The Spectre of Cyber Warfare Elections and the Need to Make Canada a Zone for Peace
- Anna Di Carlo -
Canadians have been informed that the 44th
General Election will be monitored by national
and foreign security police and intelligence
agencies, along with global social-media
platforms and various state-funded NGO's on the
hunt for signs of what they call foreign and
foreign-influenced activities. To build the case
for the need for such monitoring, on July 16 the
Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
issued its third report since 2017 on what it
calls the threat to Canada's democratic process,
which it defines as "voters, political parties
and elections." The report names Russia, China
and Iran as suspected "adversarial states."
It reiterates the
exact words it used in 2017 to explain why
Canada is a target. The CSE says that Canada
plays "an active role in the international
community, participating in key multilateral
forums, including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the Group of 20 (G20), and the Group of Seven
(G7)."
"Government of Canada foreign policy, military
deployments, trade and investment agreements,
diplomatic engagements, international aid, and
immigration policy are of interest to other
states. Canada's stance on an issue can affect
the core interests of other countries, foreign
groups, and individuals. Threat actors may use
cyber tools to target Canada's democratic
process to change election outcomes, influence
policy makers' choices, impact governmental
relationships with foreign and domestic
partners, and impact Canada's reputation around
the world," the CSE report says.
One question which comes to mind and seems
obvious is How can an election outcome be
"changed" unless it is already a foregone
conclusion? What "outcome" is the CSE talking
about? Does it have to do with Canada's
continued integration into the U.S. war-machine
and the role played by supranational
organizations in the service of oligarchic state
control of the economy and international
relations? What is the CSE talking about?
Elections are
supposed to be a time for Canadians to decide
for themselves what domestic and foreign policy
they want. They should be free to advocate
whatever vision they see fit for the country,
including Canada's withdrawal from NATO; and the
need to dismantle NATO, opposition to various
neo-liberal global alliances and trade deals,
Canada's current integration into the U.S. war
machine, and self-serving conceptions of rights
both at home and abroad; the need for political
renewal to replace the present constitutional
order with one decided by the people through a
democratic process of the people's choosing, and
so on. Will they be able to do so without being
targeted and turned into suspected agents of "an
adversarial state" -- other than our own of
course?
The CSE report declares that the next federal
election will be marked by the promotion of
hostile relations with the countries the CSE
deems to be adversarial states which endanger
Canada's democracy and way of life. The
underlying implication is that the Canadian
state expects people to line up behind the NATO
alliance countries versus "enemy states."
"Consistent with our judgement in the 2019
Update: Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic
Process, we assess that an increasing
number of threat actors have the cyber tools,
the organizational capacity, and a sufficiently
advanced understanding of Canada's political
landscape to direct cyber activity against
future Canadian federal elections, should they
have the strategic intent. We judge it very
likely that Canadian voters will encounter some
form of foreign cyber interference ahead of, and
during, the next federal election."
It states that there is "a significant amount
of false and misleading information online" and
claims that its assessment only deals with
"online foreign influence activity targeting
voters."
"This influence activity happens when foreign
threat actors covertly manipulate online
information, often using cyber tools, in order
to influence voters' opinions and behaviours. We
define foreign interference as covert,
deceptive, or coercive activity by a foreign
actor against a democratic process, conducted to
advance strategic objectives. Foreign cyber
interference includes cyber threat activity by
foreign actors as well as online foreign
influence activity."
"[W]e consider foreign interference on the
scale of state-sponsored activity against U.S.
elections to be improbable in Canada at this
time," the CSE report adds.
It also predicts that if an election is held
before the COVID-19 pandemic is over, "it is
very likely that the online activities of
political parties and candidates will be
targeted by cyber threat activity," adding
that it is "very unlikely" "to be part of
a sophisticated cyber campaign against a
particular Canadian political party or
candidate."
The CSE is now following the modus operandi
of the U.S. intelligence agencies which claim
that if nothing happens it shows they are doing
a good job on preventing anything from
happening. The CSE's prediction of foreign
interference concerning the 2019 election did
not materialize and they claim it is because the
work of the secret police was obviously
effective. The CSE says much progress has been
made in combating potential cyber attacks on the
democratic process. Referring to the
United States elections, they write: "Although
there has yet to be a systematic study of the
effectiveness of these practices, a comparison
of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. elections suggests
that identifying and publicizing potential
online foreign influence campaigns,
strengthening the cyber security postures of
organizations involved in the election, and
improving social media companies' responses to
malicious activity on their platforms can
decrease the impact of hostile states' efforts
to influence democratic processes through cyber
means."
It is a very poor argument for interfering with
freedom of speech which is a human right.
Tactics of intimidation and fear-mongering have
no justification, no matter what high ideals are
conjured up by the establishment forces. In this
regard, the Canadian spy agencies report they
operate in coordination with the Five Eyes
agencies comprised of the U.S., New Zealand,
Australia and the U.K, while special
supra-national NATO and G7 monitoring bodies are
also in place, including the G7 Rapid Response
Mechanism housed in Global Affairs Canada.[1] To
make decisions based on what these agencies
declare they have detected, a special panel of
five senior civil servants will go into service
upon the issuing of the election writ. The panel
will receive briefings from the intelligence
agencies, guided by a Liberal Cabinet directive
entitled Critical Election Incident Public
Protocol (CEIPP) which tasks them with informing
Canadians "about incidents that threaten
Canada's ability to have a free and fair
election." Established by the Liberals prior to
the 2019 Federal Election, the Panel is
comprised of the Clerk of the Privy Council, the
Prime Minister's National Security and
Intelligence Advisor, and the deputy ministers
of the departments of Justice, Public Safety,
and Foreign Affairs. Before it makes a public
announcement, the Panel consults with
representatives of the political parties with
seats in the House of Commons.
In this light, the CSE informs that "while
there are many opportunities for threat actors
to target democratic processes, it is important
to note that, in the past few years, there have
also been significant strides towards protecting
democracy around the world. This includes
efforts by governments, non-governmental and
research organizations, civil society,
traditional media, and social media and
technology companies to improve cyber security
practices, raise awareness, and respond to
incidents quickly. For example, Canada has
implemented a broad suite of measures, including
legislation (i.e., the Elections
Modernization Act), agreements with social
media companies, as well as several initiatives
to improve communication and information sharing
between Elections Canada, Canadian security and
intelligence agencies, other government
departments, political parties, and voters."
CSE praises the role given to social-media
corporations and various organizations to
monitor political discourse on the web. It says
that measures that can deal with suspect content
and accounts include:
"- demoting 'borderline content' (i.e., content
that almost violates community guidelines);
- shutting down inauthentic accounts;
- hiring personnel to screen posts and
investigate malfeasance;
- collaborating with fact-checking and research
organizations;
- flagging or demoting misleading content; and
- directing users to authoritative sources."
The Growth of Private Cyber Mercenaries and
False Claims of Attributions
The CSE uses the language of intelligence
agencies about "likelihoods" and "possibilities"
of ascertaining the source of imagined and real
cyber attacks. While claiming that Russia and
China are the primary perpetrators of cyber
attacks, the CSE says that hostile actors may
also include "cybercriminals [who aim] to make
money" and "thrill-seekers searching for a
challenge or notoriety" who it says "may target
Canadian democratic processes as well." " While
these activities lack a strategic agenda, they
still impact the functioning of democratic
processes and voters' perceptions of the
security, legitimacy, and fairness of the
results," CSE says. It does not address how the
intervention of the intelligence agencies based
on secret information and unknown criteria
"impact the functioning of democratic processes
and voters' perceptions of the security,
legitimacy, and fairness of the results."
The CSE also acknowledges the difficulty, if
not impossibility, of determining the source of
a cyber attack, which it well knows given that
the CSE itself is involved in cyber attacks. For
one thing it references the burgeoning
cyberwarfare industry. CSE says that "the
development of commercial markets for cyber
tools and talent has reduced the time it takes
for states to build cyber capabilities and
increased the number of states with cyber
programs. As more states have access to cyber
tools, states that were interested in targeting
democratic processes, but previously lacked
sufficient capabilities, can now more readily
undertake this type of cyber activity. The
proliferation of state cyber programs also makes
it more difficult to identify, attribute, and
defend against cyber threat activity more
broadly."
It also notes that "private firms increasingly
provide online influence as a service to
governments and political actors." A 2020 Oxford
study identified 48 cases of private companies
deploying disinformation on behalf of a
political actor. Since 2018, the same
researchers have identified more than 65 firms
offering disinformation as a service.
"Private firms spread disinformation through
trolling, automated accounts, human-curated
accounts, and AI [Artificial Intelligence].
Governments and political actors who hire firms
to conduct online influence campaigns on their
behalf not only use domestic firms, but also
turn to firms based in other countries. For
example, between 2019 and 2020, the Archimedes
Group, based in Israel, ran online influence
campaigns against elections in Africa, Latin
America, and South East Asia."
The use of these methods in Canada, however, is
not cited. This underscores the crass dishonesty
of the report. The only case of an official
investigation into foreign influence in a
Canadian election was conducted in the Alberta
April 16, 2019 election. It concluded that
domestic, not foreign entities, carried out what
it refers to as "inauthentic online activity."
It attributed the activity to "known national
far-right and hate group actors who have
previously disseminated material, using similar
tactics as known malign foreign actors."[2]
The report of the CSE is, besides other things,
clearly intended to put a damper on speech in
general and during the impending federal
election in particular. This is a matter of
serious concern to the polity and all Canadians
and their demand for a democratic process which
enables them to make the decisions which affect
their lives. The time is now to reject the
dictate that Canadians should not speak in their
own name with their own voice to put forward
their own vision for the country. The need to
Make Canada a Zone for Peace in the world has
never been greater.
Notes
1. Canada
offered to lead and house the G7 Rapid
Response Mechanism (G7 RMM) when it was
established at the G7 Charlevoix Summit. It
was tasked with coordinating cross-country
activities to "identify and respond to diverse
and evolving threats to our democracies,
including through sharing information and
analysis, and identifying opportunities for
coordinated response." Its stated objective is
to "monitor for and analyze potential cases of
foreign interference, regardless of the
political party affected or political nature
of any given issue. Its objective is to
articulate the trends and tactics employed by
foreign actors as it pertains to interference
in democratic processes and institutions and
to track and understand their evolution."
The G7 RRM makes a point of stating that
it is not a fact-checking body and does not
need to be since there are hundreds of those
elsewhere.
2. The G7 RRM chose to
monitor the Alberta election in 2019 because
it was identified as "being at risk of
interference because of the extent to which
environmental issues were debated. For
example, the pipeline has been noted as a
socially divisive issue that may be a target
for foreign actors." It was chosen "with the
purpose of identifying any emerging tactics in
foreign interference and drawing lessons
learned for the Canadian general election."
In its
report, issued by Global Affairs Canada, RRM
said that it identified "coordinated
inauthentic behaviour" on social-media
platforms. It concluded, however, that "the
majority of these accounts were very likely
not foreign."
"The Alberta election provides an example of a
situation where there may be evidence of
coordinated inauthentic behaviour undertaken
by Canadian actors, making the identification
of foreign interference more difficult," it
concluded.
This article was published in
Volume 51 Number 8 - August 1, 2021
Article Link:
https://cpcml.ca/Tmlm2021/Articles/M510082.HTM
Website: www.cpcml.ca
Email: editor@cpcml.ca
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