


**Corruption of Liberal Government Seen in Site C Dam Project**

**Main Aim of Site C Project Is  
to Pay the Rich**



**Corruption of Liberal Government Seen in Site C Dam Project**

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**Corruption of Liberal Government Seen in Site C Dam Project**

**Main Aim of Site C Project Is to Pay the Rich**

The aim of any endeavour is a major consideration. The BC provincial Liberal government has described the official aim of the Site C dam as the creation of jobs while satisfying a need for electricity in a growing economy by producing it in a green renewable way. Those aims could not be considered bad in themselves but they hide the fundamental aim of the project to pay the rich.



**Protest outside of court hearing in Vancouver regarding Site C dam, February 22, 2016. (R. Hales)**

The Liberal government portrays opposition to the Site C project as opposition to one or another of its declared aims. As far as jobs are concerned, any work requires workers so that can hardly be considered an aim in itself unless one speaks of employment as a right of all and at a Canadian standard, which would require the elimination of the labour market -- something the ruling imperialist elite refuse to do.

The aim the government touts of producing green electricity for a growing economy is essentially the same as that concerning the "run of river" private power projects. These were the first major privately-controlled projects for producing electricity in BC. The Liberal government tied BC Hydro to very high contracted prices to purchase the private power for years to come. BC Hydro is forced to export the private run of river electricity at market rates far below the contracted amount, as the produced electricity, mostly during the spring runoff, is surplus to provincial demand. BC Hydro passes this major burden on to individual BC purchasers of electricity through higher rates.

The problem with the government's stated aim for Site C is that it is subordinate to the main aim of making profit for private enterprise. Without discussing and analyzing the main aim and its consequences, a discussion of a subordinate aim becomes a diversion and mostly an ineffectual exercise.

Site C is a state-organized project to make and guarantee profit for private enterprise, mainly global construction, industrial and financial companies organized as oligopolies. It could be said that Site C is a state-organized project to pay the rich. That is the main aim, which dominates all other aspects.



No opposition has been allowed to stand in the way of the main aim. The Liberal government proponents of Site C have declared the opposition of Indigenous Nations, local farmers in the Peace River, environmentalists and other concerned members of the polity as being in opposition



to the aim of jobs, electrical power and a green alternative. No discussion is permitted to gain traction within the polity that would interfere with the fundamental aim to pay the rich. Critics of the project within civil society are summarily dismissed without engaging their arguments in broad serious discussion. The government deprives those affected by the project of their right to say no.

State-organized construction and financial contracts with private enterprises to construct the dam, supply the material and industrial machinery, and finance the project satisfy the main aim to pay the rich. Only large construction companies can bid on the main work, as the government demands amongst other things an upfront 10 per cent performance bond on the total contract. This is prohibitive for smaller local companies, which leaves them only with prospects for subcontracting work from the main construction companies. Construction and development contracts are budgeted at \$6.46 billion with six main contracts awarded.



The heavy machinery involved in construction is almost all produced outside Canada by monopolies such as Caterpillar and Kubota. The turbines and generators that transform the power from the water into electricity are purchased from abroad. For Site C, Voith Hydro Canada was awarded a \$470 million contract in March 2016 to supply and install six turbines, six generators and associated equipment. Voith Hydro (formerly Voith Siemens Hydro Power Generation with headquarters in Germany) is a joint venture between Voith and German monopoly Siemens, which is now a system supplier for hydropower stations. According to reports, one-third of the world's hydroelectric power is produced with turbines and generators

from Voith Hydro.

Additional construction is required for transmission lines to carry the electricity to major industrial sites and population centres. The budget for this aspect of the project is \$743 million bringing the total estimated budget to over \$9 billion.

The government is borrowing from the financial oligarchy all money for construction of the project. The estimate for interest payments on borrowed money for Site C during the construction period alone until 2024 is \$1.405 billion. The claim for interest profit from construction of the project will continue until the principal borrowed amount is paid in full. Interest profit and most of the enterprise profit will leave the economy of Northern BC and even Canada, as the companies involved are global oligopolies. The construction companies, as do the moneylenders, receive their claim on added-value before the project begins to receive any revenue from sale of the product the project produces, in this case electricity.

A pro-social alternative exists that would see most of the added-value workers produce remain in the BC and Canadian economy. Such an alternative would require an aim to stop paying the rich. State enterprises would finance, construct and manage the project using Canadian expertise, machinery, material and money borrowed from the state itself. With the aim of paying the rich out of the picture, a broad discussion could be centred on whether the project is necessary or not and whether it would serve the common good or not while upholding the rights of those affected to say no.

The recent UBC research report on Site C (see excerpts below) does not concern itself with the aim of the project to pay the rich but rather discusses the viability of the project as organized. The report contends the sale of the product from Site C under the overall aim to pay the rich will never generate enough revenue to return the price of production for the project and the interest claims on the borrowed money. In response, the proponents of the project consider that the dominant aim to pay the rich will have been satisfied and that is the point for the ruling imperialist elite.



The state will be left with a larger accumulated debt, which is then used as an excuse for the anti-social offensive on social programs and the living and working standards of Canadians. These infrastructure projects are not public projects serving the common good but rather state organized private projects serving the narrow interests of the financial oligarchy. The working class is charged by history to organize a new direction for the economy to stop paying the rich.

### **Note**

The provision of excess electricity in the North also exists as an inducement to major global private investors to advance their projects for mining, exploiting oil and gas reserves through shale fracturing, transporting oil and natural gas to the West Coast through pipelines, and transforming gas into Liquid Natural Gas for export. Those major projects to export Canadian raw material are all dominated by global oligopolies and their aim for private profit.


Once Site C is constructed, the collateral aim of jobs almost completely disappears leaving the economy in the North without an all-sided vibrant economy and community that has a foundation of manufacturing, social programs and public services.



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## **Irrational Economics of Site C Dam Project**

**- Peter Ewart -**



The BC Liberal government is plunging ahead with its controversial Site C dam project in the northeast of the province, despite more dire warnings from researchers and experts in the fields of energy and water, and broad community, Indigenous, and environmentalist opposition. Because of its colossal costs, as well as the importance of lower cost electricity to the BC economy, many feel this project could seriously harm or even destabilize the provincial economy in the future.

In that regard, on April 19, researchers with UBC's Program on Water Governance issued a report calling for a suspension of the construction of the Site C Dam on economic grounds.[1] Site C, a mega-project undertaken by BC Hydro and promoted by the BC Liberal government, is estimated to cost \$8.8 billion (and likely more after all costs are factored in), making it the largest public works infrastructure project in the province's history. One estimate puts the cost at about \$5000 per BC household.[2]

The researchers argue that the "business case" for the dam project is weak as a result of a "dramatic decline in projected energy needs," continued low prices in the US, and a significant reduction in the cost of alternative sources of electricity such as wind, solar, geothermal, and natural gas.

Once in operation, the dam will generate a 100 per cent surplus of electricity. This excess will extend for nearly a decade after commissioning, resulting in as much as a \$1 billion loss (in addition to construction costs).

The shortfall will have to be made up for by BC Hydro which likely means dramatically jacked up power rates for home, commercial and industrial users across the province.

In the opinion of the researchers, suspending the construction of Site C (and having the project reviewed by the BC Utilities Commission) is still within the realm of possibility economically speaking. Using BC Hydro's own figures, either suspending or canceling the project "would save between \$500 million and \$1.65 billion, depending on future conditions."



**Many hundreds of people from across BC have come forward to express their views on Site C and have a say on matters that affect their lives, but they are blocked by the political system. Photo shows hundreds of "Stake in the Peace" stakes purchased by BC residents and planted at a farm in Bear Flat along the Peace River, with money going to fund the resistance to the Site C project.**

In their conclusions, the researchers note that without a suspension or cancellation, the economic



risks of Site C will likely only magnify as time goes on.

This particular report is just the latest in a number of reviews and reports, as well as expert statements, slamming the Site C project as an economic boondoggle and potential disaster. Indeed, even sections of the corporate establishment have expressed their doubts in past years.

In the early 1980s, BC Hydro put forward a proposal to build a Site C dam. However, the BC Utilities Commission, a regulatory body established by the provincial government, recommended the dam proposal be rejected on the grounds that it was not needed then, and that BC Hydro's forecasting of electricity demand was faulty.

In the late 1980s, the proposal was resuscitated; but, by 1993, even the head of BC Hydro at that time, Marc Eliesen declared that the Site C project was dead, because "the fiscal exposure [was] too great ... the dam too costly" and the environmental impact unacceptable.[3]



However, despite previous verdicts and longstanding opposition from various quarters, the BC Liberal government in 2010 announced to the surprise of many that Site C was "on again" as a "clean energy project." The government also announced that Site C and various other projects would be exempted from review by the BC Utilities Commission. In making the decision, then-Premier Campbell claimed that demand for power was to increase by 20 to 40 per cent in BC over the next two decades. This claim has subsequently been proven wrong as electrical energy demand has

remained more or less flat since 2005.

In 2013, a Joint Review Panel was commissioned by the federal and provincial governments to review the proposal.[4] It concluded that BC "will need new energy and new capacity at some point" and that Site C would be the "least expensive of the alternatives." But it also stated that BC Hydro "had not fully demonstrated the need for the project on the timetable set forth" and recommended that the project demand estimate and other aspects be referred to the BC Utilities Commission for review.

Since then, Dr. Harry Swain, former Chair of the Joint Review Panel, has come out fully against the project arguing that the electrical power will not be needed and that the government's failure to explore alternative energy sources amounts to a "dereliction of duty." [5] He has further stated that "people are going to wind up paying for a stranded asset through their taxes for years and years to come. Hydro will not have the financial capacity to pay it, so it will fall the guarantors of their debt, that is, the taxpayers." [6]

Internationally recognized energy expert Robert McCullough and economist Dr. Murray Shaffer issued a research report in 2013 that concluded "there is not a need and justification for Site C as proposed by BC Hydro" and that there were far cheaper energy alternatives.[7]

For his part, Marc Eliesen, who is no longer with BC Hydro, has also become a fierce critic, predicting that the final cost "will be in the range of \$11 to \$12 billion," that the dam project "is scheduled to become a big white elephant," [8] that the project is "totally irrational," and that it "does not make any economic sense." [9]

David Austin, a lawyer who specializes in energy issues, was able to cross examine BC Hydro executives in front of the BC Utilities Commission in August 2016. In the course of the cross examination, the executives revealed the astounding news that the Site C project would not be paid off for 70 years after it is finished (in 2024). Austin noted that the provincial government was proceeding from "a completely unorthodox financial analysis" and that "you just don't do that in this day and age." [10]



While some sections of the corporate establishment, like the BC Chamber of Commerce, have expressed full support for the Site C project, other sections over the years have expressed reservations or have come out in direct opposition. For example, Richard Stout, the then-executive director of the Association of Major Power Customers of BC, stated in 2014 that the "original load forecasts [put forward by BC Hydro] are going to be wrong" and that "it's not the right project right now." [11] The Association is made up of some of the largest BC Hydro customers including pulp & paper, solid wood, mining, electrochemical and petrochemical corporations representing about 20 per cent of the domestic electricity load in BC.

Another former executive director of the Association, Dan Potts, argues that "the huge cost [of Site C] will rob the province of valuable resources that could be used to deliver other needed government services as well as burden the BC economy with debt and high electric power rates that will sap our competitiveness." [12]

Since 2014, the Association has not made any further statements about Site C, either for or against. However, Stout and Potts continue to speak out strongly against the project.

What has become clear is that sections of the corporate establishment have clashing interests in regards to Site C, with the government favouring certain sectors over others, and the oligarchs over everyone else. For example, the BC Liberal government has promised liquefied natural gas exporters and fracking companies electrical power from the Site C dam to be provided at below cost. [13]

Yet other sectors of industry have expressed worries about future power costs for them. For example, the Canfor Taylor pulp mill is one of the major customers for electricity generated by BC Hydro. Craig Thomson, energy and environment supervisor at the mill, was quoted in 2014 as saying that "industry in BC was built with a foundation of low power rates, but in the last five years that has changed and Site C would be the final straw .... Possibly it's going to drive our industry out of business." [14]

Interestingly, in 2015, Susan Yurkovich, who was executive vice president at BC Hydro, and led the development of the Site C project, left that position and became president of the Council of Forest Industries, an organization that includes many of the major customers of BC Hydro, some of whom would likely also have been members of the Association of Major Power Customers of BC. As noted before, the Association, although speaking out against Site C in 2014, has been quiet about it since then. Was this the result of some kind of compromise or deal struck between the BC government, BC Hydro and the major power customers? If so, that is similar to what happened

when BC Rail was privatized. In that case, it seems the big forest companies were given lower shipping rates for a period of time in exchange for holding back their concerns about the rail sell-off.

For its part, the news website Business in Vancouver published an editorial in 2015 arguing that "the potential for runaway costs on Site C is significant, and the rationale for investing in the megaproject remains questionable." [15]



Over the years, Site C proponents, including BC Hydro and the BC government, have put forward various, often shifting, reasons to justify the construction of the dam, including meeting future provincial energy needs, supplying fracking operations and the LNG industry, creating jobs, and exporting power to Alberta and the U.S. But the purpose of this huge and costly mega-project remains hazy with many observers and critics left scratching their heads. Certainly, when stacked up against the greater good of the province and its people, it is irrational and reckless.

In determining the purpose, perhaps a better idea is to ask the question: Who benefits from this potential stranded asset? Certainly, the monopolies constructing the dam will profit hugely, as will the banks and institutions financing it, and the oil and gas industries which will receive power likely at greatly reduced rates. [16]

So why is the BC government continuing to push ahead with the controversial project? Is this a case of a faction of the financial oligarchy, in league with government, seizing control of a publicly-owned asset for its own narrow interests in defiance of the public interest and even other sections of the oligarchy? Is it yet another example where the oligarchy has discarded the old regulatory structures (like the BC Utilities Commission) that were used in the past for sorting out inter-oligarchic contradictions, as well as giving an appearance of public oversight?

Now what tended to be hidden before has erupted into an open "law of the jungle" situation where the winner takes all and damn the consequences, no matter the destruction wrought upon the economy and people of the province by an out-of-control faction of the financial oligarchy.

Such capture of a public enterprise by private interests has already happened in British Columbia and Canada many times over the last several decades, one of the most notorious examples being the takeover of BC Rail, a Crown corporation, by the private North American monopoly CN Rail.

Indeed, this may well be the ultimate aim of burdening BC Hydro with huge debt and stranded



assets like Site C; that is, to eventually break up, sell off and privatize the public enterprise. This privatization is already well on its way. Since 2002, the BC Liberal government has ordered all new power projects (with the exception of Site C) "to be privately built and financed with the new power contracted to BC Hydro at high guaranteed rates."<sup>[17]</sup>

Given the evidence, it is entirely reasonable that the Site C dam project be halted immediately on economic grounds, let alone the very legitimate other concerns of Indigenous peoples, farmers and environmentalists.

It is also entirely reasonable, and a growing necessity, that British Columbians and Canadians need a new direction for the economy. A direction in which we, rather than out-of-control financial oligarchs, have control over our future. A direction that strengthens the public interest rather than the irrational and reckless schemes and private factional interests of the oligarchy.

*Peter Ewart is a columnist and writer based in Prince George, British Columbia. He can be reached at: [peter.ewart@shaw.ca](mailto:peter.ewart@shaw.ca)*

## Notes

1. R. Hendriks, P. Raphals and K. Bakker, "Reassessing the need for Site C," Program on Water Governance, University of British Columbia. 2017.
2. "A tremendous cost," [www.justthedamfacts.ca](http://www.justthedamfacts.ca).
3. Marc Eliesen, quoted in "Four decades and counting: a brief history of the Site C dam," DeSmog Canada, March 23, 2017.
4. Report of the Joint Review Panel. Minister of Environment, Government of Canada & BC Minister of Environment. May 2014.
5. Harry Swain, quoted in [Stakeinthepeace.com](http://Stakeinthepeace.com).
6. Harry Swain, quoted in "Hydro bill madness," Sierra Club BC, March 2017.
7. Marvin Shaffer, "Assessment of the need for and alternatives to the Site C project." Peace Valley Environmental Association, November 25, 2013.
8. Marc Eliesen, quoted in "Hydro bill madness," Sierra Club BC. March 2017.
9. Marc Eliesen, quoted in "They're killing the Peace River Valley now," Andrew Nikiforuk, *The Tyee*, December 17, 2015.
10. David Austin, quoted in "Taxpayers on the hook for Site C dam until 2094," Nelson Bennett, Business in Vancouver, November 1, 2016.
11. Richard Stout, quoted in "B.C. Business Community Slams 'Astronomical' Cost of Building Site C Dam," Judith Lavoie, DesmogCanada, June 10, 2014.
12. Dan Potts, quoted in "Site C dam: A waste of your money," Peace Valley Environmental Association.
13. "Hydro bill madness," Sierra Club BC, March 2017.
14. Craig Thomson, quoted in "B.C. Business Community Slams 'Astronomical' Cost of

Building Site C Dam," Judith Lavoie, DesmogCanada, June 10, 2014.

15. "Cost uncertainty a Site C certainty," Editorial, Business in Vancouver, December 1, 2015.

16. "Executive decree hands billions to monopolies to construct and finance Site C dam," *BC Worker*, February 23, 2016.

17. Edith Cohen, "Liberal government cover-up," *BC Worker*. Feb. 5, 2014.



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## UBC Research Questions Viability of Site C Project

A new report, the latest in a series of five into the construction of the Site C hydroelectric dam on the Peace River, questions the feasibility of the project and calls for its suspension. The report prepared by UBC researchers suggests its immediate suspension and possible cancellation pending a review by the BC Utilities Commission. The report finds that provincial demand will not meet the additional electrical supply and that the market price of the surplus electricity when exported would be less than its price of production. The losses from the project would continue to mount as the original borrowed principal required for construction of the project plus interest would have to be paid without sufficient income to meet the amount.

The report, *Reassessing the Need for Site C* is the fifth in a series produced by the Program on Water Governance at the University of British Columbia. All the reports are available [here](#).

### **UBC Researchers Call for Suspension of Site C Construction; Report says Site C is Uneconomic**

An April 18 University of BC news release states:

"In a comprehensive analysis of the hydroelectric project on the Peace River in northeastern B.C., the report's authors say Site C is now much more expensive than an alternative consisting primarily of wind power, pumped storage, and energy conservation. They conclude that it would be wise to suspend construction, and recommend a full review by the BC Utilities Commission. [...]"

"[T]he UBC researchers say that their analysis incorporates several key changes since Site C was approved, including a decline in the cost of alternatives such as wind power, and a substantial reduction in BC Hydro's forecasted need for electricity in 2024 and beyond. [...]"

"[A]ccording to BC Hydro's own forecasts, predicted electricity demand has dropped significantly. Site C electricity will not be fully required for nearly a decade after the project is finished [2034], and if demand growth does not keep up with BC Hydro's current forecasts, power from Site C could remain in surplus indefinitely."

Karen Bakker, coauthor of the UBC report, said, "The surplus energy from Site C will have to be exported at prices currently far below cost. Our analysis shows that under some of the most likely forecasts, losses from these exports will total \$1 billion or more. BC Hydro's own forecasts show that electricity demand will be relatively modest into the 2030s, even including anticipated demands from LNG and electrification of cars."

The press release states:

"The report also demonstrates that BC Hydro is significantly curtailing its energy conservation programs in response to Site C's projected energy surplus. Producing new energy with Site C costs three times as much as energy conservation. But energy conservation could meet a significant amount of new demand for several years, said Bakker.

"In an earlier report, the authors called on the provincial and federal governments to determine the full impact of the project on treaty rights of the Treaty 8 First Nations who live in the Peace River region."

Gordon Christie, professor in the Peter A. Allard School of Law at UBC, stated: "Although these communities' rights are constitutionally protected, we believe they have been systematically downplayed -- even ignored -- by governments. This demonstrates a profound lack of honourable activity by the Crown, where the legal tests in this country now rest on the notion of the 'honour of the Crown.'"

The new report recommends that construction be suspended on Site C, pending a full review by the BC Utilities Commission. While the report states that cancelling the Site C Project outright would save British Columbians hundreds of millions of dollars, delaying the commissioning date to the late 2020s is also a possible scenario, said Bakker.

"Therefore, we recommend suspension and review by the BC Utilities Commission rather than outright cancellation," said Bakker. "This is a non partisan, common sense, sober second thought analysis that indicates it's not too late to hit pause on Site C."

### **BC Liberal Leader Clark Dismisses Authors of UBC Site C Report**

While campaigning in the provincial election, Liberal Premier Christy Clark refused to discuss the recent UBC report on the Site C dam infrastructure project. The Liberal government is the loudest official proponent of the project, which has a budget of \$8.3 billion, the largest infrastructure project currently underway in Canada.

During an election campaign stop in Fort St. John on April 18, BC Liberal Leader Clark refused to discuss the facts in the report and its arguments calling for the suspension of Site C's construction. Instead, she turned on the authors and questioned their credibility as qualified researchers saying, "I think professional electricity planners in that field are better qualified to make the estimates about how much energy we're going to need in 10 years than academics at UBC who are probably not in the field of electricity use at all."

The dismissive response of the Premier exposes a serious problem with the current state of politics. The polity is blocked from being informed. Without information and extensive discussion on issues, the polity is denied crucial information on the direction of the economy and the actions of the rulers. Attempts to bring the rulers to account for their decisions and actions are summarily dismissed. This reveals that the rulers are unfit to rule and that the political system deprives the people of their right to bring the rulers to account and to control those affairs that affect their lives.

### **Who Are the Site C Authors Liberal Leader Clark Casually Dismissed?**

The report contains the following about the authors whom the Premier suggests do not have any expertise on the issue of electrical production:

#### ***About the Authors:***

"Dr. Karen Bakker is Professor, Canada Research Chair, and Founding Director of the Program on



Water Governance at the University of British Columbia ([www.watergovernance.ca](http://www.watergovernance.ca)). The author of over 100 academic publications on water-related issues, Dr. Bakker has acted as an advisor and consultant to national and international organizations in North America, Europe, and southeast Asia for the past two decades.

"Richard Hendriks is the director of Camerado Energy Consulting, an Ontario-based firm providing environmental assessment, energy planning, policy analysis, and research services to clients across Canada. For the past two decades, he has been engaged in the planning and assessment of several large-scale hydroelectric developments, and provided testimony before regulatory bodies concerning their economic viability, environmental effects, socio-economic impacts and implications for Indigenous rights.

"Philip Raphals is cofounder and executive director of the Helios Centre, a non-profit energy research and consulting group based in Montreal. Over the last 25 years, he has written extensively on issues related to hydropower and competitive energy markets, and has appeared many times as an expert witness before energy and environmental regulators in several provinces."

***Reviewers:***

"This report was independently reviewed by:

"Ian Goodman (President, The Goodman Group)

"Dr. Norman Mousseau (Professor, Université de Montréal and Director, Trottier Energy Institute)

"Dr. Mark Winfield (Professor and Co-Chair, Sustainable Energy Institute, York University)"

## **Reassessing the Need for Site C**

The following excerpts are from the Executive Summary of the Report prepared by the Program on Water Governance, at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver:

"The Government of British Columbia and its wholly owned utility, BC Hydro, have embarked on an \$8.3 billion large-scale hydroelectric project at Site C on the Peace River in northeastern British Columbia. The Project is currently in the early stages of construction with a scheduled commissioning date of 2024....

"The Report incorporates into our analysis several key changed circumstances since the initial comparison of the Site C Project with the alternatives was performed by BC Hydro in 2013. These include: a decline in the cost of the alternative resources to the Site C Project (including wind); a substantial reduction in BC Hydro's forecasted need for electricity in 2024 and beyond; and an increase in the cost of the Site C Project.

"**Our analysis:** We analyze whether it would be economically preferable to a) complete, b) cancel or c) suspend the Project. We examine these three options in the context of different forecasts for electricity requirements, possible cost overruns in the Site C Project, different levels of conservation and efficiency, and a range of electricity prices in the electricity export markets. We also consider whether cancelling the Site C Project is preferable to suspending the Project. Our analysis considers that BC Hydro will have spent \$1.87 billion as of June 30, 2017, and that cancelling or suspending the Project will entail additional construction cancellation, demobilization, and suspension costs.

"**Our findings are:** 1) The decision to approve the Site C Project in 2014 will cost ratepayers on

the order of \$1.4 to \$1.7 billion dollars more than had an alternative portfolio of resources been pursued at that time. 2) Our analysis indicates that cancelling the Site C Project as of June 30, 2017 would save between \$500 million and \$1.65 billion, depending on future conditions. 3) Suspending the Site C Project is preferable to cancelling the Project by up to \$350 million. Both cancelling and suspending are preferable to continuing with the Site C Project.

**"Our recommendation is:** Suspend the Site C Project, and refer the Project to the BC Utilities Commission for a full review."



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### Coming Events

## All Out for May Day 2017!

### Vancouver

March -- 5:00 pm

Gather at Clark Park, 14th and Commercial Dr.

Rally -- 6:00 pm

Grandview Park

*Vancouver District and Labour Council*



The poster features a blue diagonal banner on the left that reads "Be Part of the Change" in white. To the right of this banner are illustrations of two monarch butterflies and a caterpillar on a leaf. The main title "May Day 2017" is in large green letters, followed by "International Day of the Worker" in a similar green font. Below this, the date "May 1, 2017" and the day "Monday" are listed in bold black text, followed by "MARCH & RALLY" in large bold black letters. A list of events follows: "5:00 pm - Gather at Clark Park (Commercial Dr & 14th)", "5:30 pm - March to Grandview Park", and "6:00 pm - Rally". A green diagonal banner on the right side of the event list reads "Family friendly" march led by Carnival Band. At the bottom, a blue banner says "Bring your signs, flags, and banners!". A small "movetop" logo is in the bottom right corner.

**Be Part of the Change**

**May Day 2017**

**International Day of the Worker**

**May 1, 2017**  
**Monday**  
**MARCH & RALLY**

5:00 pm - Gather at Clark Park  
(Commercial Dr & 14th)

5:30 pm - March to Grandview Park

6:00 pm - Rally

**"Family friendly" march  
led by Carnival Band.**

**Bring your signs, flags, and banners!**

movetop

**Prince George**

**8th Annual May Day Dinner and Celebration**

**5:30 pm**

**Coast Inn of the North, 770 Brunswick St.**

***Organized by May Day Organizing Committee***

***Information: (250) 563-9999***

**For May Day events across Canada, [click here](#).**



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