drives
the parties of the establishment to constantly try to outdo each
other especially by finding loop-holes and ways to circumvent the
law; and (4) the only way to control the money spent by political
parties during elections becomes a battle cry to control the
political parties themselves and to control who contributes to
them. While failing to provide "an even playing field" as
professed, the party-dominated system of representative democracy
has created a conundrum which is endangering the very notion of
freedom of political association and related political rights and
freedoms. This is seen in the restrictions on "third party"
spending which effectively discourages organized participation in
the elections. Public Funds Should Be Used to Fund
the Selection and
Election of Candidates by the Electors
It is one of the anomalies of the development of Canada's
electoral laws that the more the rights of every member of the
polity to elect and be elected were said to be recognized, the
more the electoral law has strengthened the role of political
parties as "primary political organizations" rather than enabling
all citizens to exercise political rights. The electoral law has
thus become legislation enabling privileged political parties,
not all members of the polity, to participate in governance. An
extension of the problem is rule by executive decree. Neither the
House of Commons nor the Senate can calmly and responsibly
deliberate on draft legislation. For their part, MPs have no
power to set government agenda and members of parties have less
and less power over their own parties. It is the
opinion of the MLPC that the state should finance no
one and instead should finance the process of selection of
candidates. All those people, whosoever wishes to present himself
or herself as a candidate for election, first presents himself or
herself for selection and the state must fund the entire process.
This means that it would be the responsibility of non-partisan
constituency committees, established under the control of an
electoral commission, to ensure that the selection process is
carried out properly. These committees would be
responsible for making information
available about every prospective candidate to everyone in the
constituency. A constituency committee would be responsible for
organizing debates and meetings in which every candidate for
selection is free to participate. Should the workers in a factory
or other place of work wish to select someone from their own
ranks to represent them in the election, this too must be
facilitated. Those who are chosen by their own political parties
would also present themselves at this stage in the electoral
process for selection. The people in the constituency would then
select no more than three people to run as candidates in the
election. The members of a political party would be on an equal
footing with everyone else who seeks to present himself or
herself for election. The next stage of the
election would be held in a similar
manner, with public funds being used to provide the electors with
all the information required to cast an informed vote. Whether a
candidate has money or not, whether he or she agrees or disagrees
with the views of a particular political party, the candidate has
an equal opportunity to present himself or herself for election.
Only if the process of selection is funded through public funds
and no public funds are made available to special interest
groups, including political parties, can this become a
reality. There would be no need to have legislation
that intrudes into
the functioning of political parties if public funds were used to
fund the election process. For example, one of the justifications
given for regulating and controlling the leadership contests of
political parties is the fact that the leader of a political
party could eventually end up being the prime minister of the
country because of the role played by political parties in the
system. If citizens were empowered to exercise their right to
select, elect and be elected, the government would be formed by
members of Parliament who have been entrusted to govern the
country according to the will of the majority, with the prime
minister and other ministers elected by them from amongst the
elected members. Conclusion
Just over two and a half years ago, the current political
financing regime was put into place with per-vote subsidies
introduced for the first time along with limits on contributions.
The different regime has not improved the perception of Canadians
as to the integrity and honesty of the system because it has not
changed in any substantive way the relationship between electors
and political parties, their role in the polity, and the
marginalization of the electors by the system of party
government. Is the key found in $4,000, the difference between
the limits imposed by the Liberals and the limits now being
proposed by the Conservatives? To suggest that changing the
contribution limits by $4,000 and eliminating corporate and trade
union contributions (when it is already known that the ways to
circumvent these prohibitions are many), is to make a mockery of
the very concept of reform. Real democratic reform begins with
the suggestion of the MLPC for the government to fund the
electoral process and not political parties. As the
MLPC pointed out when Bill C-24 was passed, each reform
to the Canada Elections Act has merely exacerbated
the
crisis of the system of party government. This will clearly be
the case with the Federal Accountability Act and
its
changes to the Canada Elections Act. These changes
are yet
another example of changes which will further the concentration
of power in fewer and fewer hands. The outcome will be the
opposite of what Canadians want. In the opinion of
the MLPC, the Senators should ensure that
the proposed changes in the Act are properly deliberated on by
all concerned Canadians for as long as necessary. Unless the aim
is discussed and warranted conclusions are drawn about the matter
at hand, then how do we measure the changes or whether they
achieve the aim? This problem will not go away. It would be
better to deal with it now, taking as much time as required,
rather than hoping it will go away by acceding to an
ill-conceived bill.
This article was published in
Volume 50 Number 48 - December 12,
2020
Article Link:
2006
: Harper Government Fails to Restore Trust in Undemocratic Institutions - MLPC Brief
Website: www.cpcml.ca
Email: editor@cpcml.ca
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