Falsificators of History Chapter 3: The Isolation of the Soviet Union and The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact
Soviet Information Bureau, February 1948 -
the seizure of Czechoslovakia fascist Germany proceeded with her
preparations for war quite openly, before the eyes of the whole world.
Hitler, encouraged by Britain and France, no longer stood on ceremony
or pretended to favour the peaceful settlement of European problems.
The most dramatic months of the prewar period had come. At that time it
was already clear that every day was bringing mankind nearer to the
unparalleled catastrophe of war.
What was, at
that time, the policy of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and of Great
Britain and France on the other?
The attempt of the
falsifiers of history in the United States of America to avoid
answering this question merely goes to prove that their consciences are
The truth is that even during the fatal
period of the spring and summer of 1939, on the threshold of war,
Britain and France, supported by ruling circles in the United States,
continued the former course of their policy. This was a policy of
provocative incitement of Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union,
camouflaged not only with pharisaical phrases about their readiness to
cooperate with the Soviet Union, but also with certain simple
diplomatic manoeuvres intended to conceal the real character of their
policy from world public opinion.
such manoeuvres were, in the first place, the 1939
negotiations which Britain and France decided to open with the Soviet
Union. In order to deceive public opinion, the ruling circles in
Britain and France tried to depict these negotiations as a serious
attempt to prevent the further extension of Hitlerite aggression. In
the light of all the subsequent developments, however, it became
perfectly clear that so far as the Anglo-French side was concerned,
these negotiations were from the very beginning nothing but another
move in their double game.
This was also clear to
the leaders of Hitler Germany, for whom the meaning of the negotiations
with the Soviet Union, undertaken by the Governments of Britain and
France, was certainly no secret. Here, for example, is what the German
Ambassador to London, Dirksen, wrote in his report to the German
Foreign Ministry on August 3, 1939, as is evident from documents
captured by the Soviet Army during the defeat of Hitler Germany:
"The prevailing impression here was that [Britain's] ties with
other states formed during the recent months were only a reserve means
for a real reconciliation with Germany and that these ties would cease
to exist as soon as the one important aim, worthy of effort -- an
agreement with Germany -- was achieved."
opinion was firmly shared by all German diplomats who watched the
situation in London.
In another secret
report to Berlin, Dirksen wrote:
"By means of
armaments and the acquisition of allies, Britain wants to gain strength
and to catch up with the Axis, but at the same time she wants to try to
reach an amicable agreement with Germany by means of negotiations."
slanderers and falsifiers of history are trying to keep these documents
hidden since they shed a bright light on the situation during the last
prewar months, without correct assessment of which it would be
impossible to understand the true prehistory of the war. By undertaking
negotiations with the Soviet Union and giving guarantees to Poland,
Romania and certain other states, Britain and France, with the support
of the ruling circles in the United States, played a double game
calculated to lead to an agreement with Hitler Germany, for the purpose
of directing her aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union.
The negotiations between Britain and France on the one hand,
and the Soviet Union on the other, began in March 1939, and continued
for about four months.
The whole course of these
negotiations showed with perfect clarity that whereas the Soviet Union
was trying to reach a broad agreement with the Western Powers on the
basis of equality, an agreement capable of preventing Germany, even
though at the last moment, from starting a war in Europe, the
Governments of Britain and France, relying on support in the United
States, set themselves entirely different aims. The ruling circles in
Britain and France, accustomed to having others pull their chestnuts
out of the fire, on this occasion too attempted to foist obligations
upon the Soviet Union under which the USSR would have taken upon itself
the brunt of the sacrifice in repulsing a possible Hitler aggression,
while Britain and France would not bind themselves by any commitment to
the Soviet Union.
If the rulers of Britain and
France had succeeded in this manoeuvre they would have come
much closer to attaining their basic aim, which was to get Germany and
the Soviet Union to come to grips as quickly as possible. The Soviet
Government, however, saw through this scheme, and at all stages in the
negotiations it countered the diplomatic trickery and subterfuges of
the Western Powers with its clear and frank proposals intended to serve
but one purpose -- the safeguarding of peace in Europe.
is no need to recall all the vicissitudes through which the
negotiations went. We need only bring to mind a few of the more
important points. It suffices to recall the terms put forward during
the negotiations by the Soviet Government: the conclusion of an
effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression between Britain,
France, and the USSR; the granting of a guarantee by Britain, France,
and the USSR to states of Central and Eastern Europe, including all the
European countries bordering on the USSR, without exception; the
conclusion of a concrete military agreement between Britain, France,
and the USSR on the forms and volume of immediate effective aid to each
other and to the guaranteed states in the event of an attack by
the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31, 1939, V.
M. Molotov pointed out that some of the Anglo-French proposals moved
during those negotiations had contained none of the elementary
principles of reciprocity and equality of obligations, indispensable
for all agreements between equals.
guaranteeing themselves," said V. M. Molotov, "from direct attack on
the part of aggressors by mutual assistance pacts between themselves
and with Poland and while trying to secure for themselves the
assistance of the USSR in the event of an attack by aggressors on
Poland and Romania, the British and French left open the question of
whether the USSR in its turn might count on their assistance in the
event of its being directly attacked by aggressors, just as they left
open another question, namely, whether they could participate in
guaranteeing the small states bordering on the USSR and covering its
northwestern frontier, should these states prove unable to defend their
neutrality from attack by aggressors. Thus, the position was one of
inequality for the USSR."
Even when the British and
French representatives gave verbal consent to the principle of mutual
assistance on terms of reciprocity between Britain, France, and the
USSR in the event of a direct attack by an aggressor, they hedged it in
with a number of reservations which rendered this consent fictitious.
In addition to this, the Anglo-French proposals provided for
help on the part of the USSR to those countries to which the British
and French had given promises of guarantees, but they said nothing
about their own help for the countries on the northwestern frontier of
the USSR, the Baltic States, in the event of an aggressor attacking
In view of the above-mentioned
considerations, V. M. Molotov announced that the Soviet Union could not
undertake obligations with respect to some countries unless similar
guarantees were given with respect to the countries situated on the
northwestern frontier of the Soviet Union.
should also be remembered that when, on March 18, 1939, Seeds, the
British Ambassador to Moscow, asked the People's Commissar of Foreign
Affairs what the Soviet Union's position would be in the event of
Hitler's aggression against Romania -- concerning the preparation of
which the British possessed information -- and when the question was
then raised by the Soviet side as to what Britain's position would be
under those circumstances, Seeds evaded reply, stating that Romania was
geographically closer to the Soviet Union than it was to England.
Thus, from the very first step, it was already quite clear
that British ruling circles were endeavouring to bind the Soviet Union
to definite obligations, while they themselves would stand aloof. This
artless method was then again and again repeated regularly throughout
the whole course of the negotiations.
In reply to
the British inquiry, the Soviet Government suggested that a conference
be called of representatives of the most interested states -- namely
Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland, Turkey, and the Soviet Union.
In the opinion of the Soviet Government, such a conference would offer
the best opportunities for ascertaining the real state of affairs and
for determining the positions of all the participants. The British
Government, however, replied that it believed the Soviet proposal to be
Instead of calling a conference which
would have made it possible to agree on concrete measures to combat
aggression, the British Government on March 21, 1939 proposed to the
Soviet Government the signing, together with it as well as with France
and Poland, a declaration in which the signatory governments would
undertake to "consult together as to what steps should be taken to
offer joint resistance" in the event of a threat to "the independence
of any European state."
In arguing that this
proposal was acceptable, the British Ambassador laid particular
emphasis on the point that the declaration was couched in terms which
involved hardly any commitments.
quite obvious that such a declaration could not serve as an effective
means of fighting the impending threat on the part of the aggressor.
Believing, however, that even a declaration promising so little might
constitute at least some step forward in the matter of curbing the
aggressor, the Soviet Government consented to the British proposal. But
already on April 1, 1939 the British Ambassador in Moscow communicated
the information that Britain considered the question of a joint
declaration as having lapsed.
After two more weeks
of procrastination, the British Foreign Secretary, Halifax, through the
medium of the Ambassador in Moscow, made another proposal to the Soviet
Government to the effect that the Soviet Government should issue a
declaration saying that "in the event of an act of aggression against
any European neighbour of the Soviet Union, who would offer resistance,
the assistance of the Soviet Government could be counted upon if
What this proposal meant was mainly that
in the event of an act of aggression on the part of Germany against
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, or Finland, the Soviet Union would be
obliged to render them assistance without any obligation on the part of
Britain to render assistance -- i.e., for the Soviet Union to become
involved in a war with Germany singlehanded. In the case of Poland and
Romania, too, who did receive Britain's guarantees, the Soviet Union
was to render them assistance against an aggressor; but even in their
case Britain refused to assume any obligations jointly with the Soviet
Union, leaving herself a free hand and a field for manoeuvres of any
kind, not to mention the fact that, according to this proposal, Poland
and Romania as well as the Baltic States assumed no obligations
whatever with respect to the USSR.
Government, however, did not want to miss any opportunity to bring
about agreement with other Powers for a joint struggle against Hitler's
aggression. Without the least delay it presented to the British
Government its counterproposal which consisted of the following:
(1) That the Soviet Union, Britain and France should mutually
undertake to render one another immediate assistance of every kind,
including military, in the event of aggression against one of these
(2) That the Soviet Union, Britain, and
France should undertake to render any kind of assistance, including
military, to the states of Eastern Europe situated between the Baltic
and the Black Seas and bordering on the Soviet Union, in the event of
aggression against these states; and
(3) The Soviet
Union, Britain and France were to undertake to determine within a short
space of time the volume and forms of military assistance to be
rendered to each of these states in both cases mentioned above.
These were the most important points of the Soviet proposal.
It is not hard to see that there was a fundamental difference between
the Soviet and British proposals, inasmuch as the Soviet proposal
provided for really effective measures for joint counteraction to
No reply to that proposal came from the
British Government for three weeks. This caused growing anxiety in
Britain, owing to which the British Government felt constrained in the
end to resort to a new manoeuvre in order to deceive public
On May 8 the British reply, or, to be more
exact the British counterproposals, were received in Moscow. It was
again proposed that the Soviet Government should make a unilateral
declaration in which it "would undertake that in the event of Great
Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfillment of
these obligations" [to Belgium, Poland, Romania, Greece, and Turkey]
"the assistance of the Soviet Government would be immediately available
if desired and would be afforded in such manner and on such terms as
might be agreed."
Once again the Soviet Union was
expected to assume unilateral obligations. It was to undertake to
render assistance to Britain and France who on their part assumed no
obligations whatever to the Soviet Union with regard to the Baltic
Republics. Britain thus suggested that the USSR be placed in an unequal
position, unacceptable to and incompatible with the dignity of any
It is easy to see that actually
the British proposal was addressed not so much to Moscow as to Berlin.
The Germans were invited to attack the Soviet Union, and were given to
understand that Britain and France would maintain neutrality if only
the Germans attacked through the Baltic States.
May 11 the negotiations between the Soviet Union, Britain, and France
were further complicated by a statement made by the Polish Ambassador
in Moscow, Grzybowski, to the effect that "Poland does not consider it
possible to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR..."
Naturally, such a statement could only be made by the Polish
representative with the knowledge and approval of the ruling circles of
Britain and France.
The behaviour of the British
and French representatives in the Moscow negotiations was so
provocative that even in the ruling camp of the Western Powers there
were some who sharply criticized this crude game. Thus, Lloyd George
published a sharp article in the French newspaper Ce Soir
in the summer of 1939 directed against the makers of British policy.
Referring to the causes of the endless procrastination in which the
negotiations between Britain and France on the one hand, and the Soviet
Union on the other, were stuck, Lloyd George wrote that there could be
only one answer to that question : "Neville Chamberlain, Halifax, and
John Simon do not want any agreement with Russia whatever."
goes without saying that what was obvious to Lloyd George was no less
obvious to the bosses of Hitler Germany, who understood perfectly that
the Western Powers had no intention of reaching a serious agreement
with the Soviet Union, but were pursuing an entirely different aim.
That aim was to spur Hitler on to hurry with his attack upon the Soviet
Union, guaranteeing him a premium, as it were, for such an attack by
placing the Soviet Union in the least favourable conditions in the
event of a war with Germany.
Western Powers dragged out the negotiations with the Soviet Union
endlessly, seeking to drown major issues in a swamp of minor amendments
and innumerable versions. Each time the question of some real
obligations came up, the representatives of these Powers pretended not
to understand what it was all about.
Toward the end
of May, Britain and France made new proposals which somewhat improved
the previous version, but still left open a question of essential
importance to the Soviet Union -- namely, the question of guarantees
for the three Baltic Republics situated on the northwestern frontier of
the Soviet Union.
Thus, the rulers of Britain and
France, while making certain verbal concessions under the pressure of
public opinion in their countries, stuck to their previous line and
hedged in their proposals with such reservations as they knew would
make them unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
behaviour of the British and French representatives in the negotiations
at Moscow was so intolerable that on May 27, 1939, V. M. Molotov had to
tell British Ambassador Seeds and French Chargé d'affaires
Payard that their draft agreement for joint counteraction to an
aggressor in Europe did not contain a plan for the organization of
effective mutual assistance of the USSR, Britain, and France, and that
it did not even indicate that the British and French Governments were
seriously interested in a corresponding pact with the Soviet Union.
It was further plainly stated that the Anglo-French proposal
led one to think that the Governments of Britain and France were not so
much interested in the pact itself as in talk about a pact. Possibly
Britain and France needed this talk for some aims of their own. The
Soviet Government did not know what these aims were. The Soviet
Government was interested, not in talk about a pact, but in organizing
effective mutual assistance of the USSR, Britain, and France against
aggression in Europe. The British and French representatives were
warned that the Soviet Government did not intend to take part in talk
about a pact, the aim of which the USSR did not know, and that the
British and French Governments might find more suitable partners for
such talk than the USSR.
The Moscow negotiations
dragged on endlessly. The London Times blurted out
the reasons for this inadmissible procrastination when it wrote:
"A hard and fast alliance with Russia would hamper other
referring to "other negotiations" the Times apparently
implied the negotiations which Robert Hudson, Minister of Overseas
Trade, was conducting with Dr. Helmut Wohltat, Hitler's economic
adviser, on the possibility of a very large British loan to Hitler
Germany, of which more anon. Besides, as is known from press reports,
on the day that Hitler's army entered Prague, a delegation of the
Federation of British Industries conducted negotiations in Dusseldorf
with a view to concluding an extensive agreement with big German
A circumstance that attracted attention
at the time was that men of secondary importance were sent to conduct
the negotiations on behalf of Great Britain in Moscow, while
Chamberlain himself went to Germany to carry on negotiations with
Hitler, and that on several occasions. It is also important to note
that the British representative for the negotiations with the USSR,
Strang, had no authority to sign any agreement with the Soviet Union.
In view of the demand of the Soviet Union that the parties
should proceed to concrete negotiations concerning measures to fight a
possible aggressor, the Governments of Britain and France had to
consent to send their military missions to Moscow. But it took those
missions an unusually long time to get to Moscow, and when they did get
there, it transpired that they were composed of men of secondary
importance who, furthermore, had not been authorized to sign any
agreement. That being the case, the military negotiations proved to be
as futile as the political ones.
missions of the Western Powers demonstrated at once that they even had
no desire to carry on serious conversations concerning means of mutual
assistance in the event of aggression on the part of Germany. The
Soviet military mission proceeded from the fact that, since the USSR
had no common border with Germany, it could render Britain, France, and
Poland assistance in the event of war only if Soviet troops were
permitted to pass through Polish territory. The Polish Government,
however, declared that it would accept no military assistance from the
Soviet Union, thus showing that it feared the growth of strength of the
Soviet Union more than Hitler's aggression. Both the British and French
missions supported Poland's position.
In the course
of the military negotiations, the question also came up as to the
strength of the armed forces which should be put in the field at once
by the parties to the agreement in the event of aggression. The British
named a ridiculous figure, stating that they could put in the field
five infantry divisions and one mechanized division. That was what the
British offered at a time when the Soviet Union declared that it was
prepared to send to the front against the aggressor one hundred and
thirty-six divisions, five thousand medium and heavy guns, up to ten
thousand tanks and whippets, more than five thousand war planes, etc.
The above shows with what an utter lack of seriousness the British
Government treated the negotiations for a military agreement with the
The facts cited above fully bear out the
conclusion that suggests itself, and this conclusion is as follows:
(1) Throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government strove
with the utmost patience to secure agreement with Britain and France
for mutual assistance against an aggressor on a basis of equality and
on the condition that the mutual assistance would be really effective,
i.e., that the signing of a political agreement would be accompanied by
the signing of a military convention establishing the volume, forms,
and time limits of the assistance, as all the preceding events had
shown clearly enough that only such an agreement could be effective and
might bring the Hitlerite aggressor to his senses, encouraged though he
was by complete impunity and by the connivance of the Western Powers
during the course of many years.
(2) Britain's and
France's behaviour during the negotiations with the Soviet Union fully
confirmed that a serious agreement was farthest from their thoughts,
since British and French policy was guided by other aims which had
nothing in common with the interests of peace and the fight against
(3) The perfidious purpose of
Anglo-French policy was to give Hitler to understand that the USSR had
no allies, that the USSR was isolated, that he could attack the USSR
without running the risk of encountering the resistance of Britain and
It was no wonder, therefore, that
Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations ended in failure.
was, of course, nothing fortuitous about that failure. It was becoming
ever more obvious that the breakdown of the negotiations had been
planned beforehand by the representatives of the Western Powers in
their double game. The point was that, along with open negotiation with
the USSR, the British
conducted backstage negotiations with Germany, and they attached
incomparably greater importance to the latter.
by their negotiations in Moscow, the ruling circles of the Western
Powers sought primarily to lull the vigilance of the public in their
countries, to deceive the peoples that were being drawn into war, the
negotiations with the Hitlerites were of an entirely different nature.
The program of the Anglo-German negotiations was formulated
plainly enough by the British Foreign Secretary, Halifax, who was
addressing unequivocal appeals to Hitler Germany at the very time his
officials continued negotiations in Moscow. In a speech at a banquet of
The Royal Institute of International Affairs on June 29, 1939, Halifax
expressed a readiness to come to terms with Germany on all the problems
"that are today causing world anxiety." He said:
such a new atmosphere we could examine the colonial problem, the
problem of raw materials, trade barriers, the issue of Lebensraum,
the limitation of armaments and any other issue that affects the lives
of all European citizens."
If we recall how the conservative Daily Mail
which is close to Halifax, treated the problem of Lebensraum
as far back as 1933 when it suggested to the Hitlerites that they
should wrest Lebensraum from the USSR, there
remains not the slightest doubt as to what Halifax really meant. It was
an open offer to Hitler Germany to come to terms for a division of the
world and of the spheres of influence, an offer to settle all the
questions without the Soviet Union and mainly at the expense of the
As early as June, 1939, British
representatives inaugurated strictly confidential negotiations with
Germany through Hitler's Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Wohltat,
who had come to London. Conversations were carried on with him by the
Minister of Overseas Trade, Hudson, and Chamberlain's closest adviser,
G. Wilson. The substance of those June negotiations is still buried in
the recesses of diplomatic archives. But in July, Wohltat paid another
visit to London and the negotiations were resumed. The contents of that
second round of negotiations are now known from captured German
documents in the hands of the Soviet Government, which will soon be
Hudson and G. Wilson suggested to
Wohltat, and later to the German Ambassador in London, Dirksen, the
starting of secret negotiations for a broad agreement, which was to
include an agreement for the division of spheres of influence on a
world-wide scale, and for the elimination of "deadly competition in the
general markets." It was envisaged that Germany would be allowed
predominating influence in southeastern Europe. In a report to the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated July 21, 1939, Dirksen
pointed out that the program discussed by Wohltat and Wilson comprised
political, military, and economic issues. Among the political issues a
special place, along with a pact of non-aggression, was assigned to a
pact of nonintervention which was to provide for a "delimitation of Lebensraum
between the great Powers, particularly between Britain and Germany."
discussion of the questions involved in these two pacts, the British
representatives promised that, in the event these pacts were signed,
Britain would renounce the guarantees she had just given Poland.
In case an Anglo-German agreement was signed, the British were
prepared to let the Germans settle the Danzig problem and that of the
Polish Corridor with Poland alone, undertaking not to interfere in the
Further -- and this too finds a
documentary confirmation in Dirksen's reports which will shortly be
published -- Wilson reaffirmed that in case the above-mentioned pacts
between Britain and Germany were signed, the British policy of giving
guarantees would be virtually abolished.
Poland," says Dirksen on this point in his report, "would be left, so
to say, alone, face to face with Germany."
meant that the rulers of Britain were prepared to surrender Poland to
Hitler as his prey, at a time when the ink with which Britain's
guarantees to Poland had been signed had not dried. At the same time,
if the Anglo-German agreement had been concluded, the purpose which
Britain and France had set themselves in starting the negotiations with
the Soviet Union would have been achieved and the possibility of
expediting a clash between Germany and the USSR would have been further
Lastly, it was proposed to supplement
the political agreement between Britain and Germany by an economic
agreement which would include a secret deal on colonial questions, on
the distribution of raw materials, on the division of markets, as well
as on a big British loan for Germany.
rulers of Britain saw an alluring picture of a stable agreement with
Germany and the so-called "canalization" of German aggression toward
the East, against Poland to whom they had but recently given a
"guarantee" and against the Soviet Union.
Is it to
be wondered at that the slanderers and falsifiers of history carefully
hush up and try to conceal these facts of decisive importance to an
understanding of the situation in which war was thus becoming
By this time there was already no doubt
left that, far from intending to make any serious attempt to prevent
Hitler Germany from starting the war, Britain and France, on the
contrary, were doing everything within their power, by means of secret
deals and agreements, by means of every possible kind of provocation,
to incite Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union.
forgers will ever succeed in wiping from history or from the
consciousness of the peoples the decisive fact that under these
conditions, the Soviet Union faced the alternative: either to accept,
for purposes of self defence, Germany's proposal to conclude a
non-aggression pact and thereby to ensure to the Soviet Union the
prolongation of peace for a certain period of time, which might be used
by the Soviet State better to prepare its forces for resistance to a
possible attack on the part of an aggressor; or to reject Germany's
proposal for a non-aggression pact and thereby to permit war
provocateurs from the camp of the Western Powers immediately to involve
the Soviet Union in armed conflict with Germany at a time when the
situation was utterly unfavourable to the Soviet Union and when it was
In this situation, the Soviet
Government found itself compelled to make its choice and conclude a
non-aggression pact with Germany.
This choice was a
wise and far-sighted act of Soviet foreign policy under the conditions
which then obtained. This step of the Soviet Government to an enormous
extent predetermined the favourable outcome of the Second World War for
the Soviet Union and for all the freedom-loving peoples.
would be a gross slander to assert that the conclusion of a pact with
the Hitlerites was part of the plan of the foreign policy of the USSR.
On the contrary, the USSR strove at all times to have an agreement with
the Western non-aggressive states against the German and Italian
aggressors for the achievement of collective security on the basis of
equality. But there must be two parties to an agreement.
the USSR insisted on an agreement for combating aggression, Britain and
France systematically rejected it, preferring to pursue a policy of
isolating the USSR, a policy of concessions to the aggressors, a policy
of directing aggression to the East, against the USSR.
United States of America, far from counteracting that ruinous policy,
backed it in every way. As for the American billionaires, they went on
investing their capital in German heavy industries, helping the Germans
to expand their war industries, and thus supplying German aggression
with arms. They might as well be saying: "Go on, Messrs. Europeans,
wage war to your hearts' content; wage war with God's help; while we,
modest American billionaires, will accumulate wealth out of your war,
making hundreds of millions of dollars in super-profits."
with this state of affairs in Europe, there only remained one way out
for the Soviet Union: to accept the German proposal for a pact. This
was, after all, the best of all the possible ways out.
as in 1918, owing to the hostile policy of the Western Powers, the
Soviet Union was forced to conclude the Brest Peace with the Germans,
so in 1939, twenty years after the Peace of Brest, the Soviet Union was
compelled to conclude a pact with the Germans, owing to the same
hostile policy of Britain and France.
of slanderers of all hues to the effect that the USSR should in no case
have allowed itself to conclude a pact with the Germans can only be
regarded as ridiculous. Why could Poland, who had Britain and France as
allies, conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934, and the
Soviet Union, enjoying less favourable conditions, could not conclude a
similar pact in 1939? Why could Britain and France, who were the
dominant force in Europe, issue jointly with the Germans a declaration
on non-aggression in 1938, and the Soviet Union, isolated because of
the hostile policy of Britain and France, could not conclude a pact
with the Germans?
Is it not a fact that of all the
non-aggressive great Powers in Europe the Soviet Union was the last to
make a pact with the Germans?
Of course, the
falsifiers of history and other reactionaries are displeased with the
fact that the Soviet Union succeeded in making good use of the
Soviet-German pact to strengthen its defences; that it succeeded in
moving its frontiers far to the West and in barring the way of the
unhampered eastward advance of German aggression; that Hitler's troops
had to begin their offensive to the East, not from the Narva-Minsk-Kiev
line, but from a line hundreds of kilometres farther west; that the
USSR was not bled to death in the Patriotic War, but emerged victorious
from that war. This displeasure, however, should be regarded as a
manifestation of the impotent rage of bankrupt politicians.
vicious displeasure of these gentlemen can only be regarded as a
demonstration of the indubitable fact that the policy of the Soviet
Union has been and remains a correct policy.
27. Dirksen's memorandum On
the Development of Political Relations between Germany and Britain
during my Term of Office in London, compiled in September
by V. M. Molotov to the Third
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, May 31, 1939.
Sayers and Kahn, The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War against
Soviet Russia, Boston, 1946, p. 329.
Viscount Halifax, Speeches on Foreign Policy 1934-1939,
Oxford University Press, London, 1940, p. 296.
Memorandum of the German Ambassador to Britain, Dirksen, of July 21,
1939. Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This article was published in
Volume 50 Number 31 - August 22, 2020
Information: Falsificators of History Chapter 3: The Isolation of the Soviet Union and The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact -
Soviet Information Bureau, February 1948