Taking Apart the Report

The recent publication of a report[1] issued by the Independent Fact-Finding Mission in Venezuela of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations (UN)[2] was highlighted in the media and international opinion for its accusations regarding the situation of human rights in Venezuela.

This report deals, with great specificity, with extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture "and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment committed since 2014."

The Mission was approved by Resolution 42/25[3] of September 27, 2019, in a vote at the UN Human Rights Council, which was rejected in December 2019 by the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry.

On that occasion the resolution was supported by the votes of: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Slovakia, Spain, Hungary, Northern Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ukraine.

The resolution that gave rise to this commission was rejected by Venezuela at the time[4] and today it is in contradiction with the instruments of collaboration that the Bolivarian Republic has ratified with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, led by Michelle Bachelet, which has an office in the country and has to date presented two reports that have clear differences with the one that has been published now.

Venezuela is working in coordination with the Office of the High Commissioner within the framework of the Letter of Understanding signed in September 2019,[5] in accordance with the provisions of Resolution A/HRC/42/4, adopted by the Human Rights Council in its 42nd session.

It is worth saying that, despite the good offices and auspices of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Venezuelan government, the existence of this parallel commission not ratified by Venezuela arises within the same contradictions of the institutional structure of the United Nations system. These contradictions separate the actions of the High Commissioner's office from the actions that countries take on their own, even though they are part of the Human Rights Council.

This mechanism which Venezuela does not recognize appears to have been put in place by a group of countries that, in 2019, were fully aligned with the U.S. strategy of building a spurious dossier against Venezuela, as part of the ongoing agenda of overthrowing the government and the establishment of a "parallel" government and diplomacy that, at that time and right up to today, has tried to isolate the legitimate institutions of the country.

The report that has resulted from this parallel Commission and, to repeat, that was not ratified by Venezuela, bears the markings of the efforts of the United States government, but also those of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Lima Group, agencies that have played a key role in the criminalization of Venezuelan institutions and the Bolivarian Government.

The Misión Verdad (Truth Mission) research and analysis team has conducted a detailed review of this report and outlines its most salient inconsistencies below.

The Political Purpose of the Report

In context, the report emerges in the lead-up to the upcoming parliamentary elections in Venezuela. It was ratified by the International Contact Group organized by the European Union (EU) to deal with the political crisis in Venezuela and, after its publication, the EU has confirmed its position of not observing and accompanying[6] the country's upcoming elections.

With the report, the EU rids itself of the flimsy pretext of not showing up for the elections in Venezuela due to "lack of time" to organize its mission in the country. This, despite the fact that Venezuela's invitation was issued months in advance. The EU had distanced itself from the Venezuelan elections, declaring the alleged unfeasibility of organizing a mission three months ahead of December 6 this year, and now its diplomatic representatives declare that human rights conditions in the country preclude such a possibility.

Although the EU had taken open steps toward a possible observation and approval of the parliamentary elections, its foreign policy once again veered in favour of the U.S. agenda that seeks the continuity of the political crisis in Venezuela and the inopportune support of the current National Assembly.

The position of the EU is clearly linked to what was said by the Secretary General of the OAS, Luis Almagro, who immediately after the report was published, aligned it against the Venezuelan elections,[7] declaring that, because of such supposed human rights conditions, elections should not be organized and should not be recognized.

The report now becomes an instrument not only for the criminalization of the Venezuelan authorities, but also a watershed in the international institutional setup to deny the legitimacy of the Venezuelan elections and their quality as a political solution.

It will lead to gestures of non-recognition of the elections by countries and, in this scenario, the perpetuation for another five years of the crisis induced in the country and the superimposed government of Juan Guaidó, that is artificial and non-existent in fact, but an essential component for the continuance of the economic blockade against the country.

On the other hand, the document refers to alleged "systematic" violations of human rights and "crimes against humanity" that would have been carried out with "the full knowledge" of President Nicolás Maduro and his government. The objective is to establish a false long-term record of the non-applicability of crimes against humanity. It has no other purpose than to create a pseudo-legal precedent with criminal intentions against the Venezuelan authorities.

The report goes with other elements on the table, such as the efforts by the U.S. Attorney General William Barr months ago, to offer a reward for the capture of the Venezuelan President and part of his civilian and military cabinet at that time, for supposed "narco-terrorism," an action analyzed by Misión Verdad[8] at the time.

On the Preparation of the Report

As the document itself indicates, it is based on interviews with anti-Chávez political actors and was not conducted on the ground. This calls into question the very title of the report, since there can be no "fact-finding" without cross-checking testimonies on the ground.

1. In points 41, 42 and 43 corresponding to the first part of the report, the Independent Fact-Finding Mission in Venezuela of the UN Human Rights Council, again not recognized by the Bolivarian Government, reveals some initial shortcomings at the methodological level.

On the basis of these points, it constructs the general categories under which it falsely seeks to link the President of the Republic Nicolás Maduro, and other high officials of the Venezuelan State, to alleged crimes against humanity.

On these three points, the Mission's report establishes that the deprivation of liberty of certain individuals has been based on a scheme of persecution of political ideas and opinions, whitewashing their participation in acts of public agitation, violation of human rights, attacks on legal institutions and public order.

Under the premise that, supposedly, the Venezuelan State persecutes opposition figures for their opinions, the aim is to whitewash a set of actions harmful to the peace of the country that have had to be dealt with by the security forces.

On these points, the report also repeats that crimes against humanity have been committed as a result of so-called arbitrary detentions, cruel and inhumane treatment and other illegal practices attributed to the Venezuelan State.

The use of the concept of crime against humanity is misused from the beginning, constituting a methodological error that, in addition to weakening the technical credibility of the report, fully reveals its political intentions.

Acts that can be considered as crimes against humanity are stipulated in the articles of the Rome Statute,[9] the governing document of the International Criminal Court. The key concept of article 7, where the fundamental premises of crimes against humanity rest, is "extermination," understood as intentional actions that seek to progressively eliminate a population due to its political, ethnic or religious affiliation. It is fallacious to conceive that in Venezuela there are generalized practices to exterminate political or social sectors.


International Criminal Court in The Hague

2. The report elaborates an extensive chronology that attempts to summarize the last years marked by political conflict in Venezuela. In the analysis of the fundamental political events of the cycle that began with the presidency of Nicolás Maduro in 2013, the report shows high doses of political bias. This is reflected in the intention to transfer responsibility to the Bolivarian Government as the architect of the political and institutional crises of recent years, concealing the agendas of violence, a continuous coup and political disruption propagated by Venezuelan opposition actors.

A specific point demonstrates the political aim of the chronology. In number 87 it mentions Óscar Pérez, a CICPC [Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigation Corps] official who in June 2017 stole a helicopter from the La Carlota Air Base and flew over public institutions located in the centre of Caracas, firing machine gun blasts and hitting them with fragmentation grenades, endangering the lives of civilians and even minors. The report does not classify this as an attack with terrorist characteristics, but rather reduces it to a brief, not very detailed mention.

The report also does not review with sufficient forcefulness and importance another important event that involved Óscar Pérez. In December 2017 Pérez starred in an assault on the command of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) located in San Pedro de Los Altos,[10] in the Guaicaipuro municipality of Miranda state. After gagging several military personnel and stealing weapons and ammunition, Pérez posted the scene on social media to enhance the impact of the assault. The armed and irregular action was part of the forming of a paramilitary cell led by himself for the purpose of initiating a low-intensity conflict of attrition against the Venezuelan institutions and security forces.

Another sign of political bias has to do with the interviews with Cristopher Figuera, who was directly involved in the attempted military coup in April 2019 ("Operation Libertad" -- Guaidó-López) and who now is protected by the United States government. Throughout the entire report, the whitewashing of his figure to make political use of his discourse as an actor who provides "privileged information" is noteworthy.

In point number 1987, a candid Figuera is portrayed as one who was never involved in the criminalizing acts of the report, giving the character in question an image of equanimity that contrasts with the alleged criminal nature of the government of Nicolás Maduro:

"General Figuera told the Mission that when he was appointed Director General of SEBIN [Bolivarian Intelligence Service] at the end of 2018, he took steps to change the practices inside the intelligence body. He told the Mission that he investigated specific allegations of torture, dismissed an official who he believed was involved in violations and secured the release of certain detainees, among other measures. The Mission has no knowledge of any complaints about torture during the period in which he was Director. Likewise, it does not have information either that criminal investigations might have been carried out into the complaints of torture in SEBIN nor of sanctions against those responsible."

3. In point 262 the report states:

"The Mission finds reasonable grounds to believe that arbitrary arrests were used to attack people for their political affiliation, participation, views, opinions or expression during the period under review."

In this sense, the Mission reveals its inconsistency since the people were not detained for their opinions or points of view, but for their involvement in coup d'état operations and the violations of internal stability that have left hundreds of innocent civilian victims, as evidenced by the cycle of colour revolutions/guarimbas [street barricades] in 2014 and 2017.

4. Later, the report establishes that the SEBIN and the DGCIM [Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence] have committed acts of torture and abuse of the human rights of those deprived of liberty. These accusations are supported in anonymous interviews impossible to verify. Because the Venezuelan executive does not recognize the legitimacy of this Mission, since it was raised as a "ghost" commission (Foreign Minister Arreaza dixit[11]) parallel to the one established by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, it evaded dialogue with the officials responsible for both institutions, since the report was produced outside the country, insisting that "there was no response" from the Venezuelan State.

Much of this argument is based on the accusations made by the former director of SEBIN Cristopher Figuera. Figuera fled Venezuela after the failure of "Operation Libertad" in April 2019, and since then has become a "source" for attacking the Bolivarian government. The report, we repeat, gives high credibility to Figuera's opinions, knowing his political partiality and his participation in an attempted coup, which weakens the accusations made against SEBIN and the DGCIM.

5. The report refers to the iconic case of Leopoldo López. Relying on the account of his lawyer (Juan Carlos Gutiérrez) and descriptions that are not very detailed or demonstrable, the Mission considers that López was a victim of "torture and cruel treatment or punishment," even though there are no examples or records that confirm this. The report bases this accusation on the night searches, the changes to the visitation period and other elements of anticipation and security against his possible plans to escape from the Ramo Verde prison.

Given the treatment of this case, it is noteworthy that there is a whitewashing of the events promoted by the operators of the coup in Venezuela. There is no contextual explanation of why López was arrested (promoter of a colour revolution/guarimba/coup d'état), the statement by Diosdado Cabello about the intention to murder López that his own family denounced is ignored[12] and the data supposedly proving his "arbitrary detention" is just accepted, which explains nothing. The same happens with the rest of the cases of the imprisoned politicians (some of whom were pardoned at the end of August), so it is not worth elaborating on the rest of the cases.

6. Later, the report refers to the cases of Antonio Ledezma, Gilber Caro and Steyci Escalona. In this section the report seeks to overwhelm with a cascade of statements that start from a biased version of their detentions, incorporating confusing elements that are difficult to prove in order to demonstrate the thesis of arbitrary detentions and abuse of the human rights of these individuals imprisoned for their involvement in coup plotting.

In Ledezma's case, the account of the events makes the former mayor appear as a hero of freedom who managed to "escape" (not break out) from his house arrest, which resulted from his having been involved in coup plotting and insurrection against the Republic (the so-called "Golpe azul" [Blue Coup] of 2015).

7. In point 470, aimed at negating government security plans, it uses the testimony of unidentified people, whom it implicates in mistreatment and human rights violations. This account is one of the most strident in the entire report and raises suspicions about the methodology of statements used on condition of anonymity.

Many of the testimonies allude to the fact that detainees at the time of the interrogation were "forced" to declare allegedly non-existent connections or facts. The whitewashing of the operators of the continuing coup in Venezuela is absolute.

In the case of Juan Carlos Requesens, to show just one example, according to relatives and lawyers, the government "induced," through drugs, the confession on his part[13] of having been a link for the assassination attempt in 2018.

It should be noted that, likewise, there is too much condescension in the report to characterize the assassination attempt in August 2018 against President Nicolás Maduro and members of the Military High Command for what it was. It doesn't even qualify it as "assassination."

8. The same occurs in the case of Víctor Navarro, leader of the Corazón Valiente [Fearless Heart] Foundation, supported by the United States in a context of violent destabilization to overthrow the Bolivarian Government. The testimonies collected reflect that Navarro was insulted after being detained in 2018, threatened with rape, among other alleged pressure tactics, to generate confessions, situations that the report assumes occurred and that constitute acts of torture.

9. In the case of Operation Liberation of the People (OLP) and Operation Humanitarian Liberation of the People (OLHP), the report assails us with statements and testimonies of eyewitnesses, statements of relatives of the victims and on stories that have a clear profile of sensitization in order to whitewash certain confrontations.

The report highlights that President Nicolás Maduro activated certain corrective measures in the face of different complaints of police excesses in the framework of these security mechanisms. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic also executed a set of indictments, and opened several investigations, to prosecute police officers involved in crimes.

However, the Mission points to these elements arising out of intentions of a particular instance and does not give them an objective weight. In this sense, it chooses to overwhelm with stories and testimonies that project the image of a government and judicial institutions unconcerned in the face of complaints and that, supposedly, collaborated in, directed and coordinated the human rights violations that the report suggests occurred.

10. The use of fallacies and information without context is notable when it states, in point 127, that the National Constituent Assembly was established illegitimately because of not having consulted the population, when the Venezuelan Constitution[14] provides that the President of the Bolivarian Republic can convene a National Constituent Assembly (article 348).


Session of Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly.

In point 145, it says: "The executive allegedly uses the cards to distribute aid based on loyalty to the ruling party." A notoriously false fact: whoever lives in Venezuela can testify against this lie.

Likewise, point 147 says:

"The 'Orinoco Arco Minero Strategic Development Zone' was established in 2016 by Presidential Decree. It was created without conducting the social and environmental impact studies required by the Constitution. It comprises an area of almost 112,000 square kilometres around the Orinoco River that encompasses the states of Amazonas and Bolívar, through concessions expropriated from international companies. Organized crime and illegal armed groups have infiltrated the area, engaging in illegal mining and various related criminal activities, including smuggling. Numerous violations that correspond to the Mission's mandate have been reported in the Arco Minero region, which the Mission was unable to investigate due to time and resource constraints, as noted above."

This is also a fallacy because the Arco Minero is a project that was planned during the presidency of Hugo Chávez and put into practice during the government of Nicolás Maduro, precisely to prevent criminal mining groups from committing illicit acts (economic, sovereign and ecological) in the area circumscribed by the Arco.

11. In point 216, the "collectives" are mentioned for the first time, defining them as "armed groups" and "criminals" (taking Insight Crime as a source), when in the majority of cases they do not fit that profile: they are social and/or popular organizations that do grassroots work in communities of different types (productive, organizational, cultural, health, etc.). In this sense, organized communities, be they communal councils, communes, Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAP) or social and popular collectives/organizations, are criminalized by the report, and identified as being accomplices of the "crimes" described. Thus, grassroots Chavismo is subject to criminalization.

12. The report emphasizes that Venezuela ratified the Rome Statute on June 7, 2000, implying from the outset that the crimes it examines and describes for which it blames the Venezuelan government are liable to be tried before the International Criminal Court.

But later, the report clarifies in point 1977:

"It is important to remember at this stage that the Mission's conclusions are based on a particular evidentiary criterion: the Mission considers that the facts are established if there are reasonable grounds to affirm them. This criterion is both lower than the criterion required for a criminal conviction (proof beyond reasonable doubt) and than the balance or probability test in civil matters (which means that something is more likely to have happened). The Mission's findings do not amount to a criminal conviction and the information presented here is, in most respects, less than what would be needed to achieve a criminal conviction. The determination of the individual criminal responsibility of the persons mentioned in this section must be carried out by the competent judicial authorities." (Emphasis by Misión Verdad).

This inconsistency clearly shows that the report attempts to skew Venezuelan and world public opinion in favour of the Mission's objectives (in a context of increasing siege and suffocation by internal and external factors, plus the electoral context).

13. At the end of the report, in the "recommendations to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," point 59 says:

"Cooperate with the bodies of the Organization of American States. Comply with the precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission and the provisional measures issued by the Inter-American Court. Apply the judgments of the Inter-American Court related to Venezuela."

The sentence summarizes what Venezuela must do so that the accusations against its leaders cease to have effect, or lapse into a non-condemnation, which is the prerogative of those who promote this Mission: to allow themselves to be protected in a blackmailing manner under the banner of human rights from the institutions that are directly controlled by the United States, or are directly or indirectly influenced in an obvious way.

14. In the "recommendations to the international community," the report states:

"63. States should consider the possibility of initiating legal actions against the individuals responsible for the violations and crimes identified in this report, in accordance with their pertinent domestic legislation."

The foregoing can be considered a call to the Lima Group and other countries in the Anglo-imperial orbit of influence to adhere to the strategy of strangulation of the Venezuelan population and government and even to deepen the pressure already exerted by a good number of countries in the region and in other continents.

Likewise, and to end these "observations" of the Mission, point 65 calls for "the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to take into account the need for timely justice to be done for the victims of the crimes investigated by the Mission and to those who are under your consideration," which concludes the ultimate, long-term purpose of this report: the attempt to force a trial at The Hague against Nicolás Maduro, Diosdado Cabello and other ministers who are held responsible for alleged crimes against humanity.

The inconsistencies of the report are evident everywhere, as long as a lens is used that is not prejudiced by the rhetoric endorsed by the U.S. government regarding the Venezuelan conflict.

Notes

1. ohchr.org 

2. ohchr.org 

3. undocs.org 

4. Venezuelan government document  

5. UN Document

6. talcualdigital.com  

7. Almagro twitter feed 

8. medium.com 

9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 

10. See video here

11. Jorge Arreaza twitter feed 

12. See here 

13. See video here 

14. Venezuelan Constitution 

(Medium, September 18, 2020. Translated from original Spanish by TML. Photos: AVN, Int Criminal Court, Misión Verdad)


This article was published in

Volume 50 Number 36 - September 26, 2020

Article Link:
Taking Apart the Report - Misión Verdad


    

Website:  www.cpcml.ca   Email:  editor@cpcml.ca