The Spectre of Cyber Warfare Elections and the Need to Make Canada a Zone for Peace

Canadians have been informed that the 44th General Election will be monitored by national and foreign security police and intelligence agencies, along with global social-media platforms and various state-funded NGO's on the hunt for signs of what they call foreign and foreign-influenced activities. To build the case for the need for such monitoring, on July 16 the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) issued its third report since 2017 on what it calls the threat to Canada's democratic process, which it defines as "voters, political parties and elections." The report names Russia, China and Iran as suspected "adversarial states."

It reiterates the exact words it used in 2017 to explain why Canada is a target. The CSE says that Canada plays "an active role in the international community, participating in key multilateral forums, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Group of 20 (G20), and the Group of Seven (G7)."

"Government of Canada foreign policy, military deployments, trade and investment agreements, diplomatic engagements, international aid, and immigration policy are of interest to other states. Canada's stance on an issue can affect the core interests of other countries, foreign groups, and individuals. Threat actors may use cyber tools to target Canada's democratic process to change election outcomes, influence policy makers' choices, impact governmental relationships with foreign and domestic partners, and impact Canada's reputation around the world," the CSE report says.

One question which comes to mind and seems obvious is How can an election outcome be "changed" unless it is already a foregone conclusion? What "outcome" is the CSE talking about? Does it have to do with Canada's continued integration into the U.S. war-machine and the role played by supranational organizations in the service of oligarchic state control of the economy and international relations? What is the CSE talking about?

Elections are supposed to be a time for Canadians to decide for themselves what domestic and foreign policy they want. They should be free to advocate whatever vision they see fit for the country, including Canada's withdrawal from NATO; and the need to dismantle NATO, opposition to various neo-liberal global alliances and trade deals, Canada's current integration into the U.S. war machine, and self-serving conceptions of rights both at home and abroad; the need for political renewal to replace the present constitutional order with one decided by the people through a democratic process of the people's choosing, and so on. Will they be able to do so without being targeted and turned into suspected agents of "an adversarial state" -- other than our own of course?

The CSE report declares that the next federal election will be marked by the promotion of hostile relations with the countries the CSE deems to be adversarial states which endanger Canada's democracy and way of life. The underlying implication is that the Canadian state expects people to line up behind the NATO alliance countries versus "enemy states."

"Consistent with our judgement in the 2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process, we assess that an increasing number of threat actors have the cyber tools, the organizational capacity, and a sufficiently advanced understanding of Canada's political landscape to direct cyber activity against future Canadian federal elections, should they have the strategic intent. We judge it very likely that Canadian voters will encounter some form of foreign cyber interference ahead of, and during, the next federal election."

It states that there is "a significant amount of false and misleading information online" and claims that its assessment only deals with "online foreign influence activity targeting voters."

"This influence activity happens when foreign threat actors covertly manipulate online information, often using cyber tools, in order to influence voters' opinions and behaviours. We define foreign interference as covert, deceptive, or coercive activity by a foreign actor against a democratic process, conducted to advance strategic objectives. Foreign cyber interference includes cyber threat activity by foreign actors as well as online foreign influence activity."

"[W]e consider foreign interference on the scale of state-sponsored activity against U.S. elections to be improbable in Canada at this time," the CSE report adds.

It also predicts that if an election is held before the COVID-19 pandemic is over, "it is very likely that the online activities of political parties and candidates will be targeted by cyber threat activity," adding that  it is "very unlikely" "to be part of a sophisticated cyber campaign against a particular Canadian political party or candidate."

The CSE is now following the modus operandi of the U.S. intelligence agencies which claim that if nothing happens it shows they are doing a good job on preventing anything from happening. The CSE's prediction of foreign interference concerning the 2019 election did not materialize and they claim it is because the work of the secret police was obviously effective. The CSE says much progress has been made in combating potential cyber attacks on the democratic process.  Referring to the United States elections, they write: "Although there has yet to be a systematic study of the effectiveness of these practices, a comparison of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. elections suggests that identifying and publicizing potential online foreign influence campaigns, strengthening the cyber security postures of organizations involved in the election, and improving social media companies' responses to malicious activity on their platforms can decrease the impact of hostile states' efforts to influence democratic processes through cyber means."

It is a very poor argument for interfering with freedom of speech which is a human right. Tactics of intimidation and fear-mongering have no justification, no matter what high ideals are conjured up by the establishment forces. In this regard, the Canadian spy agencies report they operate in coordination with the Five Eyes agencies comprised of the U.S., New Zealand, Australia and the U.K, while special supra-national NATO and G7 monitoring bodies are also in place, including the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism housed in Global Affairs Canada.[1] To make decisions based on what these agencies declare they have detected, a special panel of five senior civil servants will go into service upon the issuing of the election writ. The panel will receive briefings from the intelligence agencies, guided by a Liberal Cabinet directive entitled Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) which tasks them with informing Canadians "about incidents that threaten Canada's ability to have a free and fair election." Established by the Liberals prior to the 2019 Federal Election, the Panel is comprised of the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Prime Minister's National Security and Intelligence Advisor, and the deputy ministers of the departments of Justice, Public Safety, and Foreign Affairs. Before it makes a public announcement, the Panel consults with representatives of the political parties with seats in the House of Commons.

In this light, the CSE informs that "while there are many opportunities for threat actors to target democratic processes, it is important to note that, in the past few years, there have also been significant strides towards protecting democracy around the world. This includes efforts by governments, non-governmental and research organizations, civil society, traditional media, and social media and technology companies to improve cyber security practices, raise awareness, and respond to incidents quickly. For example, Canada has implemented a broad suite of measures, including legislation (i.e., the Elections Modernization Act), agreements with social media companies, as well as several initiatives to improve communication and information sharing between Elections Canada, Canadian security and intelligence agencies, other government departments, political parties, and voters."

CSE praises the role given to social-media corporations and various organizations to monitor political discourse on the web. It says that measures that can deal with suspect content and accounts include:

"- demoting 'borderline content' (i.e., content that almost violates community guidelines);
- shutting down inauthentic accounts;
- hiring personnel to screen posts and investigate malfeasance;
- collaborating with fact-checking and research organizations;
- flagging or demoting misleading content; and
- directing users to authoritative sources."

The Growth of Private Cyber Mercenaries and
False Claims of Attributions

The CSE uses the language of intelligence agencies about "likelihoods" and "possibilities" of ascertaining the source of imagined and real cyber attacks. While claiming that Russia and China are the primary perpetrators of cyber attacks, the CSE says that hostile actors may also include "cybercriminals [who aim] to make money" and "thrill-seekers searching for a challenge or notoriety" who it says "may target Canadian democratic processes as well." " While these activities lack a strategic agenda, they still impact the functioning of democratic processes and voters' perceptions of the security, legitimacy, and fairness of the results," CSE says. It does not address how the intervention of the intelligence agencies based on secret information and unknown criteria "impact the functioning of democratic processes and voters' perceptions of the security, legitimacy, and fairness of the results."

The CSE also acknowledges the difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining the source of a cyber attack, which it well knows given that the CSE itself is involved in cyber attacks. For one thing it references the burgeoning cyberwarfare industry. CSE says that "the development of commercial markets for cyber tools and talent has reduced the time it takes for states to build cyber capabilities and increased the number of states with cyber programs. As more states have access to cyber tools, states that were interested in targeting democratic processes, but previously lacked sufficient capabilities, can now more readily undertake this type of cyber activity. The proliferation of state cyber programs also makes it more difficult to identify, attribute, and defend against cyber threat activity more broadly."

It also notes that "private firms increasingly provide online influence as a service to governments and political actors." A 2020 Oxford study identified 48 cases of private companies deploying disinformation on behalf of a political actor. Since 2018, the same researchers have identified more than 65 firms offering disinformation as a service.

"Private firms spread disinformation through trolling, automated accounts, human-curated accounts, and AI [Artificial Intelligence]. Governments and political actors who hire firms to conduct online influence campaigns on their behalf not only use domestic firms, but also turn to firms based in other countries. For example, between 2019 and 2020, the Archimedes Group, based in Israel, ran online influence campaigns against elections in Africa, Latin America, and South East Asia."

The use of these methods in Canada, however, is not cited. This underscores the crass dishonesty of the report. The only case of an official investigation into foreign influence in a Canadian election was conducted in the Alberta April 16, 2019 election. It concluded that domestic, not foreign entities, carried out what it refers to as "inauthentic online activity." It attributed the activity to "known national far-right and hate group actors who have previously disseminated material, using similar tactics as known malign foreign actors."[2]

The report of the CSE is, besides other things, clearly intended to put a damper on speech in general and during the impending federal election in particular. This is a matter of serious concern to the polity and all Canadians and their demand for a democratic process which enables them to make the decisions which affect their lives. The time is now to reject the dictate that Canadians should not speak in their own name with their own voice to put forward their own vision for the country. The need to Make Canada a Zone for Peace in the world has never been greater.

Notes

1. Canada offered to lead and house  the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RMM) when it was established at the G7 Charlevoix Summit. It was tasked with coordinating cross-country activities to "identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response." Its stated objective is to "monitor for and analyze potential cases of foreign interference, regardless of the political party affected or political nature of any given issue. Its objective is to articulate the trends and tactics employed by foreign actors as it pertains to interference in democratic processes and institutions and to track and understand their evolution."

The G7 RRM  makes a point of stating that it is not a fact-checking body and does not need to be since there are hundreds of those elsewhere.

2. The G7 RRM chose to monitor the Alberta election in 2019 because it was identified as "being at risk of interference because of the extent to which environmental issues were debated. For example, the pipeline has been noted as a socially divisive issue that may be a target for foreign actors." It was chosen "with the purpose of identifying any emerging tactics in foreign interference and drawing lessons learned for the Canadian general election."

In its report, issued by Global Affairs Canada, RRM said that it identified "coordinated inauthentic behaviour" on social-media platforms. It concluded, however, that "the majority of these accounts were very likely not foreign."
 
"The Alberta election provides an example of a situation where there may be evidence of coordinated inauthentic behaviour undertaken by Canadian actors, making the identification of foreign interference more difficult," it concluded.


This article was published in

Volume 51 Number 8 - August 1, 2021

Article Link:
https://cpcml.ca/Tmlm2021/Articles/M510082.HTM


    

Website:  www.cpcml.ca   Email:  editor@cpcml.ca