Venezuela
U.S. Interferes (Again) to Save Guaidó
- Misión
Verdad -
Mass rally in Caracas of the people's forces, January 23, 2020. Also
present were 400 delegates of social movements from more than 70
countries.
On January 5, the election of new leadership for
the National Assembly, the country's parliamentary body, took place in
Venezuela. In that session, deputy Luis Parra was elected, who was once
part of the opposition party Primera Justicia.
As is known, the events of January 5 were marked
by controversy given the decision of the deputy and outgoing president
of parliament, Juan Guaidó, not to come to the session and
his subsequent attempt to enter the chamber by jumping a fence -- an
image that went viral and became the cover story for an alleged boycott
against his re-election [and his supposed barred entry -- TML
Ed. note].
That day ended with Juan Guaidó
swearing himself in without a parliamentary quorum in front of a group
of his followers at the headquarters of the newspaper El
Nacional. The event was just a media stunt that then turned
into a political act. For the U.S. government as well as for other
countries in the region, especially those that make up the Lima Group,
the media "truth" prevailed.
Several countries that went along with the same
narrative as the U.S. government dismissed the election of Parra and
blamed him for allegedly impeding the election of Guaidó.
However, another act, even more unusual, took
place on January 7. At the end of an ordinary session of
parliament, chaired by Luis Parra, Juan Guaidó violently
broke into the chamber accompanied by his supporting deputies.
He then appeared before the podium, his lackeys
flanking him and swore himself in, again, as president of the National
Assembly and, consequently, the "president in charge" of Venezuela,
that is to say, in front of no more than a few dozen deputies that
followed him in, and a lot of media. The whole thing was clearly staged
as a set-up in which the parliamentarians faked a session in which
Guaidó was once again declared president.
As it seems to have been planned, this was another
media event. For a number of media and political actors,
Guaidó took office in the legislature, that is, he presented
himself triumphantly as rescuing the "legality" and
"legitimacy" of the powers with which he is "vested."
Although for the internal politics of Venezuela,
Guaidó does not exercise any real power and his position is
today totally void in the Venezuelan institutional sphere, for the
press and the U.S. government and its allies, Juan Guaidó is
the man responsible for the two most important public powers of the
Venezuelan State, even though such a thing is fully outside the
Venezuelan Constitution.
Collusion of Two
Parliaments a Rupture of Venezuela's
Institutional Arrangements
Venezuela's Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza addresses the contents of a
"diplomatic note" sent by the U.S. government to several countries.
The news channel TeleSUR reported that
Venezuela's Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza addressed the media to
disseminate the contents of a "diplomatic note" sent by the U.S.
government to several countries. The document was called "The U.S.
Government requests support for a statement on fair elections in the
Venezuelan National Assembly."
For the Minister, this document confirms the U.S.
government's intention to interfere in the election of the
parliamentary leadership, the only explanation for the unusual and
unprecedented actions taken by deputy Guaidó throughout
these events.
According to U.S. government spokesmen, the
"president" is still Guaidó. And indeed, Deputy Luis Parra
is expected to be added to the list of Venezuelan officials sanctioned
by the United States and the European Union, as clear retaliation. It
is now evident that the U.S. government insists on Guaidó's
continuity in the political arena despite his rejection by the majority
of deputies, now made up of dissident members of the opposition and
Chavistas.
The seriousness of these events lies in the
deepening of the Venezuelan institutional crisis and the U.S. seems to
be perfectly clear about this. That seems to be the intention, along
with sustaining the artificial "presidency" of Guaidó, as a
multipurpose pressure and delegitimization tactic of both President
Nicolás Maduro, and now also the new president of the
legislature.
Another of the derivations of the parallel
"National Assembly" that Guaidó governs is that it blocks
any possibility of a political detente in Venezuela between Chavismo
and the opposition, which could have repercussions for the Chavista
leadership and opposition forces, which, although they have distanced
themselves from Guaidó, continue to maintain an openly
anti-Chavista position.
With these actors, there is the possibility that
the Venezuelan legislature will recognize the other public powers and
that, consequently, Venezuela will overcome the political stagnation it
has suffered since the National Assembly decided to place itself in
contempt of the other branches of the state in 2016.
Another possibility lies in the renewal of the
Electoral Authority of Venezuela through the appointment of new
leaders, something that has not been possible because of the on and off
negotiations between Chavismo and the opposition, as well as the
no-dialogue position assumed in 2019 by the radical wing under the
command of Guaidó, on U.S. instructions.
The outcome of this series of events may be the
stagnation of the political and institutional exercise in Venezuela,
particularly in 2020, a parliamentary election year. Without a
political agreement, without a new National Electoral Council and
without an elementary detente, this year's parliamentary elections
would be at risk. Whether they are boycotted by a number of opposition
parties or even if they are carried out with the participation of broad
national sectors of Chavismo and the opposition, they could end in
non-recognition by the U.S. government and its satellites.
Such an outcome would mean, then, that Venezuela
would continue to be subject to U.S. pressure, which implies an
economic and diplomatic blockade and political interference accompanied
with threats of military intervention and the promotion of internal
sedition.
The U.S. does not want a political solution
between Venezuelans and has as its central objective the dismantling of
the Chavista forces in government. The existence of two leaderships in
the National Assembly, one recognized within Venezuela and the other
recognized by the United States and its allies, represents a clearly
useful institutional dissonance to consolidate a rupture in Venezuela,
a fundamental link for the consolidation of a coup d'état.
On the other hand, the clearly disturbing presence
of Guaidó, artificially sustained in the political arena, is
clearly essential for the flow of resources for the benefit of specific
sectors of the opposition.
At the end of 2019, Namita Biggins, spokeswoman
for the U.S. State Department, said that during 2019 "the U.S.
government has given more than $650 million towards humanitarian
assistance, not only inside Venezuela but also to support 16
neighbouring countries." She said they would like to continue deepening
support for Guaidó during this year, which implies more
resources.
It should also be noted that supporting
Guaidó means continuing the U.S. strategy against Venezuela.
Getting another deputy recognized as "president in charge" would be
very cumbersome for the Trump Administration's diplomacy and, in
effect, would mean declaring the "Guaidó strategy" that was
expected to meet the objective of getting Maduro out in just months, in
early 2019, a failure.
In his recent presentation to the press,
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza, referring to the U.S.
diplomatic document, indicated that it expressed the U.S. interest in
forming a "transition government" in Venezuela. At the same time they
ratified their intention to maintain the unilateral coercive measures
against the country to force the exit of the legitimate president
Nicolás Maduro.
Everything seems to indicate that, in the
framework of an election year for Donald Trump, his bet on Venezuela
will be to sustain the "Guaidó strategy" despite its
catastrophic results in 2019. But in addition to that, everything seems
to point to an increase in economic pressures and policies against
Venezuela, to assert the U.S. "position of strength" and to present
Trump's foreign agenda as a "successful model" of institutional
relations for the region.
In the plot of their coup agenda against the
Venezuelan state, the U.S. is not concerned about forms, and their
agenda is clearly that of the "big stick."
This article was published in
Volume 50 Number 1 - January 25, 2020
Article Link:
Venezuela: U.S. Interferes (Again) to Save Guaidó >
Website: www.cpcml.ca
Email: editor@cpcml.ca
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