Paying Respect to the Firefighters Who Have Died
Fellow firefighters pay respects to firefighter killed August 3, 2024 fighting the Jasper wildfire.
Morgan Kitchen, a 24-year old wildland firefighter, died on August 3
after being struck by a falling tree while battling the massive Jasper
wildfire. Kitchen, who had just turned 24 years old was from Calgary
and was based out of the Alberta Wildfire's Rocky Fire Base. He had
previously
served as a volunteer firefighter and was working his first season as a
wildland firefighter. Fellow firefighters and first responders showed
their deep respect and paid tribute to Morgan by lining the procession
route out of Jasper National Park as Morgan's remains left the park.
Morgan died fighting a fire of unprecedented scale which destroyed more than a third of the town of Jasper. In a statement issued August 19, Parks Canada said it was proud to say the wildfire was "held," meaning it is no longer out of control, on Day 27 of the blaze, especially because this was achieved on the day of firefighter Morgan Kitchen's memorial in Calgary. TML sends sincere condolences to the family and friends of Morgan Kitchen. Paying tribute to those who lost their lives requires action to prevent more such deaths.
Reports on Deaths of Firefighters in 2023
Eight firefighters died in the unprecedented wildfire season in Canada in 2023. WorkSafeBC has recently issued reports on two of these deaths. The reports cite multiple violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. They provide proof that the safety of firefighters and the prevention of tragic workplace deaths require that the firefighters themselves exercise control over their working conditions, including wages and benefits.
Workers are well aware of how routine violations of safety protocols are normalized. Protocols exist on paper, but are routinely violated. Then when a tragedy takes place and a worker is injured or killed, the workers can be blamed for not following protocols.
Both reports pointed to a culture which normalizes risks around dangerous trees, despite the well-known danger posed and a documented history of failure to comply with requirements for dangerous tree assessments during firefighting operations. This is compounded when the "mainstream" media speak about how firefighters know the risks they are taking and that this is just "part of the job."
Devyn Gale was only 19 years old, but in her third season working for the BC Wildfire Service (BCWS) when she was killed when a burning tree fell on her. She was a third-year nursing student at the University of British Columbia Okanagan.
The WorkSafeBC report on Gale's death found no evidence that a dangerous tree assessment had been completed on the burning cedar at the site before the workers began their work, despite the fact that two firefighters had raised concerns about the tree. The report also identified gaps in the supervision of dangerous tree assessments and the training of young workers.
WorkSafeBC concluded that hazard management and supervision prior to the tragedy were "ineffective" and "inadequate" and that young, inexperienced firefighters were deployed to the area without sufficient training.
BC General Employees' Union (BCGEU) President Paul Finch released a statement in response to the report which concluded that, "...Processes like completing dangerous tree assessments and implementing safety training and orientation for new workers have fallen by the wayside due to an inability to retain experienced staff.
"The employer's failure to retain experienced staff means that many workers are put in dangerous situations. There is no substitute for experience fighting wildfires, and the Ministry needs to address the dire retention crisis currently facing BCWS. That starts with the Ministry reversing its current stated position that there is no retention issue among junior to mid level leadership positions, and working to take the appropriate steps to resolve the retention crisis."
Finch also pointed out that safety protocols are overlooked when staff are overworked, which is also a problem of recruitment and retention. More than half of all crew leaders in 2024 were in their first year in their position, he said.
WorkSafeBC also issued a report on the July 28 death of Zak Muise. Zak was working for contractor Big Cat Wildfire when he died in a utility vehicle crash in northern BC while fighting the massive Donnie Creek wildfire. He was 25 years old, and had come to BC from Ontario to work as a wildland firefighter. He was killed when the heavy-duty ATV he was riding in rolled over a steep drop on a gravel road in a remote area about 150 kilometres north of Fort St. John.
The report concludes that BCWS failed to adequately supervise the use of utility vehicles, lacked procedures and training about their operation and did not ensure they were inspected for safety.
For example, a netting system to keep occupants inside the utility vehicle in the event of a rollover was damaged and ineffective, something that would likely have been identified if a pre-use inspection had been carried out.
Wildfires are becoming more frequent, larger and higher-intensity. Treating wildland firefighting as a "gig" where low pay, minimal training, a transitory workforce, and seasonal work are the norm is highly irresponsible. Time and again it has been shown that it is the fight of the workers and their organizations to uphold safety standards which is decisive, otherwise even the existing protocols are not enforced. The safety of firefighters, of the Indigenous Peoples who are the most affected by fire in the forest, and all the communities in the forest and urban-forest interchange requires that decision-making be in the hands of the working people and Indigenous nations, not the forestry monopolies and governments which serve private interests. Putting the full weight of workers' organizations behind this issue can make a difference. All out to support the demands of the wildland firefighters for the conditions required for their health and safety!
This article was published in
September 27, 2024
Article Link:
https://cpcml.ca/ITN2024/Articles/TI54188.HTM
Website: www.cpcml.ca Email: editor@cpcml.ca