Taking Apart the Report
- Misión Verdad - The recent
publication of a report[1]
issued by the Independent Fact-Finding Mission in Venezuela of the
Human Rights Council of the United Nations (UN)[2] was highlighted
in the media and international opinion for its accusations regarding
the situation of human rights in Venezuela. This
report deals, with great specificity, with extrajudicial executions,
forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture "and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment committed since 2014." The
Mission was approved by Resolution 42/25[3] of September 27,
2019, in a vote at the UN Human Rights Council, which was rejected in
December 2019 by the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry. On
that occasion the resolution was supported by the votes of: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic
(Czechia), Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Slovakia, Spain, Hungary, Northern
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ukraine. The resolution that gave rise to this
commission was rejected by Venezuela at the time[4] and today it is
in contradiction with the instruments of collaboration that the
Bolivarian Republic has ratified with the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, led by Michelle Bachelet, which has an
office in the country and has to date presented two reports that have
clear differences with the one that has been published now. Venezuela
is working in coordination with the Office of the High Commissioner
within the framework of the Letter of Understanding signed in September
2019,[5]
in accordance with the provisions of Resolution A/HRC/42/4, adopted by
the Human Rights Council in its 42nd session. It is
worth saying that, despite the good offices and auspices of the Office
of the High Commissioner and the Venezuelan government, the existence
of this parallel commission not ratified by Venezuela arises within the
same contradictions of the institutional structure of the United
Nations system. These contradictions separate the actions of the High
Commissioner's office from the actions that countries take on their
own, even though they are part of the Human Rights Council. This
mechanism which Venezuela does not recognize appears to have been put
in place by a group of countries that, in 2019, were fully aligned with
the U.S. strategy of building a spurious dossier against Venezuela, as
part of the ongoing agenda of overthrowing the government and the
establishment of a "parallel" government and diplomacy that, at that
time and right up to today, has tried to isolate the legitimate
institutions of the country. The report that has
resulted from this parallel Commission and, to repeat, that was not
ratified by Venezuela, bears the markings of the efforts of the United
States government, but also those of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the Lima Group, agencies that have played a
key role in the criminalization of Venezuelan institutions and the
Bolivarian Government. The Misión Verdad
(Truth Mission) research and analysis team has conducted a detailed
review of this report and outlines its most salient inconsistencies
below. The Political Purpose of the Report
In context, the report emerges in the lead-up to
the upcoming parliamentary elections in Venezuela. It was ratified by
the International Contact Group organized by the European Union (EU) to
deal with the political crisis in Venezuela and, after its publication,
the EU has confirmed its position of not observing and accompanying[6] the country's
upcoming elections. With the report, the EU rids
itself of the flimsy pretext of not showing up for the elections in
Venezuela due to "lack of time" to organize its mission in the country.
This, despite the fact that Venezuela's invitation was issued months in
advance. The EU had distanced itself from the Venezuelan elections,
declaring the alleged unfeasibility of organizing a mission three
months ahead of December 6 this year, and now its diplomatic
representatives declare that human rights conditions in the country
preclude such a possibility. Although the EU had
taken open steps toward a possible observation and approval of the
parliamentary elections, its foreign policy once again veered in favour
of the U.S. agenda that seeks the continuity of the political crisis in
Venezuela and the inopportune support of the current National Assembly.
The position of the EU is clearly linked to what was said by
the Secretary General of the OAS, Luis Almagro, who immediately after
the report was published, aligned it against the Venezuelan elections,[7] declaring that,
because of such supposed human rights conditions, elections should not
be organized and should not be recognized. The
report now becomes an instrument not only for the criminalization of
the Venezuelan authorities, but also a watershed in the international
institutional setup to deny the legitimacy of the Venezuelan elections
and their quality as a political solution. It will
lead to gestures of non-recognition of the elections by countries and,
in this scenario, the perpetuation for another five years of the crisis
induced in the country and the superimposed government of Juan
Guaidó, that is artificial and non-existent in fact, but an
essential component for the continuance of the economic blockade
against the country. On the other hand, the
document refers to alleged "systematic" violations of human rights and
"crimes against humanity" that would have been carried out with "the
full knowledge" of President Nicolás Maduro and his
government. The objective is to establish a false long-term record of
the non-applicability of crimes against humanity. It has no other
purpose than to create a pseudo-legal precedent with criminal
intentions against the Venezuelan authorities. The
report goes with other elements on the table, such as the efforts by
the U.S. Attorney General William Barr months ago, to offer a reward
for the capture of the Venezuelan President and part of his civilian
and military cabinet at that time, for supposed "narco-terrorism," an
action analyzed by Misión Verdad[8] at the time.
On the Preparation of the Report As
the document itself indicates, it is based on interviews with
anti-Chávez political actors and was not conducted on the
ground. This calls into question the very title of the report, since
there can be no "fact-finding" without cross-checking testimonies on
the ground. 1. In points 41, 42 and 43
corresponding to the first part of the report, the Independent
Fact-Finding Mission in Venezuela of the UN Human Rights Council, again
not recognized by the Bolivarian Government, reveals some initial
shortcomings at the methodological level. On the
basis of these points, it constructs the general categories under which
it falsely seeks to link the President of the Republic
Nicolás Maduro, and other high officials of the Venezuelan
State, to alleged crimes against humanity. On these
three points, the Mission's report establishes that the deprivation of
liberty of certain individuals has been based on a scheme of
persecution of political ideas and opinions, whitewashing their
participation in acts of public agitation, violation of human rights,
attacks on legal institutions and public order. Under
the premise that, supposedly, the Venezuelan State persecutes
opposition figures for their opinions, the aim is to whitewash a set of
actions harmful to the peace of the country that have had to be dealt
with by the security forces. On these points, the
report also repeats that crimes against humanity have been committed as
a result of so-called arbitrary detentions, cruel and inhumane
treatment and other illegal practices attributed to the Venezuelan
State. The use of the concept of crime against
humanity is misused from the beginning, constituting a methodological
error that, in addition to weakening the technical credibility of the
report, fully reveals its political intentions. Acts
that can be considered as crimes against humanity are stipulated in the
articles of the Rome Statute,[9]
the governing document of the International Criminal Court. The key
concept of article 7, where the fundamental premises of crimes against
humanity rest, is "extermination," understood as intentional actions
that seek to progressively eliminate a population due to its political,
ethnic or religious affiliation. It is fallacious to conceive that in
Venezuela there are generalized practices to exterminate political or
social sectors.
International Criminal Court in The Hague 2. The
report elaborates an extensive chronology that attempts to summarize
the last years marked by political conflict in Venezuela. In the
analysis of the fundamental political events of the cycle that began
with the presidency of Nicolás Maduro in 2013, the report
shows high doses of political bias. This is reflected in the intention
to transfer responsibility to the Bolivarian Government as the
architect of the political and institutional crises of recent years,
concealing the agendas of violence, a continuous coup and political
disruption propagated by Venezuelan opposition actors. A
specific point demonstrates the political aim of the chronology. In
number 87 it mentions Óscar Pérez, a CICPC
[Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigation Corps] official who in
June 2017 stole a helicopter from the La Carlota Air Base and flew over
public institutions located in the centre of Caracas, firing machine
gun blasts and hitting them with fragmentation grenades, endangering
the lives of civilians and even minors. The report does not classify
this as an attack with terrorist characteristics, but rather reduces it
to a brief, not very detailed mention. The report
also does not review with sufficient forcefulness and importance
another important event that involved Óscar
Pérez. In December 2017 Pérez starred in an
assault on the command of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) located
in San Pedro de Los Altos,[10]
in the Guaicaipuro municipality of Miranda state. After gagging several
military personnel and stealing weapons and ammunition,
Pérez posted the scene on social media to enhance the impact
of the assault. The armed and irregular action was part of the forming
of a paramilitary cell led by himself for the purpose of initiating a
low-intensity conflict of attrition against the Venezuelan institutions
and security forces. Another sign of political bias
has to do with the interviews with Cristopher Figuera, who was directly
involved in the attempted military coup in April 2019 ("Operation
Libertad" -- Guaidó-López) and who now is
protected by the United States government. Throughout the entire
report, the whitewashing of his figure to make political use of his
discourse as an actor who provides "privileged information" is
noteworthy. In point number 1987, a candid Figuera
is portrayed as one who was never involved in the criminalizing acts of
the report, giving the character in question an image of equanimity
that contrasts with the alleged criminal nature of the government of
Nicolás Maduro: "General Figuera told
the Mission that when he was appointed Director General of SEBIN
[Bolivarian Intelligence Service] at the end of 2018, he took steps to
change the practices inside the intelligence body. He told the Mission
that he investigated specific allegations of torture, dismissed an
official who he believed was involved in violations and secured the
release of certain detainees, among other measures. The Mission has no
knowledge of any complaints about torture during the period in which he
was Director. Likewise, it does not have information either that
criminal investigations might have been carried out into the complaints
of torture in SEBIN nor of sanctions against those responsible."
3. In point 262 the report states: "The
Mission finds reasonable grounds to believe that arbitrary arrests were
used to attack people for their political affiliation, participation,
views, opinions or expression during the period under review."
In this sense, the Mission reveals its inconsistency since the
people were not detained for their opinions or points of view, but for
their involvement in coup d'état operations and the
violations of internal stability that have left hundreds of innocent
civilian victims, as evidenced by the cycle of colour
revolutions/guarimbas [street barricades] in 2014 and 2017. 4.
Later, the report establishes that the SEBIN and the DGCIM [Directorate
General of Military Counterintelligence] have committed acts of torture
and abuse of the human rights of those deprived of liberty. These
accusations are supported in anonymous interviews impossible to verify.
Because the Venezuelan executive does not recognize the legitimacy of
this Mission, since it was raised as a "ghost" commission (Foreign
Minister Arreaza dixit[11]) parallel to
the one established by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Michelle Bachelet, it evaded dialogue with the officials responsible
for both institutions, since the report was produced outside the
country, insisting that "there was no response" from the Venezuelan
State. Much of this argument is based on the
accusations made by the former director of SEBIN Cristopher Figuera.
Figuera fled Venezuela after the failure of "Operation Libertad" in
April 2019, and since then has become a "source" for attacking the
Bolivarian government. The report, we repeat, gives high credibility to
Figuera's opinions, knowing his political partiality and his
participation in an attempted coup, which weakens the accusations made
against SEBIN and the DGCIM. 5. The report refers
to the iconic case of Leopoldo López. Relying on the account
of his lawyer (Juan Carlos Gutiérrez) and descriptions that
are not very detailed or demonstrable, the Mission considers that
López was a victim of "torture and cruel treatment or
punishment," even though there are no examples or records that confirm
this. The report bases this accusation on the night searches, the
changes to the visitation period and other elements of anticipation and
security against his possible plans to escape from the Ramo Verde
prison. Given the treatment of this case, it is
noteworthy that there is a whitewashing of the events promoted by the
operators of the coup in Venezuela. There is no contextual explanation
of why López was arrested (promoter of a colour
revolution/guarimba/coup d'état), the statement by Diosdado
Cabello about the intention to murder López that his own
family denounced is ignored[12]
and the data supposedly proving his "arbitrary detention" is just
accepted, which explains nothing. The same happens with the rest of the
cases of the imprisoned politicians (some of whom were pardoned at the
end of August), so it is not worth elaborating on the rest of the cases.
6. Later, the report refers to the cases of Antonio Ledezma,
Gilber Caro and Steyci Escalona. In this section the report seeks to
overwhelm with a cascade of statements that start from a biased version
of their detentions, incorporating confusing elements that are
difficult to prove in order to demonstrate the thesis of arbitrary
detentions and abuse of the human rights of these individuals
imprisoned for their involvement in coup plotting. In
Ledezma's case, the account of the events makes the former mayor appear
as a hero of freedom who managed to "escape" (not break out) from his
house arrest, which resulted from his having been involved in coup
plotting and insurrection against the Republic (the so-called "Golpe
azul" [Blue Coup] of 2015). 7. In point 470, aimed
at negating government security plans, it uses the testimony of
unidentified people, whom it implicates in mistreatment and human
rights violations. This account is one of the most strident in the
entire report and raises suspicions about the methodology of statements
used on condition of anonymity. Many of the
testimonies allude to the fact that detainees at the time of the
interrogation were "forced" to declare allegedly non-existent
connections or facts. The whitewashing of the operators of the
continuing coup in Venezuela is absolute. In the
case of Juan Carlos Requesens, to show just one example, according to
relatives and lawyers, the government "induced," through drugs, the
confession on his part[13]
of having been a link for the assassination attempt in 2018. It
should be noted that, likewise, there is too much condescension in the
report to characterize the assassination attempt in August 2018 against
President Nicolás Maduro and members of the Military High
Command for what it was. It doesn't even qualify it as "assassination."
8. The same occurs in the case of Víctor Navarro,
leader of the Corazón Valiente [Fearless Heart] Foundation,
supported by the United States in a context of violent destabilization
to overthrow the Bolivarian Government. The testimonies collected
reflect that Navarro was insulted after being detained in 2018,
threatened with rape, among other alleged pressure tactics, to generate
confessions, situations that the report assumes occurred and that
constitute acts of torture. 9. In the case of
Operation Liberation of the People (OLP) and Operation Humanitarian
Liberation of the People (OLHP), the report assails us with statements
and testimonies of eyewitnesses, statements of relatives of the victims
and on stories that have a clear profile of sensitization in order to
whitewash certain confrontations. The report
highlights that President Nicolás Maduro activated certain
corrective measures in the face of different complaints of police
excesses in the framework of these security mechanisms. The Office of
the Attorney General of the Republic also executed a set of
indictments, and opened several investigations, to prosecute police
officers involved in crimes. However, the Mission
points to these elements arising out of intentions of a particular
instance and does not give them an objective weight. In this sense, it
chooses to overwhelm with stories and testimonies that project the
image of a government and judicial institutions unconcerned in the face
of complaints and that, supposedly, collaborated in, directed and
coordinated the human rights violations that the report suggests
occurred. 10. The use of fallacies and information
without context is notable when it states, in point 127, that the
National Constituent Assembly was established illegitimately because of
not having consulted the population, when the Venezuelan Constitution[14] provides that
the President of the Bolivarian Republic can convene a National
Constituent Assembly (article 348). Session of Venezuela's
National Constituent Assembly. In point 145, it
says: "The executive allegedly uses the cards to distribute aid based
on loyalty to the ruling party." A notoriously false fact: whoever
lives in Venezuela can testify against this lie. Likewise,
point 147 says: "The 'Orinoco Arco Minero Strategic
Development Zone' was established in 2016 by Presidential Decree. It
was created without conducting the social and environmental impact
studies required by the Constitution. It comprises an area of almost
112,000 square kilometres around the Orinoco River that encompasses the
states of Amazonas and Bolívar, through concessions
expropriated from international companies. Organized crime and illegal
armed groups have infiltrated the area, engaging in illegal mining and
various related criminal activities, including smuggling. Numerous
violations that correspond to the Mission's mandate have been reported
in the Arco Minero region, which the Mission was unable to investigate
due to time and resource constraints, as noted above." This
is also a fallacy because the Arco Minero is a project that was planned
during the presidency of Hugo Chávez and put into practice
during the government of Nicolás Maduro, precisely to
prevent criminal mining groups from committing illicit acts (economic,
sovereign and ecological) in the area circumscribed by the Arco.
11. In point 216, the "collectives" are mentioned for the
first time, defining them as "armed groups" and "criminals" (taking
Insight Crime as a source), when in the majority of cases they do not
fit that profile: they are social and/or popular organizations that do
grassroots work in communities of different types (productive,
organizational, cultural, health, etc.). In this sense, organized
communities, be they communal councils, communes, Local Supply and
Production Committees (CLAP) or social and popular
collectives/organizations, are criminalized by the report, and
identified as being accomplices of the "crimes" described. Thus,
grassroots Chavismo is subject to criminalization. 12.
The report emphasizes that Venezuela ratified the Rome Statute on June
7, 2000, implying from the outset that the crimes it examines and
describes for which it blames the Venezuelan government are liable to
be tried before the International Criminal Court. But
later, the report clarifies in point 1977: "It is
important to remember at this stage that the Mission's conclusions are
based on a particular evidentiary criterion: the Mission considers that
the facts are established if there are reasonable grounds to affirm
them. This criterion is both lower than the criterion required for a
criminal conviction (proof beyond reasonable doubt) and than the
balance or probability test in civil matters (which means that
something is more likely to have happened). The Mission's
findings do not amount to a criminal conviction and the information
presented here is, in most respects, less than what would be needed to
achieve a criminal conviction. The determination of the
individual criminal responsibility of the persons mentioned in this
section must be carried out by the competent judicial authorities." (Emphasis
by Misión Verdad). This
inconsistency clearly shows that the report attempts to skew Venezuelan
and world public opinion in favour of the Mission's objectives (in a
context of increasing siege and suffocation by internal and external
factors, plus the electoral context). 13. At the
end of the report, in the "recommendations to the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela," point 59 says: "Cooperate with the
bodies of the Organization of American States. Comply with the
precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission and the
provisional measures issued by the Inter-American Court. Apply the
judgments of the Inter-American Court related to Venezuela." The
sentence summarizes what Venezuela must do so that the accusations
against its leaders cease to have effect, or lapse into a
non-condemnation, which is the prerogative of those who promote this
Mission: to allow themselves to be protected in a blackmailing manner
under the banner of human rights from the institutions that are
directly controlled by the United States, or are directly or indirectly
influenced in an obvious way. 14. In the
"recommendations to the international community," the report states:
"63. States should consider the possibility of initiating
legal actions against the individuals responsible for the violations
and crimes identified in this report, in accordance with their
pertinent domestic legislation." The foregoing can
be considered a call to the Lima Group and other countries in the
Anglo-imperial orbit of influence to adhere to the strategy of
strangulation of the Venezuelan population and government and even to
deepen the pressure already exerted by a good number of countries in
the region and in other continents. Likewise, and
to end these "observations" of the Mission, point 65 calls for "the
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to take
into account the need for timely justice to be done for the victims of
the crimes investigated by the Mission and to those who are under your
consideration," which concludes the ultimate, long-term purpose of this
report: the attempt to force a trial at The Hague against
Nicolás Maduro, Diosdado Cabello and other ministers who are
held responsible for alleged crimes against humanity. The
inconsistencies of the report are evident everywhere, as long as a lens
is used that is not prejudiced by the rhetoric endorsed by the U.S.
government regarding the Venezuelan conflict. Notes
1. ohchr.org
2. ohchr.org
3. undocs.org
4. Venezuelan
government document 5.
UN
Document 6. talcualdigital.com
7. Almagro
twitter feed 8. medium.com
9. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court
10. See video here
11. Jorge
Arreaza twitter feed 12. See here
13. See video here
14. Venezuelan
Constitution
This article was published in
Volume 50 Number 36 - September 26, 2020
Article Link:
Taking Apart the Report - Misión Verdad
Website: www.cpcml.ca
Email: editor@cpcml.ca
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