What Happened in Bolivia's 2019 Vote Count? Role of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission
- Guillaume Long, David Rosnick,
Cavan Kharrazian, and Kevin Cashman, Center for
Economic and Policy Research (Extract) -
[...]
Introduction
On October 20, 2019, Bolivia held presidential
and parliamentary elections. Nine presidential
candidates competed in the presidential election.
However, well before the electoral campaign began,
polling indicated that the election was likely to
be a two-way race between incumbent president Evo
Morales of the Movimiento al Socialismo
(MAS-IPSP), and former president Carlos Mesa of
Comunidad Ciudadana (CC).
There are potentially two rounds in Bolivia's
presidential elections. A candidate receiving
either more than 50 percent of the vote, or at
least 40 percent with a 10 percentage point lead
over the runner-up in the first round, is declared
the winner. If no candidate meets either of these
requirements, the two candidates with the most
votes must face each other in a runoff election.
On October 25, Bolivia's electoral authority, the
Tribunal Supremo Electoral, or TSE, published the
final official election results. Morales had
obtained 2,889,359 votes, or 47.08 percent, to
Mesa's 2,240,920 votes, or 36.51 percent.
Morales's 648,439-vote lead gave him a 10.5
percentage point margin and therefore a
first-round victory without the need for a runoff.
The MAS-IPSP also won a majority in the
legislative elections. Though the MAS-IPSP lost
seats in both houses, the party held on to a
majority of 68 seats out of 130 in the lower
house, and 21 out of 36 seats in the senate.
An Electoral Observation Mission from the
Organization of American States (OAS) was sent to
observe the elections.[1] According
to the OAS, the mission was "composed of 92
observers, who [were to be] deployed in the 9
departments of the country to observe the process
in all of its stages and throughout the country."[2]
Bolivia Has Two Vote-Counting Systems, but Only
One Is Legally Binding
The TSE has two vote-counting systems.[3]
The first is a quick count known as the
Transmisión de Resultados Electorales Preliminares
(TREP, hereafter referred to as the quick count).
This is a system that Bolivia and several other
Latin American countries have implemented
following OAS recommendations.[4]
It was implemented for the 2019 election by a
private company in conjunction with the Servicio
de Registro Cívico (SERECÍ), the civil registry
service, and is designed to deliver a swift -- but
incomplete and not definitive -- result on the
night of the elections to give the media an
indication of the voting tendency and to inform
the public. The TSE is unlikely to process 100
percent of the results in the quick count in
nationwide votes due to logistical limitations and
the amount processed can vary widely by geography
and the type of ballot.[5] For
example, in the 2016 nationwide constitutional
referendum, it processed 81.2 percent of the
results before it held a press conference at about
6:15 p.m. on election night.[6] The
2016 autonomous referendum results were released
for each jurisdiction with between 66.7 and 100
percent of the results processed at 7:30 p.m. on
election night.[7] In the 2017
judicial elections, an Electoral Experts Mission
of the OAS praised the performance of the quick
count system for releasing the results at 80
percent at around 9:30 PM.[8]
The second vote-counting system is the official
count (or cómputo), which is legally binding under
Bolivian law. The official count is more thorough
and precise and takes longer. It is the only valid
vote tallying system, and the TSE uses it to
determine and announce the final election results.
Once voting has concluded, individual ballots are
counted in voting stations and aggregated into
actas, or tally sheets. For the nonbinding quick
count, the results from the tally sheets are sent
to SERECÍ verification operators via a mobile app,
along with photos of the sheets themselves. The
tally sheets are then physically sent to a
Departmental Electoral Tribunal (TED), where the
information is verified and entered into the
official count.
Each polling station has six electoral jurors.
They perform a mandatory citizens' role akin to
jury duty in the US judicial system. In Bolivia,
207,322 citizens were randomly selected to be
jurors and trained a month before the elections.[9]
All six jurors in each polling station must sign
off on the tally sheet. Representatives of
political parties may also be present at the
polling stations and request to approve the tally
sheets. Any person or political organization is
able to monitor the vote-counting process as an
observer, which is encouraged by the TSE.[10]
Images of the tally sheets are available online to
anyone who wishes to confirm that the information
on the physical tally sheets matches the
information entered into the system. This makes it
easy to check for inconsistencies, and for any
errors to be quickly corrected.
In these elections, the results of the official
count generally coincided with those of the quick
count, which ended once 95.63 percent of tally
sheets were counted, with Morales having a lead of
46.86 percent to Mesa's 36.72. The final official
count, with 100 percent of votes counted, resulted
in Morales winning the election in the first round
with 47.08 percent, to Mesa's 36.51 percent.
Criticism of Bolivia's Electoral Process by the
OAS Mission
On October 21, the OAS Electoral Observation
Mission in Bolivia (hereafter referred to as the
OAS mission, or the mission) issued an initial
postelection press release, which expressed "its
deep concern and surprise at the drastic and
hard-to-explain change in the trend of the
preliminary results [from the quick count]
revealed after the closing of the polls."[11]
In line with the quick count process in previous
elections, the TSE had ended the quick count at
83.85 percent of tally sheets verified. This tally
showed MAS-IPSP receiving 45.71 percent of the
presidential votes, and CC receiving 37.84
percent, a difference of 7.87 percentage points.
Two days later, the OAS mission issued its
preliminary report on the elections, which briefly
repeated the criticism that "the changes in the
TREP [quick count] trend were hard to explain and
did not match the other measurements available."[12]
However, the mission provided no evidence to
support these statements suggesting that the quick
count could be wrong or "hard to explain." The
following paper analyzes the election results and
finds that:
- The results from the quick count for the first
83.85 percent of the vote count are consistent
with a final projected result of Morales winning
the election outright with a more than 10
percentage point victory;
- Neither the OAS mission nor any other party has
demonstrated that there were widespread or
systematic irregularities in the elections of
October 20, 2019;
- Neither the quick count nor the official count
exhibit significant changes in voting trends in
the final results; rather, the same well-known
trend, explainable by differences in voter
preferences in different geographical areas, is
evident in both counts;
- The legally binding vote count -- the official
count -- did not stop for any significant period
of time;
- It is unclear how the OAS mission's objections
regarding the quick count would affect the
official count.
The Quick Count Process and the Official Count
There were other statements from the OAS, also
without evidence, that appeared to cast doubt upon
the result in addition to those from the mission's
first press release and preliminary report.[13]
While the TSE did suspend the verification of
tally sheets in the quick count process on
election night at 83.85 percent of tally sheets
verified, this is consistent with what the TSE had
pledged to do more than a week before the
election: to publicize the result of a quick count
that verified at least 80 percent of the
preliminary results.[14] The TSE
thus followed through with this commitment, and
its decision to stop the quick count was not in
itself irregular or in violation of any prior
commitment.[15]
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that it
is the official count that is legally binding, not
the quick count that the OAS mission took issue
with. The official count was never interrupted and
was regularly updated online without any
significant interruption. Any potential
irregularity would have had to affect the official
count and not only the quick count in order to
affect the final result. It is unclear by what
mechanism any widespread or systematic
irregularities could occur without being quickly
apparent, given the existing safeguards in the
Bolivian electoral process.[16] In
addition to not presenting any evidence that
irregularities that could have altered the vote
count actually occurred, the OAS mission does not
even provide a possible means by which they could
have occurred.
The OAS Mission claims that after the interruption
of the quick count, it urged the TSE to restart it
and that on October 21, 23 hours after the
interruption, the TSE agreed to resume that count.[17]
At this point, the results showed Morales
approaching the 10 percentage point margin of
victory that would give him an outright win. The
Mission then issued its first press release in
which it expressed its "deep concern and surprise
at the drastic and hard-to-explain change in the
trend of the preliminary results revealed after
the closing of the polls."[18]
But was this "change in the trend" in fact "hard
to explain"?
Results: Consistent with Geographic Patterns in
Voting
It is a general phenomenon that later-reporting
areas are often politically and demographically
different from earlier ones,[19] and it has
been noted that this is relevant to interpreting
the results from a parallel vote tabulation such
as a quick count.[20] In Bolivia's
elections over the last decade and a half, votes
from rural and peripheral areas of the country
have tended to disproportionately favor Morales
and the MAS-IPSP.[21] Because of
logistical, technological, and possibly other
limitations, these votes end up being computed
later in the counting process.[22]
This is true of both the quick and the official
counts, which are both affected by the same
geography and infrastructure. Rural and poorer
places, which have tended to heavily favor
Morales, are slower to transmit data or send tally
sheets to the electoral tribunals.
The Final Quick Count Results Were Not Hard to
Explain
The quick count, in this case, was no exception.
The gap between Morales and Mesa widened steadily
as the counting process advanced. It was a
predictable and unsurprising phenomenon that need
not have surprised the OAS mission.
Figure 1 shows that the MAS-IPSP margin of
victory increased steadily as more votes were
counted, consistent with the idea that differences
in geography and infrastructure resulted in later
counting of areas that favored MAS-IPSP. This
trend also holds for seats in the legislative
assembly.[23]
Figure 1
The MAS-IPSP
margin increased steadily through most of the
quick count (TREP) as more tally sheets (actas)
were verified
Source: Órgano Electoral Plurinacional (2019b)
and authors' calculations.
The Partial Results from the Quick Count Before
Suspension Predict a Result that Is Extremely
Close to the Final Results
The election winner's margin of victory can be
projected based on the quick count at the time of
interruption at 83.85 percent. If a tally sheet is
uncounted at that time, votes can be imputed for
each candidate based on the number of voters
eligible for that tally sheet and the votes for
each candidate per eligible voter counted in the
quick count at that time for the corresponding
precinct. If the precinct is uncounted,
corresponding votes per eligible voter for the
location, the municipality, and so on to broader
geographies as needed can be used.[24]
This exercise suggests that Morales's margin of
victory with complete results - based entirely on
the interrupted quick count - would be 10.09
percentage points, although there is reason to
believe this underestimates Morales' margin.[25] It also suggests that
Morales's margin was unusually large in the yet-
uncounted areas; sufficient even to increase his
margin past the 10 percentage point threshold as
those last votes were counted. These results are
consistent with the official count results
(showing Morales winning with a 10.5 percentage
point margin).[26]
The Results from the Official Count Follow a
Trend Very Similar to that of the Quick Count, and
Both Are Explained by Geography
Figure 2 analyzes the results from the
official count. As with the quick count, the
MAS-IPSP margin of victory steadily increased as
more tally sheets were counted. This shows a
similar dynamic, mainly that later-reporting areas
disproportionately favored MAS-IPSP.
In both the official count and the quick count,
results for MAS-IPSP legislative seats outperform
the results for the presidential ticket early in
the counting process. But as the MAS-IPSP margin
increases, the gap between the results shrinks:
for every 10 percentage point increase in the
MAS-IPSP presidential ticket share, there is a 9.6
percentage point increase in the share for
legislative seats. When CC-heavy areas are
counted, the MAS-IPSP does slightly better in
legislative races than in the presidential race,
and likewise when areas more heavily favoring
MAS-IPSP are counted, the CC does somewhat better
in the legislative races than the presidential.
This explains the "wedge" between legislative and
presidential results seen in both counts. It is
also consistent with the observation that
later-reporting areas, when the "wedge"
disappears, more heavily favor the MAS-IPSP.
Figure 2
The MAS-IPSP
margin increased steadily through most of the
official count (cómputo) as more tally sheets
(actas) were verified
Source: Órgano Electoral Plurinacional (2019b)
and authors' calculations.
In all, these analyses confirm that the overall
trends in the results from both the quick count
and the official count are easily explainable and
consistent with the fact that later-reporting
rural areas heavily favor MAS-IPSP, especially for
the presidential ticket.[27]
In addition, and contrary to public statements
from the OAS mission, an analysis of the results
of the quick count up until it was suspended on
election day predict an outcome that is extremely
similar to the actual final results.
Conclusion: The Politicization of the Electoral
Observation Process
As shown in this paper, at the time that the
reporting of the quick count results was
suspended, the existing trend supported Morales
winning the election outright with a more than 10
percentage point margin.
Crucially, the legally binding official vote count
did not stop for any significant period of time,
and the trend in results in the official count is
very similar to the trend in the results of the
quick count. The trends in both counts reflect
well-known voting patterns that occur based on
geography, and unlike claims from the OAS mission,
did not change substantially over time.
The unsubstantiated doubts cast upon the vote
count by the OAS mission in its first press
statement and its preliminary report have been
widely cited in the international and Bolivian
media, repeatedly since the October 20 election.[28] It is clear that these
unusual statements -- despite the OAS to this day
not having presented any evidence whatsoever to
support them -- have had a significant influence
on media coverage and therefore on public opinion.
The Trump administration and its allies such as
Senator Marco Rubio, who appears to have a strong
influence on its Latin America policy agenda, have
also made public statements -- both before and
after the allegations contained in the OAS
mission's first press release -- implying that the
election was stolen.[29]
The United States supplies about 60 percent of the
OAS budget.[30]
On October 25, the Bolivian government proposed an
international audit of the vote count. While
initially stating that the only institution
recognized by the Bolivian constitution to
validate electoral results is the TSE, Morales
nevertheless made it clear that he would abide by
the findings of the international audit. He
invited the OAS and a number of foreign
governments to participate in the audit. The
Bolivian government later went further and
accepted the "binding" nature of the audit, on
which the OAS had made its participation
conditional.[31] Carlos
Mesa has rejected the audit, stating that "[w]e
don't accept the audit with these unilaterally
agreed terms," demanding instead the annulment of
the official results before any audit is carried
out.[32]
The politicization of what is normally an
independent process of electoral monitoring seems
inevitable when an organization that is entrusted
with this monitoring -- in this case the OAS --
makes unsubstantiated claims that call into
question the validity of an election count. This
is a serious breach of the public trust, and even
more dangerous in the context of the sharp
political polarization and postelection political
violence that has taken place in Bolivia. These
unsubstantiated allegations should be retracted,
and measures should be taken to insure the
neutrality of electoral observation by the OAS in
the future.
The OAS, in continuing its technical assistance in
implementing a quick count system in Bolivia,
should provide guidance to the TSE on an
appropriate procedure to release and disseminate
preliminary results on election night. The OAS
also should arrange for an independent
investigation of its Department of Electoral
Cooperation and Observation; the Electoral
Observation Mission that participated in this
election; and any other part of the OAS that is
found to have responsibility for this failure of
the Electoral Observation Mission in Bolivia.
[...]
For footnotes and the Data Appendix, see the full
report.
Guillaume Long is a Senior Policy Analyst at
the Center for Economic and Policy Research
(CEPR). David Rosnick is an Economist at CEPR,
Cavan Kharrazian is a Researcher at CEPR, and
Kevin Cashman is a Senior Associate at CEPR..
This article was published in
Volume 49 Number 27 - November 16, 2019
Article Link:
What Happened in Bolivia's 2019 Vote Count? Role of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission - Guillaume Long, David Rosnick,
Cavan Kharrazian, and Kevin Cashman, Center for
Economic and Policy Research (Extract)
Website: www.cpcml.ca
Email: editor@cpcml.ca
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