March 16, 2011 - No. 40 -
Supplement
Operation Surf -- U.S. Attempt to Subvert
Cuban Revolution
- Deisy Francis Mexidor, Marina
Menéndez and Jean Guy Allard,
Granma International, March 13, 2011 -
Clandestine
networks and illegal Internet connections, part of a subversive plot
against the island that the CIA has already implemented in other
countries.
This story recounts the work of men and women in Cuban State Security
who,
together with other citizens like Cuban Dalexi González
Madruga, have confirmed that the intentions of the enemies of the
Revolution remain the same: to destroy it.
Seated at the entry to the
little bridge leading to El
Cayuelo, Dalexi González Madruga, once again ran over the
passwords that he had to give when an unknown person turned up: an
expected arrival that, for him, had made sleep hard to come by the
previous night.
It was a while after midday and the sun was beating down
on his face. He would have liked to have been with the others, enjoying
the surfing contest on that part of the Havana coast on the road to
Matanzas, near the town of Santa Cruz del Norte. But he couldn't forget
the "magic" words that he had
to say when the man approached him.
He was wearing, as instructed, a white T-shirt; Marcos,
his neighborhood friend who had been living in Spain for some time and
had gotten him into this, almost without consulting him, had more or
less told him, "The important thing is a white T-shirt."
Everything had started in January 2007, about 12 months
before. At that point, Marcos only told him that a friend would be
coming to see him. "Listen to him, he's coming to help you." He
silently wondered how a foreigner could help him.
He thought that it was just another of Marcos' things.
He had changed so much since moving to Spain, telling him that he was
into cell phones etc. Lately, it was almost only their shared devotion
to technology and business that sustained their friendship.
It never occurred to Dalexi that Marcos would send him a
person as weird as the one who knocked on his door.
It was all a matter of strange questions when the
visitor, Robert Guerra -- as he introduced himself without looking at
him directly -- arrived. The first thing that caught Dalexi's attention
was the question as to whether, from his flat roof on a hill in La
Víbora (a Havana district) he could make out the
U.S. Interests Section. He didn't like that question.
Just to make sure he was being very clear as
to his allegiances he curtly replied, "No, what is clearly visible
from my roof is the Russian embassy."
But Guerra didn't understand or that wasn't enough. He
spoke clear and fluent Spanish but with a foreign accent and Dalexi
felt so overwhelmed by the alarming significance of his conversation
that he didn't even ask him his nationality. He quickly realized that
there was something more than merely
technical questions behind the visit.
The conversation was laced with double meanings which
did not pass unnoticed by a telecommunications engineer like Dalexi.
Talking freely, both Guerra and Marcos confided to him
that earlier, they had toured various hotels, checking the state of
their wireless Internet connections as part of a study. This prompted
more suspicions in his mind, given that it was a matter of a foreigner
who looked like a tourist. Why was that
man so interested in how Cubans surfed the net?
Later, it was Guerra's insistence on talking about how
to obtain easy Internet access which, of course, is everyone's dream in
a country like Cuba, surrounded by underwater cables potentially
providing easy and rapid entry into cyberspace but whose use is banned
by the United States for a reason that
dates back 50 years: the blockade.
However, that was just a kind of apple of temptation.
Guerra's little inducement concealed a world of evil intentions, which
could be made material by installing all those CD programs, plug-ins,
browsers and other sophisticated software that he handed to Dalexi,
without his asking for them.
He was stunned by Guerra's insistence on his learning to
set up communication networks between two or more buildings in case
something happened and it was necessary to send information; you could
say that Guerra was obsessed with the subject. He showed Dalexi how to
enter websites without
access from national connections, doing so from a server outside the
country. Moreover, no one would be able to detect him.
Also evident was Guerra's desire to show Dalexi how to
encrypt messages. He even gave him a disk containing applications
capable of sending texts which, on radio waves, could be transmitted as
something similar to noise, and thus would be very hard to identify.
Robert Guerra's secretive leanings were laid bare before
Dalexi's eyes, more like a revelation. He tossed him more bait showing
him his cell phone: a creation of German intelligence services which
had just come onto the market and whose central attraction was that
encrypted messages could be sent
on it, likewise in normally inaccessible codes.
Evidently, Marcos had already agreed with Guerra on how
to get Dalexi involved in dirty work which was not proposed to him in
concrete terms, but for which they left him all the tools and the
suggestion.
Naturally, the only thing he did was to reveal his
concerns to somebody who could dispel them. Maybe Marcos and Guerra had
thought that the fact of working illegally presupposed that he was
capable of acting against his country?
As he was instructed, from that moment he strung along
the foreigner and Marcos to see where they were headed. His neighbor
arrived to propose, or rather impose an illegal connection.
Marcos, already back in Spain, sent him an email with an
urgent order to go to a remote location in Baracoa, at the other end of
the island, to pick up some antennas. What most surprised him later was
the confirmation of Marcos' description of that remote place, "where
there isn't a goddamn soul
about." But initially he refused to make such a long and dangerous trip.
Bathed by a warm March sun in 2008, he was now in the
middle of a surfing contest facing El Cayuelo, sitting on the little
bridge looking as if he had come out of the water. The new "tourist"
would know he was the man as soon as he saw the white T-shirt.
It wasn't long before the subject emerged from among the
surfers. He covered the approximately 50-meter wooden bridge in a few
strides and came to a halt beside him. He was the organizer of the
contest, promoted by a webpage. Blond and athletic, he had the
appearance and name of an American
from a Hollywood film studio: Barry.
The code words identifying him also seemed like
something out of a spy movie, but apart from being sent as a well-built
emulator of James Bond, he was very nervous. He evidently knew that he
was doing something illegal.
"How's the surf in the south of France," he asked
rapidly, with an obvious desire to get things over with. It was the
expected question. Dalexi replied with the correct password, and that
was enough.
They headed for a minibus parked a few meters away, and
Barry gave him four satellite dishes, camouflaged as surf boards,
together with a genuine article. A very good system to link into the
illicit Internet flow. Using an antenna, every user could connect to
various people and form those networks
with which Guerra was so obsessed.
Left: Dalexi in a
reconstruction of the events. Right: the antennas,
camouflaged as surf boards.
Espionage and Subversion
What Dalexi did not initially know was that the enemy
strategy was one of undermining from within and, at the same time,
using lies to create a scandal abroad. Establishing illegal networks in
Cuba is an attempt to form a parallel communications system on the
margin
of national institutions and authorities in order to incite people to
rebel, and then to find support abroad via campaigns demonizing their
state.
This is not something invented by a novice. It is a
modus operandi
carefully studied by the U.S. intelligence services and
already tried and tested with positive results in the so-called color
revolutions in certain Eastern European countries and in Iran. That is
how the questioning of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
victory in the June 12, 2009 presidential elections was put into
circulation and the people were incited to demonstrate, while the
protests were internationally presented as expressions of spontaneous
discontent.
A more recent example of this modus operandi has become
evident in response to popular uprisings in some countries in the
Middle East and North Africa.
Finally, subversive efforts to undermine the Cuban
Revolution are nothing new and are in receipt of strong financial
backing. These incidents are not isolated ones; the equipment might
change, but the objectives and methods remain the same.
One of the principal funding channels is USAID (the
ill-named U.S. Agency for International Development), whose Latin
American section is directed by Mark Feuerstein, a supposed opinion
poll expert who was head of the National Endowment Foundation (NED) in
Nicaragua in the 1990s. In
2002, he acted as presidential campaign advisor to Bolivian Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada, now a refugee in the United States given the
charges
against him in his home country for the massacre of 63 campesinos in
2003.
Now, exactly like under Bush, USAID remains the
multimillion-dollar mechanism for attacking and attempting to
destabilize, fragment and annex the island. From its creation, shortly
after the triumph of the Revolution, to date, it has always been the
visible face of yankee intelligence.
An internal audit of its Cuba Program revealed that,
from 1996 through September of 2007, it granted subsidies of $64
million to approximately 30 agencies.
Reports recently made public reveal that via the
annexationist Bush Plan, USAID channeled approximately $140 million,
excluding funds assigned to secret parties.
In spite of the acknowledged ineffectiveness of the
agencies it used, USAID reported to the U.S. Congress and government
that, prior to 2008, it infiltrated more than 80 international experts
into Cuba, distributed 10,000 shortwave radios, two million subversive
books and other informative material.
It was the immediate antecedent to cybernetic aggression.
Today, USAID openly boasts of giving support to the
extended activities of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, of
providing Internet access programs, while it acknowledges having
smuggled into the country "money, latest-generation laptops and other
means of communication."
For that, it utilizes direct and indirect methods,
including remittances, mules, embassies and diplomats in third
countries, not to mention giving international awards to mercenary
bloggers.
A reading of all the information concerning USAID
aggression against Cuba reveals a long list of illegal activities which
range from subsidies to ex-CIA agents or authentic terrorists, to the
trafficking of latest generation electronic equipment, the agency's
current obsession.
The dirty practice of utilizing Internet for political
intervention has been developed over a number of years, with an
increasing tendency in the wake of recent measures by the Barack Obama
administration, which inherited from George W. Bush the decision to
redirect the financing of subversion within
Cuba into the telecommunications sector.
The Fake Philanthropist
It wasn't exactly a disinterested benefactor with a
foreign businessman's resume who appeared at the home of Dalexi
González, leaving as a gift a suitcase full of computer
programs. His dossier was too fat for Dalexi not to at least suspect
something.
Robert Guerra is no less than the current head of the
aggressive cybernetics plan of Freedom House, the CIA organization
which, for decades, has mounted intelligence operations in Cuba,
financed by USAID through the NED -- a plan created by CIA agent Frank
Calzón's Center for a Free Cuba.
On April 19, 2010, Guerra spoke as a Freedom House
expert at an event organized by this group in conjunction with the
George W. Bush Institute, tellingly entitled the Global Cyber-Dissident
Movement, a propagandistic creation conceived and run by the CIA.
The 20-some panelists included Jeffrey Gedmin, head of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty -- two CIA broadcasting stations with a
long history of subversion; Daniel Baer, assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights and Work; Peter Ackerman, subversion expert
in Eastern Europe; Colombian
Oscar Morales Guevara, associated with the George W. Bush Institute's
Human Liberty program; as well as other mercenaries working on
cybernetic attacks unleashed by Washington around the world.
Guerra has a service record very similar to that of
other figures identified with U.S. intelligence agencies.
He studied in such places as the University of Western
Ontario, in London, Canada (1984-1988), and the University of Navarra
in Pamplona, Spain, (1991-1996), where he pursued a degree in medicine.
Although he has never practiced the profession, he has made forays into
the world of health.
He quickly became involved in computers and over the
course of several years created a network of companies which appear and
disappear, nevertheless all linked to the topics which are his current
specialty.
Thus, little by little, a hybrid image of a human rights
specialist linked to informatics was constructed. He became an expert
in the subversive use of the Internet and network security, even,
strangely enough, risk management in communication, censure, so-called
cyber-crimes and in methods used to
encrypt information, that is to say the coding of messages.
According to the needs of his tasks, he created real and
phantom entities until settling down with Privaterra, the Canadian
company with which he appeared in Havana. Privaterra would be defined
later as "a Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility project,"
a non-governmental organization
in Palo Alto, California, U.S.A.
Over the last several years, Guerra has participated in
many international conferences, always about these same topics and has
been linked with NGOs, or pseudo-NGOs and foundations with the
unmistakable trademark of U.S. intelligence services. He even managed
to get himself into the UN World
Summit on the Information Society as an advisor to the Canadian
delegation.
He took off his mask in April, 2009, when -- already
head
of Freedom House subversive informatics operations -- he made public
statements crudely defaming half a dozen countries, all opposed to the
hegemonic power of the United States, among them Russia and China.
He reserves his most vicious slander for Cuba. He
asserts that the country has "the most disastrous" situation on a world
scale, because practically no one on the island has Internet access,
and "it is where the use of the web is fiercely repressed with cruel
laws" and other arguments regularly disseminated
by the United States.
As is to be expected, he never mentions the measures
taken by Washington to prohibit Cuba's use of the latest generation
equipment and software or the fiber optic networks which surround the
island, obliging the country to resort to expensive satellite
connections.
Covert Surfing
Our country is accused of denying free Internet access;
however, many people do not know that the country's slow connection to
cyberspace is not the result of a Cuban government ruling, but a tactic
in the close to 50-year economic warfare against Cuba which makes it
impossible
to access a Washington-controlled network.
It was in 1996 that access to the worldwide web became
possible, but with political conditions: it is part of the package of
restrictions in the 1992 Torricelli
Act to 'democratize' Cuban society.
According to the legislation -- which is still in
effect --
every megabyte contracted out to U.S. companies has to be approved by
the Treasury Department; moreover, it establishes a whole range of
sanctions for any company, within or outside the United States, in
favor of electronic dealings or providing
a minimum economic benefit to Cuba in this context. Thus, any
connection from the island has to be via satellite, making it slower
and four times as expensive.
Within the current incitement to illegality, digital
sites offering guaranteed Internet access are being advertised from
Miami, with benefits including broadband, total discretion and
confidentiality because, as they say, the system is undetectable and
the dish can be easily camouflaged, and that clients
can surf without restrictions, see their family members on camera, use
Skype, set up Wi-Fi networks with up to 20 computers and connect calls.
New Methods, Old Strategy
When the Cuban militia defeated the Bay of Pigs
mercenaries, Washington think tanks realized that the Cuban problem
could not be solved by classical military aggression. The only way to
crush the nascent Revolution was by utilizing covert activities:
terrorism and
subversion. That was what the Cubans themselves had to destroy from
within. That was the context of the so-called Operation Mongoose.
The first step, initiated in 1959 itself, was the
official establishment of the blockade as a policy of asphyxiation, the
freezing of Cuban capital in U.S. banks and the elimination of the
sugar quota. That was compounded by a bevy of different laws
prohibiting any commercial transaction with the United
States involving products containing Cuban components, and vice-versa.
It is a veritable economic war which has punished third parties since
the Helms-Burton Act
internationalized the yankee obsession. It is a policy
which punishes the people whose "freedom and democracy" it claims to
defend. It not only denies them
latest generation medicines, but also slows the country's access to an
almost indispensable information and communication service.
Recently, the CIA has been seeking to provide Internet
connections to Cubans whom it selects to serve its intelligence
interests, in the style of the best covert actions.
At a time when voracious media campaigns are demonizing
the "Cuban regime," CIA plans are to utilize something as noble and
useful as the network of networks as a means of mounting a
destabilization operation to end the government of "the Castros."
While in the 1970s and '80s in Cuba, encoded messages
had
to be sent in Morse code or via illegally acquired shortwave radios,
there is now no need for such complications. It is enough to make use
of the applications which Robert Guerra handed over to Dalexi.
On the other hand, today's covert agents are entering
the country the way that he and Barry did: as tourists with baseball
caps and brightly colored T-shirts, the latter carrying an antenna
disguised as an inoffensive surf board under his arm.
The Homeland Has No Price
After the Cayuelo episode, Dalexi González
received additional packages. He was instructed to pick up certain
parts for the antennas on Havana's Almendares Bridge, to be found in a
seemingly discarded black plastic bag. He could not refuse, so he went
there, searched
and searched again above and under the bridge, among the bushes: but
there was nothing there. Later, he found out that the items were sent
with another U.S. tourist named Margaret, perhaps an envoy of Robert
Guerra.
If one thing was clear to Dalexi from the beginning, it
was that Marcos had strong financial backing behind him. He made sure
that every expense was covered by a receipt, which he kept carefully.
Those people checked and double checked, and were spending even more.
Their style of operating was
very flamboyant. And from the moment that Dalexi met Guerra, he knew
that they wanted to recruit him. Everything worked that way, like a spy
thriller in which he was being tested on a number of occasions.
"Given the way that things were developing, I soon
realized that they wanted to use me and, simply, I wasn't going to lend
myself to any activity of this kind. And so, I became Alejandro to the
enemy and Raúl to my country's State Security."
Cuba Is Not Against
Technology
Cuba is not against the use of technology, on the
contrary. The world is moving at a vertiginous speed in this direction,
but it requires order, control. Mounting satellite stations requires a
license, explains Carlos Martínez, director of the Control and
Supervision
Agency (ACS) attached to the Ministry of Informatics and Communications
(MIC). It is not about Cuba's exclusivity, but something which is
internationally stipulated.
Signed by 189 countries, the constitution of the
lnternational Telecommunication Union, a UN specialized agency,
acknowledges the sovereign right of states to regulate the sector.
For example, some countries charge for the television
service that is offered free of charge to our people. Others implement
a tax, that is their right. "Here, it is a regulation that all
satellite services must have a license," Martínez explains.
That is why ACS works hard on the detection of illegal
stations. In Cuba, use of the radio frequency spectrum is legislated by
Decree 135 of 1986.
In relation to satellite services, these are governed by
Decree 269 of 2000, which covers stations with access to artificial
earth satellites, transmission to and reception from these satellites,
or both, on any frequency band used."
That legislation also states the obligation to obtain an
ACS permit, issued in line with specific technical regulations.
Cuba has the technology to deal with any illegal act
related to the utilization of its airspace. It is expensive technology,
but the country has been obliged to acquire it, and which, linked to a
state body of inspectors, among other measures, closes the circuit on
violations.
Website: www.cpcml.ca
Email: editor@cpcml.ca
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